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Abstract 
Credit risk management is becoming more and more important in recent years. Credit risk 
refers to the risk that an obligor fails to make payments on any type of debt at the time of 
maturity. Credit risk models are statistical tools to infer the future default probabilities and 
loss distribution of values of a portfolio of debts. This doctoral thesis focus on the application 
of credit risk management in different areas. 
To better understand the credit risk management, in the first chapter, we introduce the 
basic ideas in credit risk management and review the models developed in the last decades. 
To empirical test the performance of models reviewed in the first chapter, in the second 
chapter, we compare the reduce-form model with the structural model based on the China’s 
stock market. It turns out that both models contribute to explaining the default risk of listed 
firms, however, reduce-form model outperformances the structural model. The empirical 
results from the second chapter suggests that reduce-form model can better predict the firm’s 
default risk, but the correlated default risk between firms has not been answered yet. So 
therefore in the third chapter, we investigate the correlated default risk using copula theory 
which has been introduced in the first chapter. Based on the insurances firms and other 
financial firms in the US market, both short-term and long-term default dynamic correlations 
are found. Another interesting finding from the third chapter is that insurance firms which 
were considered to be stable actually have higher default risk. This motive us to further 
explore the determinants of default risk of insurance firms in the fourth chapter and new risk 
factors (macroeconomic and insurance-specific variables) are found.  
The first chapter of this thesis provides a comprehensive review of recent developments 
of credit risk models and important empirical research in the large and growing finance and 
economics literature. This chapter first briefly introduces the definition and properties of 
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credit risk models as well as several related concepts. Then reviews model selection tests for 
credit risk models in the literature. At last, interesting topics for further research is suggested. 
The remaining three chapters investigate applications of credit risk modelling in three 
topics: credit risk of public listed firms, systemic risk within insurance and financial sectors 
and credit risk determinants for general insurance industry. 
Chapter two investigates the credit risk of public listed firms in China. There are few 
papers on the credit risk for public listed firms due to the lack of default data in China. For 
this reason, we construct the unique default dataset of Chinese public firms from 1999 to 
2013. We explore the determinants of firm failure using both firm-specific and 
macroeconomic covariates by the multinomial logit model. We find a distinct difference in 
firm-specific variables between post-default and tranquil times. The results show that both 
binomial and multivariate logit models outperform the KMV-Merton structural model. Our 
result is surprisingly different from the US market, and it turns out that some traditional 
determinants of credit risk, for example, profitability, are not significant in China’s market. 
Unlike the US market, firms who are holding more liquid assets, are more likely to default 
in good market condition (low interest rate and high index return). In addition, we find the 
special treatment (ST) which is commonly used in previous literature may not be good 
default proxy for China’s market. We also investigate if a high PD leads a firm to be delisted 
out of the stock market. The results show no clear difference of default probability between 
active firms and delist firms in recent years. 
Chapter three investigates the linkage between the insurance and financial sectors based 
on the default probability for individual firms. Time-varying symmetric correlations 
between these two sectors are found for both short-term and long-term horizons. We 
investigate the joint default risk between insurance firms and other financial institutions 
using student t copula with the generalized autoregressive score model (GAS) with skewed 
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t and empirical distribution function (EDF) marginal distribution. We find the existence of 
a time-varying correlation between these two sectors which indicating a dynamic and 
symmetric dependence. And this correlation varies widely in different time horizons, the 
negative correlation is found in the 1-month horizon. Short-term correlations are relatively 
lower but more fluctuating while the long-term correlations suggest that insurance and 
financial firms are positively correlated. We find economic drivers of the movement of 
insurance and finance industries by regressing the copula correlations with macroeconomic 
variables. By using the cupula correlations, we can also simulate the joint default probability 
for the two sectors. In addition, we find the joint PD between these two sectors are very 
sensitive to global financial market events. 
Chapter four applies reduced form model to access the credit risk of general insurance 
(non-life) firms in the United Kingdom. This paper extends previous research of credit risk 
of insurance industry in UK market by using a much larger database and more risk factors. 
New risk factors, both macroeconomic and firm-specific variables, are found in assessing 
the credit risk of general insurance firms. In addition, we firstly consider both insolvency 
and other exit like transferring business when modelling the default process for insurance 
firms to avoid censoring bias. Our research firstly applies 30 years’ regulation data of 515 
firms to assess credit risk of UK insurance industry. With the support by Bank of England, 
we study and identify insolvent events from different data sources. Though business 
concentration is not the determinant of insolvency, our analysis of firms’ PD with different 
business lines shows significant differences, especially when natural disasters happened. 
Also we firstly analyse system risk of general insurance industry in UK using more than 300 
individual firms’ PD and find slight joint default risk. At last, we further study the 
relationship between reinsurance assumed and credit risk of GI firms. The empirical results 
v 
 
may provide implications to regulators of the GI firms’ supervision under the coming 
Solvency II. 
Chapter Five concludes with recommendations for further study. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Credit Risk Management in Finance and 
Economics: A Comprehensive Survey 
 
Credit risk refers to the probability of loss due to an obligor’s failure to make 
payments on any type of debt at maturity. The global financial crisis，the credit 
crunch and the European debt crisis that followed put credit risk management into the 
regulatory spotlight. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review 
of recent developments in credit risk models and some important applications in 
systemic risk management by the Copula theory. First, we briefly introduce the credit 
scoring model, which is an accounting-based model. Second, we review the 
development of widely used structural models and discuss their advantages and 
limitations. Third, we provide a comprehensive review of recently developed 
reduced-form models in multi-period forecasting. Finally, we discuss copula-based 
models in joint default risk modelling. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of credit risk management cannot be overstated. Credit risk refers to the risk 
of an obligor failing to make payments on any type of debt at the time of maturity. Credit 
risk models are statistical tools to infer the future default probabilities and loss distribution 
of values of a portfolio of debts.  
2. Credit Scoring Models 
Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968) study corporate bankruptcy prediction models 
which relied on accounting-based measures as variables. Recent accounting-based models 
use composite measures that statistically combine several accounting variables, such as 
Altman (1968) Z-Score and Ohlson (1980) O-Score.  
The widely used Z-score indicates the probability of a company entering bankruptcy 
within the next two years. The higher score, the lower the probability of firm’s bankruptcy. 
A score above 3 indicates bankruptcy is unlikely; below 1.8 means bankruptcy is probable.  
Altman's Z-Score for US firms calculated in the following: 
 
Altman′s Z − Score
= 1.2 ∗ (Working Capital Total Assets⁄ ) + 1.4
∗ (Retained Earnings Total Assets⁄ ) + 3.3
∗ (EBIT Total Assets⁄ ) + 0.6
∗ (Market Value of Euquity Total Liabilities⁄ )
+ (Sales Total Assets⁄ ). 
(1.1) 
There are some clear drawbacks of credit scoring models: for example, the historical data 
used in credit scoring models doesn’t necessarily contain enough information to estimate 
future performance, and the fixed value of firm’s asserts and debts could affect the accuracy 
when measuring the threshold of default. Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue that there are several 
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problems when modelling probability of default based on accounting data. Firstly, the 
estimates of probability of default are the likelihood of future events, but financial statements 
are designed to measure past performance of a firm. As a result, the accounting data may not 
be indicative of the future status of the firm. Secondly, the predictive ability of these models 
is limited by their design. Financial statements are designed based on the going-concern 
assumption, which assumes the firm will not default. Thirdly, due to the conservatism 
principle, fixed assets and intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative to their market 
prices. Downward-biased asset valuations will cause accounting-based leverage measures to 
be overstated.  
In addition, asset volatility is ignored in accounting-based default prediction models. 
Volatility is a critical factor in asset pricing models, and price of assets are crucially 
important when estimating the default probability, however it is omitted in both the Altman 
(1968) and Ohlson (1980) corporate default prediction models. Campbell et al. (2001) argue 
that since firms exhibit considerable cross-sectional variation in volatility, the omission of 
volatility measurement in the accounting-based models may lead to a substantial reduction 
in their prediction accuracy. Without incorporating volatility into the model, the model will 
fail to capture the likelihood of whether the firm’s assets’ value will below its debts in a 
dynamic way. High volatility will increase the probability of default. For example, two 
identical firms with same financial statements ratios can have very different probability of 
default depending on their asset volatilities. Obviously, credit scoring models are easy to 
implement but have lower prediction accuracy compared to other models.  But volatility of 
assets and debts should be incorporated into the models and market-risk factors should be 
introduced to the models, which may substantially improve the estimation accuracy. 
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3. Structural Models 
Structural models are also called market-based models that provide an alternative and 
potentially superior source of firm’s information compared to credit scoring models. 
Structural models are widely used to model firm’s credit risk. The information contained in 
the financial statements may not be enough to estimate future default probabilities accurately. 
Besides the financial statements, structural models add stock prices which aggregate 
information from the market into the models. Beaver (1968) has recognized the potential 
default-related information contained in the market variables. Cheung (1991) and Dhaliwal 
et al (1992) argue that structural models provide a natural starting point to extract the 
probability of default related information from market prices.  
Since the 1970s, many structural models have been developed to forecast and price credit 
risk. The methodology of these models, which is based on Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1974), is to consider corporate liabilities as contingent claims on the assets of the 
firms. Merton (1974) first applied option theory to derive the value of a firm’s liabilities in 
the presence of default, considering only one single type of debt. As a result, structural 
models are also called Merton models. Merton also adds some restrictions on corporate debt, 
such as the firm cannot issue any new debt and bondholders will not receive any cash 
dividend from the firm. The probability of default is embedded in the structural models. Both 
volatility of assets and total liabilities are key variables in the option-pricing models. The 
firm’s equity value can be viewed as a call option on the value of the firm’s assets. Default 
will occur if the asset value which is the value of the firm is not enough to cover the firm’s 
liabilities. When the asset value falls behind the liabilities value, there is no value of holding 
equity.  If the value of the equity is zero or negative, the firm cannot fully cover creditors’ 
claims. As a result, the firm is in default.  
18 
 
The interest rate in structural models used to be non-stochastic. Interest rates are treated 
as non-stochastic processes in the first generation structural-form models (see Black and Cox, 
1976; Geske, 1977; Leland and Toft, 1996). It’s a very strong assumption and the fixed 
interest rates cannot be hold in reality. As a result, a stochastic process of the interest rates 
has been introduced many researchers (see Nielsen et al. 1993; Longstaff and Schwartz, 
1995). Hillegeist et al (2004) suggest that the main advantages of using structural models in 
default prediction are that the models provide guidance about the theoretical determinants of 
default risk and they supply the structure to extract default-related information from market 
prices. However, in practice, many simple assumptions of the models cannot be hold. Any 
violations of the assumptions will introduce errors and biases into the resulting probability 
of default estimates. Another shortcoming of these option-based models is that the stock 
price may not efficiently include all publicly-available default-related information. Sloan 
(1996) argues exactly this, that the market does not accurately include all of the information 
in financial statements. Thus, Hillegeist et al (2004) propose that whether the market-based 
default models or the accounting-based default models can achieve better estimates is 
ultimately an empirical question 
 
3.1 First Generation Structural Models  
The first generation structural models are based on Merton (1974). The Merton models 
follow Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing theory. The default occurs if the value of the 
firms’ assets falls below a critical value L which is calculated based on the firm’s short-term 
and long-term liabilities. 
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The models consider firms as a call option, and total value of asset A is financed from 
the market with value of equity E and a zero-coupon bond with notional value F and maturity 
at time T1.  
Whether a firm will default or not will be assessed only at end of time T, which means 
the default can only happen at maturity time T. A firm will go bankrupt when the value of 
assets is below the value of its liabilities L at the maturity.   
The key assumption of the structural-form model is that the stock price follows an 
independently log normal distribution with annual volatility 𝜎 and the following parameters: 
 InAt~N(InAt + (μ −
σ2
2
) (T − t), σ2(T − t)), (1.2) 
If the asset value A falls below the liability value L, the value of equity E will be zero, 
the payoff to equity holders described as: 
 Et = max(0, AT − L), (1.3) 
  The equity value E can be calculated using the standard Black–Scholes European call 
option formula: 
 Et=At ∙ ∅(d1) − Le
−r(T−t)∅(d2), (1.4) 
where: 
 d1 =
ln(
At
L
)+(r+
σ2
2
)(T−t)
σ√T−t
 And d2 = d1 − σ√T − t, 
(1.5) 
After values of 𝐿, At μ,and σ
2 are calculated, the probability of default can be estimated 
by: 
 Pr(Default) = ∅(
InL−LnAt−(μ−
σ2
2
)(T−t)
σ√T−t
), (1.6) 
                                                          
1 There will be no payments until the maturity time T.  There will also be no dividends payment. 
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The three the unknown parameters will be estimated, which are μ  (i.e. the annual 
expected asset returns), σ (i.e. the annual asset volatility) and At (i.e. market value of assets 
at time t). 
The distance to default (DTD) which is the deviation of asset value from the default point 
L can be calculated in the following: 
 DTD =
InAt+(μ−
σ2
2
)(T−t)−InL
σ√T−t
, (1.7) 
 
 
The Merton’s model considers the firm as a European call option and this method bear 
the same assumptions by Black and Scholes (1973)2. But most assumptions of the Black-
Scholes option pricing formula may not be held in reality. Black and Cox (1976), Geske 
(1977), and Vasicek (1984) develop the original Merton model by removing some unrealistic 
assumptions. In the original Merton models, the first unrealistic assumption is that default 
will only occur at the end of the maturity. The possibility of reorganization of the firm before 
default happens is not taken into consideration in Merton’s model. Black and Cox (1976) 
add safety covenants which entitles debt holders to force the firm to reorganize when the 
value of a firm falls below a threshold, and receive a discounted value of the debt’s principal 
amount3 into the indenture.  Whether the firm has reorganized before the maturity will be 
                                                          
2 The structural models apply assumptions of the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula which are: 
1) Constant return and volatility 
2) No transaction costs 
3) No dividends payments 
4) No riskless arbitrage 
5) Continuous trading 
6) Risk free rate is constant for all maturities 
7) Short selling proceeds is permitted 
3 The safety covenant is a contractual provision that lets debt holders to claim the ownership of a firm’s 
assets which provide a floor value of the bond. 
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taken into account when calculating the value of the firm at the maturity time by using Cox 
and Ross (1975). 
The second unrealistic assumption in original Merton’s model is that it assumes only one 
single type debt of the firm. The tranche structure4 should be allowed in the firms’ debt. 
When the threshold of safety covenant provided in the bond is lower, subordinated bonds 
will not benefit from this in the first place, and no payments will be received for the 
subordinated bonds until all payments for the senior bonds have been made. The seniority 
structures of firm’s debts are very complex and empirical evidence shows that violation of 
this seniority rule is very likely in practice. Tranche structure in bonds is added into the 
model by Black and Cox (1976). 
Third, the term structure of debt which has a significant effect of default probability is 
also ignored in Merton’s models. Short-term debt and long-term debt should be given 
different weights when measuring the default probability. It’s complicated when tranche 
structure and term structure are both taken into consideration. Vasicek (1984) finds the 
distinction between short-term and long-term liabilities. He analyses three different cases 
and finds that not only a firm’s mark-to-market asset value, but also a firm’s maturing debts 
and higher priority debt, would affect the expected loss for the firm. 
Fourth, interest payment should be added into the original Merton’s model. Black and 
Cox (1976) assume that interest payments are continuous and not a closed form solution for 
discrete payments. However, Geske (1977) develops an approach to value the bonds with an 
arbitrary number of discrete payments. Geske (1977) develops the original Merton models 
by considering the debt structure as a coupon bond. The models allow bonds to have discrete 
interest payment by viewing each payment as a compound option by Geske (1966).  
                                                          
4 Tranching allow for the senior bonds obtaining full payment before junior bonds. 
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Though Merton’s models have been developed in recent years, the model still has some 
drawbacks. The first generation structural models have few inputs that could not capture 
enough information on the firm. Expected returns of assets, risk aversion, accounting ratios 
and macroeconomic covariates are not taken into consideration. In these models the term 
structure of interest rates is assumed to be constant and flat and no stochastic process is 
applied into the models. However, the term structure of interest rate has a significant effect 
of value of firm’s debts.  The using stochastic interest rates will allow correlations between 
asset values which would improve the Merton models’ performance. Further studies by 
Nielsen (1993) and Longstaff & Schwarts (1995) consider stochastic interest rate in the 
models. 
 
3.2 Second Generation Structural–form Models 
The original Merton’s model has been improved in many ways, but still retains some 
drawbacks. One unrealistic assumption held in the first generation structural-form models is 
that default happens only at the time of maturity. In the real world of finance, a firm will 
default any time between issuance time and maturity when it fails to pay interests or coupons. 
Another unrealistic assumption held in the first generation structural-form models is that a 
risk-free rate is constant and flat not following any stochastic process. The original structural 
models apply flat term-structure of the interest rates which is unlikely to hold in reality.   
Kim et al. (1993) develop Merton’s original model by allowing default to happen 
anytime in the entire life cycle of the bond and introducing a stochastic process for the 
evolution of the short-term rates. They point out that net cash flow is one of the key factors 
when measuring a firm’s default risk. One assumption of their model is that the bondholders 
and shareholders receive net cash flow from the firm and the assets of the firm cannot be 
sold. As a result, when a firm fail to have enough net cash to make a coupon payment then 
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the firm is in default even through the asset value of the firm may higher than the liability 
value of the firm. In addition, since most corporate bonds are callable, the study of yield 
spread between callable corporate bonds and treasury bonds is important. Kim et al. (1993) 
find that the call policy is more sensitive to interest rates than to the firm’s value5. And 
because the interaction between the call provision and the default risk, the stochastic interest 
rates have a significant effect of the yield difference between a callable treasury bond and a 
callable corporate bond. Flat term-structure of interest rates is one of the assumptions in 
original Merton’s model. While incorporating stochastic processes in interest rate will affect 
capital structure of a firm.  And the uncertainty of interest rate may have a significant effect 
of credit spread. But the study from Kim et al. (1993) shows that the effect is quite limited. 
However, the difference between shore-term rate and long-term rate plays a more important 
role in pricing the credit spread.  
The relationship between firms’ assets and interest rate is important. Empirical research 
by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) suggests that firms with same default risk may have 
different credit spreads due to the different degree of correlations between firms’ asset and 
the interest rates. The interest rate in their model follows the Vasicek (1977) process6 in 
order to capture the macroeconomic factors of interest rates. A closed-form solution of the 
valuation of a risky floating-rate bond is derived by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) which 
summing the values of the fixed-rate coupons and the value of principal payment at the time 
                                                          
5 When a firm calls a bond, it requires an instantaneous cash outflow while reducing high coupon payments. 
6 The Vasicek (1977) process is a mathematical model describing the evolution of interest rates. It is a one-
factor model, and it describes interest rate movements as driven by only one source of market risk. It is used 
in the valuation of interest rate derivatives, and has also been adapted for credit markets. The models consider 
the interest rates following stochastic movements: 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎(𝑏 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 
Where 𝑎(𝑏 − 𝑟𝑡) is the drift movement.  𝑊𝑡 is a Wiener process modelling the random market risk. The 
models capture the mean-reverting property of the interest rate. And b is the long-term average value, 𝑟𝑡 is 
the short-term interest rate at time t. 
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of maturity to calculate the value of the risky floating-rate coupon bond. They run 
regressions of the changes in credit spreads with two key factors: an asset value factor and 
an interest rate factor. It turns out a negative correlation between interest rate risk and credit 
spread, and the volatility of credit spread mostly come from the interest risk. They conclude 
that both interest rate risk and default risk are key explanatory variables when modelling the 
credit spread. 
Despite the fact that most recent credit risk research focus on reduced-form models, 
structural models are still popular among researchers. For example, Camara et al. (2012) 
present a comparative study of the probability of default using structural models for global 
financial firms with traded options in the US. Due to complicated capital structures of 
financial firms, there is a lack of research in default probability in financial firms, and most 
recent research focus on estimating the default risk of non-financial firms. Camara et al. 
(2012) present empirical evidence on default risk models for global financial firms. Their 
model for estimating default risk can be easily applied in other markets or other financial 
areas.  
They modify the original Merton model and derive the implied probability of default 
from the model which has a better forecasting accuracy compared to the original Merton 
model. They compare the performance of their model with EDF (expected default 
frequencies) based on the Moody’s KMV model and credit ratings from agency during the 
subprime mortgage crisis period by CAP (cumulative accuracy profile) and the ROC 
(receiver operating characteristic) methods.  The results show their model gets a better 
accuracy of default probability prediction. In their model, the probability of default is defined 
as the probability that shareholders will lose all their money in the stock during the life of 
the option. And their ex-ante default probability is embedded in the market price (i.e. option 
price) of each firm. Instead of using hedging arguments in Black and Scholes (1973), they 
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derive the option prices by using equilibrium arguments developed by Rubinstein (1976), 
Brennan (1979), Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984), Amin and Ng (1993) and Camara 
(2003) 7 .Valuable information on financial distress, bankruptcy reorganization and 
liquidation, and capital structure, and risk management can be interpreted from the default 
probability which implied by the firm’s stock price and firm’s option price. They propose 
that stock prices and option prices of a firm contain enough information to measure default 
probability and as a result, the value of asset and value of debt won’t be incorporated into 
the model.  
To sum up, there are still two main problems need to be solved in the second-generation 
structural models. First, the firm’s value needed to be estimated in the models in some certain 
ways when the deterministic parameters cannot be observed directly. As a result, the 
estimation of firms’ market value leads to poor empirical performance when using the 
structural models. Second, credit rating contains valuable information of the firms’ financial 
health, but the credit rating cannot be incorporated into structural models. In addition, some 
credit derivatives which payoffs depend on credit ratings cannot be properly priced in 
structural models. 
 
4. Reduced-Form Models 
The second-generation of structural model still faces the difficulties of estimating the 
firm’s market value and the credit rating which can reveal the financial health of a firm 
cannot be incorporated in the structural models. The standard structural models from Black 
and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Fisher et al. (1989), and Leland (1994) treat the asset 
process to be a geometric Brownian motion. The covariates of the models are market prices 
                                                          
7 Schroder (2004) derives general conditions for option price using equilibrium arguments. 
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of stocks and accounting data (i.e. short-term and long-term liabilities) from the financial 
statements. Crosbie and Bohn (2002) and Kealhofer (2003) find that the structural models 
have been developed and widely used in industry practice like Moody’s KMV. Duffie and 
Lando (2001) argue that distance to default estimated from the structural models is a crucial 
covariate for default estimation, but if the distance to default cannot be measured accurately 
or a firm’s financial health may have multiple influences over time from firm-specific, cross-
sector and macroeconomic factors, adding other covariates may reveal additional 
information about the default probability of the firm.  
In recent years, the reduced-form models which use an exogenous Poisson random 
variable to determine the default probability is becoming more and more popular8. Reduced-
form models treat default as an unpredicted event given by hazard process. The exogenous 
variable which is not dependent on the value of firm’s asset makes reduced-form models 
more tractable than structural models. 
The reduced-form models assume an exogenous Poisson random variable that drives the 
default events. A firm will default when the exogenous random variable shifts in its level 
over any time interval. As a result, the default event, which, treated as unpredictable Poisson 
events, will not be forecasted on the basis of the value of the firm’s assets. The stochastic 
process in the models does not directly link to firm’s assets’ value which makes the models 
more tractable. The Poisson process is one of the most important stochastic processes. It is 
a jump process that the variable jumps instantaneously from one value to another at random 
times. In reduced-form models, the event in a Poisson process is “the default”. The stochastic 
intensity parameter 𝜆(𝑠) called “the default intensity” or the “frequency of jump” and that 
describes the likelihood that the numbers of events 𝑁(𝑡) occurs in the time interval[0, 𝑡]. 
                                                          
8 Papers like Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Campbell, et al (2008) develop statistical models 
such as logistic models and hazard models. In these papers, firms that disappear for reasons other than defaults 
are left untreated, which will result in censoring biases. 
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λ refers to the rate at which event occur. Before the maturity time, when 𝑁(𝑡)is nonzero, 
defaults happen. In the case of a constant λ, the probability distribution is described by: 
 P(𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑘) = exp(−𝜆𝑡)
(𝜆𝑡)𝑘
𝑘!
,            𝑘 = 0,1,2, …. (1.8) 
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) first propose the reduced-
form model for credit risk modelling.  The assets value of the firm does not determine the 
default probability in the reduced-form models. The reduced-form models are based on 
assumptions that both probability of default and recovery rate are dynamic. Recovery rate is 
exogenous and independent from probability of default. Whenever default occurs, the 
recovery will be paid only at the time of maturity. And they incorporate the credit ratings of 
issued debts that will cover information about the financial status of the firms without 
considering the firms’ assets value.  But the model in Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) only 
describes two possible states: survival and default. There are a lot of movements from one 
credit rating to another credit rating with different probabilities published periodically by 
rating agencies. Jarrow et al. (1997) incorporate credit ratings into the valuation of a 
contingent claim model. They extend the model introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) 
by studying the term structure of credit spread in a model with the default process following 
a Markov chain in credit rating. They assume the recovery rate is exogenous and the recovery 
can only be received at the time of maturity through the default occurs prior to maturity9.  
Another assumption in their model is that the stochastic processes of risk-free rate and 
recovery rate are dependent. However, the assumption in the model that recovery payment 
will only be obtained at the time of maturity is unrealistic. In addition, the recovery rate is 
described as an exogenously specified percentage of risk-free bonds. As a result, the 
                                                          
9 Jarrow et al. (1997) assume that the bondholders will receive certain recovery money at the maturity, if 
default happens prior to maturity. 
28 
 
recovery payment may exceed the actual recovery amount at the default time. The actual 
recovery payment that depends on the liquidation value of the firm is fluctuating over time. 
A new method is proposed by Duffie and Singleton (1999) to model the valuation of 
contingent default claim.  They point out that the value of a default claim is the present value 
of the promised payoff discounted by the adjusted short rate.  They propose that default 
probability distribution of a firm follows a translated single-factor square root diffusion 
process10. Also, they develop the model by allowing the recovery payment to be made at any 
time. The model keeps the recovery rate to be a fixed fractional of the non-default bond price 
when default occurs.  As a result, the recovery amount will fluctuate that depending on the 
firm’s liquidation value at the time of default. 
 
4.1 Multi-Period Default Prediction  
Recent multi-period credit default prediction models focus on modelling the time-varying 
covariates. For instance, in the context of assessing corporate default probability, a typical 
approach is to use time-varying covariates like balance sheet or stock price as regressors. If 
a model needs to cover multiple prediction periods, the unknown future evolution of 
covariates needs to be estimated.  
Studies in the default prediction literature often deal with a fixed and often short-term 
prediction horizon. For example, Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Shumway, 
2001 propose an approach to estimate a discrete-time hazard model with yearly data directly 
yielding one-year default probabilities. Time horizon for more than one year is not available 
in these models since time-varying evolution of the covariates is unknown.  
                                                          
10 Variables like default risk, liquidity difference and state taxes etc. Duffie and Singleton (1999) take these 
factors into consideration when measuring the stochastic default process. 
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Hamerle et al. (2007) reduce the dimension problem by forecasting the credit score11. A 
Monte Carlo simulation of the credit scores is used to calculate the default probabilities with 
different horizons. A Poisson intensity approach (i.e. Cox doubly stochastic process) is 
proposed by Duffie et al. (2007), and further developed by Duffie et al. (2009), and Duan et 
al. (2012) to model corporate defaults where default risk is measured by common risk factors 
and firm-specific attributes. The model links individual default events along with economic 
predictors as a dynamic panel data. Common risk factors can be observable, for example, 
Duffie et al. (2009) use four covariates: firm’s distance to default; firm’s trailing one-year 
stock return; three-month Treasury bill rate; trailing one-year return on the S&P 500 index. 
Parameter uncertainty of the models arises since any errors and biases in the forecasting of 
the evolution of the covariates will impact the models’ default prediction accuracy. Duffie 
et al. (2007) propose the model with time-varying covariates and then forecasting the 
evolution of covariates process using Gaussian panel vector autoregressions. And Duan et 
al. (2012) apply a forward intensity approach to estimate multi-periods PD. 
4.1.1 A Doubly Stochastic Poisson Process with Time-varying Covariates 
Duffie, et al (2007) propose the time-series dynamics of the explanatory covariates in order 
to estimate the likelihood of default over different future periods12. Considering the benefits 
of parsimony and the need to model the joint time-series development of all the covariates, 
they adopt a relatively small set of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. Duffie et 
al. (2007) suggest that a firm’s distance to default, US interest rates and stock-market returns 
have significant dependence of the level and shape of the term structure of conditional future 
default probabilities, among other covariates. 
                                                          
11 The credit score here is the inner product of the estimated parameter vector and the covariate vector. 
12 They estimate the model for US-listed firms, using firm-months of data over 20 years. 
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A doubly-stochastic formulation of the point process for default13 is proposed by Duffie 
et al. (2007), where the conditional probability of default within s years is 
 𝑞(𝑋𝑡, 𝑠) = 𝐸 (∫ 𝑒
−∫ (𝜆(𝑢)+𝜑(𝑢))𝑑𝑢
𝑧
𝑡
𝑡+𝑠
𝑡
𝜆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧|𝑋𝑡) (1.9) 
𝑋𝑡 is a Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates which 
intertemporal variation in a firm’s default intensity 𝜆𝑡 = ⋀(𝑋𝑡). 𝜆𝑡 is the conditional mean 
arrival rate of default measured in events per year. The firm may exit for other reasons like 
merger or acquisition, the intensity is defined as 𝜑𝑡 = 𝐴(𝑋𝑡). Thus the total exit intensity 
is 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡. The doubly-stochastic model allows to combine two decouple estimators β and γ 
to obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of the default probability q(Xt, s). In the default 
estimation models, given the path of state-vector X, the merger or acquisition and default 
times of the firm are conditionally independent. 
 (Ω, ℱ, P)  is a fixing probability space with an information filtration {𝒢𝑡: 𝑡 ≥ 0} 
satisfying the usual conditions. Let X =  {𝑋𝑡: 𝑡 ≥ 0}  be a time-homogeneous Markov 
process in ℛ𝑑, for some integer d ≥ 1. The 𝑋𝑡 is a state vector that a covariate for a given 
firm’s exit intensities. Let (M, N) be a doubly-stochastic nonexplosive two-dimensional 
counting process driven by X, with intensities φ = {𝜑𝑡 = 𝐴(𝑋𝑡): 𝑡 ∈ [0,∞)} for M and λ =
 {𝜆𝑡 = Λ(𝑋𝑡 ): 𝑡 ≥ 0} for N, for some non-negative real valued measurable functions 𝐴(∙) 
andΛ(∙) on ℛ𝑑14.  
A given firm exits at τ = inf{𝑡: 𝑀𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡  > 0}, which is the earlier of the first event time 
of N (i.e. default) and the first event time of M (i.e. exits for other reasons). They also allow 
the state vector 𝑋𝑡 to include firm-specific default covariates that cease to be observable 
when the firm exits at τ. And they suppose that 𝑋𝑡 = (𝑈𝑡, 𝑌𝑡), where 𝑈𝑡  is firm-specific 
                                                          
13 The doubly-stochastic assumption is that conditional on the path of the underlying state process X which 
determining default and other exit, exit times are the first event times of independent Poisson process. 
14 This means that, conditional on the path of X, the counting processes M and N are independent Poisson 
processes with conditionally deterministic time-varying intensities, α and λ respectively. 
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and 𝑌𝑡 is macroeconomic. They consider conditioning by an observer whose information is 
given by the smaller filtration {ℱ𝑡: 𝑡 ≥ 0}15, The firm’s default time is the stopping time T =
inf{𝑡: 𝑁𝑡 > 0,𝑀𝑡 = 0}.  
4.2.1 A Doubly Stochastic Poisson Process without Time-varying 
Covariates 
A more convenient approach to calculate the default risk is developed by Duan et al. (2012) 
which applying the forward intensity rate. 
The key point is to derive the forward intensity rate at time 𝜏. 
First, we define 𝐹𝑡( 𝜏) to be the time conditional distribution function of the combined 
exit time.  
 𝜓𝑡(𝜏) = −
𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝐹𝑡( 𝜏))
 𝜏
= −
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡 [𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−∫ (𝜆𝑢 + 𝜑𝑢)𝑑𝑧
𝑡+ 𝜏
𝑡
)]
 𝜏
 (1.10) 
Then, 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝜓𝑡(𝑠)𝑠] becomes the survival probability at time interval (t, t+𝜏). 
And the forward combined exit intensity is defined as 
 𝑔𝑡( 𝜏) ≡
𝐹′𝑡( 𝜏)
1 − 𝐹𝑡( 𝜏)
=  𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) + 𝜓
′
𝑡
( 𝜏) 𝜏. (1.11) 
Also the forward default intensity censored by other forms of exit  
 
𝑓𝑡( 𝜏) ≡ 𝑒
𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) 𝜏 lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃𝑡(𝑡 +  𝜏 <   𝜏𝐷 =  𝜏𝑐  ≤ 𝑡 +  𝜏 + ∆𝑡)
∆𝑡
= 𝑒𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) 𝜏 lim
∆𝑡→0
𝐸𝑡 [∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−∫ (𝜆𝑢 + 𝜑𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑧
𝑡
)𝜆𝑧𝑑𝑧
𝑡+ 𝜏+∆𝑡
𝑡+ 𝜏
]
Δ𝑡
,  
(1.12) 
So the default intensity between (t, t+s) will be ∫ −𝑒𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) 𝜏
 𝜏
0
𝑓𝑡(𝑠)𝑑𝑠. 
                                                          
15  ℱ𝑡 is the σ-algebra generated by {(𝑈𝑠, 𝑀𝑠, 𝑁𝑠): 𝑠 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡, 𝜏)}  ∪ {𝑌𝑠: 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡}. 
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And since 𝑋𝑡 is the state variables contain both firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. 
 𝑓𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝛼1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛼2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘), (1.13) 
 
 𝑔𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑓𝑡(𝜏) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽0(𝜏) + 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛽2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘). (1.14) 
 
The pseudo-likelihood function for the prediction time τ defined as 
 ℒ𝜏(𝛼, 𝛽; 𝜏𝐶 , 𝜏𝐷 , 𝑋) =∏∏ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽),
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (1.15) 
And the likelihood function ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽) for firm i consists of five situations: the first is 
the firm i survives in the prediction time period (i.e. no default or any other exit events 
happen), the second is the firm i defaults in the prediction period, the third is the firm i exits 
for other reasons, the fourth is the firm i exits after this prediction time period and the last is 
the firm i exits before the start of this time interval: 
 
ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽) =  1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐶𝑖≥𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 𝑡 + 𝜏) +
 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖= 𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐷𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖,𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐷𝑖 ≠
𝜏𝐶𝑖, 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖>𝑡} + 1{𝑡𝐶𝑖<𝑡}. 
(1.16) 
where this pseudo-likelihood function can be decomposed into two process α and β: 
 
ℒ𝜏(𝛼(𝑠)) =∏ ∏ ℒ𝑖,𝑡(𝛼(𝑠)), 𝑠 = 0,1, … , 𝜏 − 1
𝑇−𝑠−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
ℒ𝜏(𝛽(𝑠)) =∏ ∏ ℒ𝑖,𝑡(𝛽(𝑠)), 𝑠 = 0,1, … , 𝜏 − 1
𝑇−𝑠−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
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4.2.3 Other Studies about Reduced-Form Models 
Orth (2013) present simple alternatives for multi-period prediction that avoid modelling the 
covariate evolution process. This model delivers high out-of-sample predictive accuracy. 
Orth (2013) propose a multi-period credit risk model. The model observes obligor i, i= 1,…N, 
for 𝑇𝑖 periods and record its default history and a vector of time-varying covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡. For 
each period t, t=1,…𝑇𝑖, the model define 𝑌𝑖𝑡 to be the lifetime (i.e. the time to be default 
history) of obligor i starting in period t. since there is no information about the lifetime 
starting in the last period, the model observes the 𝑇𝑖−1 for each obligor instead and define 
additionally the corresponding censoring indicator variable 𝐶𝑖𝑡 which is zero in the case of 
no censoring (i.e. the lifetime ends with a default event and one for censored lifetimes). Orth 
(2013) build models in terms of the continuous-time hazard rate16: 
 λ(y) =  lim
Δ𝑦⟶0
𝑃(𝑦≤𝑌<𝑦+Δ𝑦|𝑌≥𝑦)
Δ𝑦
. (1.17) 
Orth (2013) suppose that at a point in time t they want to predict the default probabilities 
for the next H periods using the current information17. A simple solution is to specify the 
hazard rate in period t+s, λ(t + s) as a function of the covariates in period t, Xit, and the 
forecast time s. For example, within the proportional hazard framework a possible 
specification would be 
 λ(t + s, Xit) =  λ0(s) exp(β
′Xit). (1.18) 
λ0(s) is the baseline hazard rate. λ0(s) captures the variation of the hazard rate over the 
forecast time and may be referred as a kind of duration dependence18. There, the hazard rate 
can be freely fluctuating for different s due to the repeated estimation of the model. Orth 
(2013) imposes a structure on the evolution of the hazard rate over the forecast time by 
                                                          
16 The hazard rate defines the instantaneous risk of default. 
17 The covariates, we have at t. 
18 The forecast time s is the analogue to the lag length in the approach of Campbell et al. (2008). 
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integrating s as an argument into the functional form of the model. The default probabilities 
are calculated in closed form: 
 P(Yit ≤ H) = 1 − exp (−∫ λ(t + s, Xit)ds
H
0
). (1.19) 
An advantage of the covariate forecasting approach like Duffie, et al (2007), as compared 
to Orth (2013), is that it can analyse the portfolio credit risk as the covariate processes 
provide a model for the dependence of defaults. Orth (2013) focuses on single-obligor credit 
risk and present models designed for the purposes of rating and probability of default 
estimation with a multi-period prediction horizon. 
 
5. Default Prediction Accuracy 
Two methods are commonly used to assess the default prediction accuracy. One is the 
cumulative accuracy profiles and another is the receiver operating characteristic. 
5.1 Cumulative Accuracy Profiles (CAP) 
First we will rank firms by their default probabilities from highest to lowest that predicted 
by the model. 
Then, we define 𝛼 as an integer between 0 and 100 which represent 𝛼 percent of the total 
number of sorted firms (i.e. firms rank from highest predicted default risk to lowest predicted 
default risk), we record the corresponding number of defaulted companies being captured as 
a percentage (z%) of total number of actual default firms.  
And obviously 𝑓(𝛼 = 0) = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓(𝛼 = 100) = 1 
where 
𝑓(𝛼) =
number of default firms captureed at α%
number of total actual default firms
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The CAP curve can then be traced out by varying 𝛼 from 0 to 100 and plotting the 
corresponding values of x and y along and x-axis and y-axis respectively.  
A good model will result in a majority of the default firms having relatively high default 
probability estimates and the percentage of default firms being captured will increase quickly 
as 𝛼 increases. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE] 
If the model has zero information of the future default probability, for example, the 
default probability will be ranked randomly for a large number of times, and then 𝑓(𝛼) 
would be equal to 𝛼. As a result, the CAP curve will correspond to the 45-degree line (the 
red curve in Figure1.1). And a good model will be more like the blue line in Figure1.1. 
Finally, the accuracy ratio by CAP curve= (the area under a model’s CAP)/ (the area 
under the ideal CAP) 
5.2 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC), or simply ROC curve, is a graphical plot which 
measures the performance of a binary classifier system as its threshold is varied. It is created 
by plotting the percentage of true positives out of the total actual positives (TPR) vs. the 
percentage of false positives out of the total actual negatives (FPR) at different cut-off 
probability. 
When we use the ROC curve to measure the performance of default prediction, the 
threshold is every cut-off probability, the ROC curve defines the “true positive rate” 
(percentage of defaults that the model correctly predicts as default) on the y-axis as a function 
of the corresponding “false positive rate” (percentage of non-defaults that are mistakenly 
predicted as default or other exits) on the x-axis. 
36 
 
First, in order to construct the ROC curve, all firms are ordered by their default 
probabilities from highest to lowest.  
Then at each default probability γ we calculate a set of two fractions, the first one is the 
percentage of defaults that the model correctly predicts as default, where the correct 
prediction means the default probability of the firm is equal or greater than γ.  
fy(γ) =
number of correctly predicted as default at the threshold γ
number of total  correctly predict default 
, 
The second one is the percentage of non-defaults that are mistakenly predicted as default, 
also here the firm has a default probability that equal or greater than γ. 
f x(γ) =
number of mistakenly predicted as default at the threshold γ
number of total mistakenly predict default 
. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE] 
If the model contains no default information, then the ROC curve (the green line in 
Figure1.2) will correspond to the 45-degree line. However, a perfect model (the blue line in 
Figure1.2) will have a ROC curve that goes straight up from (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then across 
to (1, 1). And a good model will be more like the red line in Figure 1.2. 
 
6. Correlated default 
A good measure of correlated default risk in financial system is crucial for credit risk 
management given the fact that financial institutions are engaged more closely in many ways. 
Das et al (2006) point out that both default correlations and default probabilities vary through 
the different economic environment. Time-series variation can be observed in default 
probabilities and the series show high volatility when to shift from the different economic 
environment. For example, default probabilities are more than double in high default risk 
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than low default risk time. These are also well captured by the correlated default probability 
curves from our model in different time horizons. Dembo et al. (2004) suggest that 
macroeconomic variables are significant in explaining the default probabilities. Other 
studies show common risk factors such as GDP growth rate, market volatility, and interest 
rates have a direct effect on joint default risk. Duffie et al. (2007) suggest that common risk 
factors are not the only reason of correlated default risk. Both contagion factor and latent 
frailty factors play a significant role in explaining joint default risk. Here the contagion effect 
means one firm default will cause the change of default risk of other firms. Default risk could 
spread quickly during financial firms through credit derivatives like CDS and CDOs.  For 
example, Jorion & Zhang (2007) and Stulz (2010) find the counterparty risk is transferred 
through financial products like the CDS protection seller will be exposed to higher default 
risk caused by the protection buyer’s other counterparties. And the frailty factors are the 
remaining sources of the joint default risk which are not explained by the common factors 
and contagion factors. 
The modelling of correlated default risk is well developed. The models include intensity-
based models, barrier-based firm’s value models, and copula-based models. Traditional 
reduced-form model of portfolio applies a bottom-up model which portfolio intensity is an 
aggregate of individual intensities or a top-down model which portfolio intensity is 
calculated without including individual intensities. Schönbucher (2003) points out that the 
drawback of intensity-based models is the computational complexities may be very time-
consuming. For the barrier-based models, it’s difficult to calibrate and implement the model.  
 The copula-based models have some natural advantages because of the mathematical 
properties of correlated default modelling. The copula allows great flexibility in choosing a 
marginal distribution for each sector. Random variables with different marginal distributions 
can be easily linked with the copula function. In our case, when modelling the joint default 
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risk, the marginal distributions of firm’s default probability can be transformed to the 
portfolio default probability by the copula. Gaussian copula was first introduced to default 
risk to simulate the dependence structure of the times until default by Li (2000).  And this 
Gaussian assumption is further studied by Andersen and Sidenius, 2004; Das et al., 2007; 
Glasserman and Li, 2005; Giesecke, 2004; Hull and White, 2004. Since there is no tail 
dependence of the Gaussian copula, but empirical data always shows ‘fat tails’ in their 
distribution, while obviously, Gaussian copula cannot capture the extreme increase in default 
probability when the correlated default happens. Also, empirical study by Wolfgang et al. 
(2003) turns out student t copula is better than Gaussian copula. Meneguzzo and Vecchiato 
(2004) find that due to the ability to capture the tail dependence, the Student’s t copula 
outperformance Gaussian copula when pricing the CDO and basket CDS.  In addition, 
Christoffersen et al. (2016) suggest that default dependence between reference entities is 
non-Gaussian and time-varying. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The credit risk modelling has developed rapidly in recent years, and become an important 
component in financial risk management. This chapter discusses credit risk models 
developed in last decades. This chapter presents a number of different approaches to measure 
the probability of default of a firm.  
The accounting-based credit scoring model is first proposed to model the credit risk for 
firms. Then structural models and reduced form model are developed rapidly for modelling 
the credit risk. Structural models consider firm’s liabilities as contingent claims on the value 
of firm’s assets. The models assume that default occurs when the assets’ value fall below a 
certain threshold, whereas reduced form models use a hazard rate framework to measure 
default risk. The structural models are further developed in many ways, such as including 
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stochastic process of interest rate, considering term structure of debt and credit spread etc. 
Reduced-form models define the default process as an exogenous Poisson random process. 
The models could incorporate additional information like credit ratings. The exogenous 
variable which is not dependent on the value of firm’s asset makes reduce-form models more 
tractable than structural models. However, the academic literature in both types of models 
has also been lacking concerned of the term structure of default probabilities. The prediction 
accuracy of time-varying covariates, the availability of large number of default data which 
including other exits like merger and acquisition and also some covariates selection problem 
etc. will be great changelings of the multi-period default prediction. 
The modelling of correlated default risk is well developed. The joint default risk models 
include intensity-based models, barrier-based firm’s value models, and copula-based models. 
Among all the models, the copula-based models have some natural advantages because of 
the mathematical properties in correlated default modelling. The copula allows the great 
flexibility of choosing a marginal distribution for each sector. Random variables with 
different marginal distributions can be easily linked with the copula function. As a result, 
copula-based models have been well developed and widely used in recent years. 
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Figure 1.1 CAP of estimated default probability 
Notes: Figure1.1 plots the CAP of the estimated default probability. If the model has zero 
information of the future default probability, for example, the default probability will be 
ranked randomly for a large number of times, and then 𝑓(𝛼) would be equal to 𝛼 (i.e., 𝛼 % 
of the default firms with about 𝛼 % of the observations). As a result, the CAP curve will 
correspond to the 45-degree line (the red curve). And a good model will be more like the 
blue line. 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
%
5
%
1
0
%
1
5
%
2
0
%
2
5
%
3
0
%
3
5
%
4
0
%
4
5
%
5
0
%
5
5
%
6
0
%
6
5
%
7
0
%
7
5
%
8
0
%
8
5
%
9
0
%
9
5
%
1
0
0
%
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
D
ef
au
lt
 F
ir
m
s 
b
ei
n
g 
C
ap
u
tu
re
d
Percentage of Sorted Firms
Accuracy Ratio
good model zero default information
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 ROC of estimated default probability 
Notes: Figure1.2 plots the receiver operating characteristic of the estimated default 
probability. If the model contains no default information, then the ROC curve (the green line) 
will be corresponds to the 45-degree line, however a perfect model (the blue line) will have 
a ROC curve that goes straight up from (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then across to (1, 1). And a good 
model will be more like the red line. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Revisit to Corporate Default Risk in China 
 
 
There are few papers on the credit risk for public listed firms due to the lack of default 
data in China. In this paper, we construct a large default dataset of Chinese public 
firms from 1999 to 2013 and revisit the corporate credit risk in China. First, the results 
show that both binomial and multivariate logit models outperform the KMV-Merton 
structural model. Second, unlike the US market, some traditional determinants of 
credit risk, like profitability and M/B are not significant in China’s market. Third, we 
find useful economic information for default prediction from the post-default firms 
which were discarded by previous literature. Fourth, we find the special treatment 
(ST) and delisted firms which are commonly used in previous literature are not 
reliable good default proxies for actual default event in China’s market. Overall, our 
study makes a turning point in investigating the corporate credit risk of China’s public 
listed firms. 
 
This chapter is the early version of the working paper “Cerrato, Mario., Kim, Minjoo., Zhang, Bing., and 
Zhang, Xuan.  (2016). Revisit to Corporate Default Risk in China”. I would like to thank Tang Shengrui 
from Huatai Securities for providing the data, and helpful comments from Risk Management Institute of 
National University of Singapore, and the business school of Nanjing University. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of previous literature study the credit risk of Chinese public firms using a default proxy 
due to the lack of actual default dataset. Most frequently used proxy is the Special Treatment 
(hereafter ST)19, a delist warning sign designated by the regulators (Chen, 2012; Yang ,2010; 
Zhang et.al, 2010; Huang et.al, 2010; Zeng and Wang, 2013; Peng, 2012). However, they 
suffer from the suspicion on the reliability of ST as the good proxy for actual default. Orth 
(2013) uses default ratings (D or SD) from Standard & Poor’s for US firms to avoid that 
limitation, but there are also many problems with this data when it comes to listed companies 
in China, given that fact that most listed firms in China are not rated by the rating agency. 
For these reasons, we endeavour to construct actual default data of Chinese public firms and 
revisit the corporate credit risk using the actual default and bankruptcy data which are 
obtained from the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) database maintained by Risk 
Management Institute, National University of Singapore. 20 The CRI database covers credit 
events from Bloomberg, Compustat, CRSP, Moody’s report, exchange websites and news 
sources. 
The most fundamental question is whether ST is the good proxy for the actual default or 
not. According to the definition of ST, firms being marked as ‘ST’ mostly face profitability 
problems. Nonetheless, ST is not directly related to firm’s actual default. Thus assessing the 
credit risk of Chinese public firms using ST is subject to its reliability as the good proxy. To 
investigate this question, we incorporate ST as a dummy variable into our firm’s default 
model and test how well ST is able to predict the actual default.  
                                                          
19 With ST or *ST before the stock code. When a stock is marked as *ST, its trading is suspended for one 
accounting year. More details of ST regulations can be found in ST firm’s analysis section. 
20 Thanks to the default data provided by Risk Management Institute (RMI) of National University of Singapore 
(NUS). The actual default events include: bankruptcy filing-restructuring, bankruptcy-liquidation, bankruptcy-
subsidiary bankrupt, bankruptcy-sued by creditor, default corporate action-loan payment, default corporate 
action-debt restructuring, default corporate-principal payment, and default resolution. 
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Next research interest directs to accessing the determinants of firm’s credit risk with the 
actual default data. Some previous studies (Carling et al., 2007; Jacobson et al., 2008) show 
that macroeconomic variables are not important in the U.S. firms. On the contrary, Duan et 
al. (2012) show that macroeconomic variables such as interest rate and stock index return 
significantly influence firm’s credit risk along with form specific factors like leverage, 
liquidity, profitability and volatility. Following Duan et al. (2012), in our paper, both level 
of covariates and the trend of covariates is taken into consideration21. For example, consider 
two firms holding the same amount of cash but with different profiles of cash holding in the 
past; e.g., the average of cash holding over the last 12 months in our paper. Suppose that one 
firm’s cash holding has been reduced while the other has been increased over the last 12 
months. Then, ceteris paribus, two firms would face different default probabilities. By 
including the average of covariates in the last period, the model could catch the overall trend 
of firms. 
Next, we are interest in firm’s behaviour during post-default time. We observe that most 
default events are not hard default (i.e. firms survive after defaults happened) in our actual 
default data. For this reason, we prefer to retain these firms to avoid the selection bias. Then 
we consider firms in three states (i.e., default, post-default or tranquil) rather than a binary 
state (i.e., default or no default).  
We find several new features and implications from the empirical analysis with actual 
default data. First, when we include the ST dummy variable in the model, it is insignificant. 
This indicates that ST is not the good predictor of the actual default event. Further, when we 
use the ST dummy variable as the dependent variable, the estimation results are quite 
different from those obtained from the actual default data. Both analysis suggests that 
previous studies using ST may mislead their conclusion due to incorrect default information. 
                                                          
21 The ‘‘level’’ denotes the current value, ‘‘trend’’ denotes the difference between current value and its 
previous 12-month average. 
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Our analysis challenges previous studies relying on ST as it could contain incorrect default 
information. Second, we find that the determinants of credit risk of Chinese public firms are 
quite different from the US firms. The usual default determinants like profitability and 
market-to-book value do not have the significant influence on the default of Chinese public 
firms. Another interesting finding is that firms holding more cash are very likely to default. 
Furthermore, firms have higher default probability when the market is in good conditions 
such as low interest rate and high stock index returns. This may be caused by the 
misallocation of finance (see Whited and Zhao, 2016) and the financial constraints faced by 
small and medium-sized firms. Third, given the fact that most default firms did not exit the 
market, it’s not appropriate to discard the post-default data (i.e. firms with binary states) 
when modelling the PD. As a result, three states of default event (default, post-default, and 
tranquil) which containing more information provide the better estimation accuracy than 
binary states (default and non-default). 
Our study makes four contributions to literature and finance policy in China. First, we 
construct the actual default data of China’s public listed firms. This work resolves the 
limitation of using the default proxy (i.e. ST) for the corporate credit risk research. We 
believe that our actual default dataset will contribute to further studies on the credit risk 
problem of Chinese public firms. Second, we find the importance of post-default information 
in the credit risk analysis of Chinese public firms. Firms show heterogeneous behaviour 
during the post-default and tranquil time. When the model considers the binary states 
(default and tranquil), it has the lower power of default prediction than the model considering 
the three states (default, post-default and tranquil). Third, we extend previous studies greatly 
by constructing the large actual default dataset. More than 800 active firms and 700 default 
events are included in our sample, which has never been studied in the previous literature. 
Lastly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suffer from the high default 
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risk in spite of good financial market condition. This finding could draw some implications 
for policy-makers that they should pay attention to SMEs and push further finance reform. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the previous 
empirical study which mostly about US market and the credit risk studies in China market. 
Section 3 first presents a briefly review of credit risk modelling in recent years and then 
introduces the model for distance to default and for default probability. Section 4 presents 
the empirical research results of the binomial logit and multinomial logit Model. We further 
investigate the default probability of ST and delist firms based on the estimation of 
multinomial logit model. Section 5 makes conclude. 
  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Credit Risk of U.S. Firms 
Traditional firm-specific variables for default studies come from the credit scoring models 
that are proposed by Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968). They study corporate 
bankruptcy prediction models that rely on accounting-based variables based on actual 
manufacturers that filed a bankruptcy petition. Their results show that the liquidity ratio 
(working capital/total assets) has a positive relationship with firm’s survival probability. 
Firms with high profitability (i.e. retained earnings/total assets ratio and earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets ratio in the paper) and the capital-turnover ratio (i.e. sales/total 
assets) will have lower default probability.  
Beside firm-specific variables, the relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
default risk has been found in many studies. For example, McDonald and Van de Gucht 
(1999) use quarterly industrial production growth in the US as a covariate to model high-
yield bond default. Fons (1991), Blume and Keim (1991), and Jonsson and Fridson (1996) 
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suggest that aggregate default rates tend to increase in the downturn of business cycles. 
Keenan, Sobehart, and Hamilton (1999) and Helwege and Kleiman (1997) study the default 
rate of US corporate bonds using many macroeconomic variables which including industrial 
production, interest rates, aggregate corporate earnings, and indicators for recession that may 
affect the default rate. 
Recent studies on default risk modelling usually estimate the model based on large 
sample with actual default data. Campbell et al. (2008) proposed a multiple logit model to 
predict bankruptcy for different time horizons. Their default research is based on the monthly 
800 bankruptcy and 1,600 failure data provided by Kamakura Risk Information Services. 
The monthly data span from 1963 to 1998. Duffie et al. (2007) study the default probability 
of US industrial firms, based on 2,770 firms that covering 390,000 firm-months of data 
spanning 1980 to 2004. The model is calibrated by actual default data from Moody’s Default 
Risk Service, which provide detailed issue and issuer information on ration, default or 
bankruptcy, data and type of default (such as bankruptcy, distressed exchange, or missed 
interest payment). Duan et al. (2012) propose a forward intensity approach to model the 
default probability of a much larger sample (comparing to Duffie et al., 2007) of the US 
industrial and financial firms dating from 1991 to 2011 on a monthly basis. They include 
12,268 firms with 1,104,963 firm-month observations in the sample. The default and 
bankruptcy data are obtained from the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) database maintained 
by Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore.  
Most firm-specific and macroeconomic variables are found to be significant and with the 
expected sign in the US market, based on the results from Campbell et al. (2008), Duffie et 
al. (2007), and Duan et al. (2012). For example, CASH/Total Assets, NI/Total Assets, firm’s 
size, DTD, three-month Treasury rate have negative correlations with firm’s default 
probability. It’s natural that US firms holding more liquidity assets, having good earning 
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ability, with big size, and high DTD will have a lower default probability. Interest rate, the 
market-to-book ratio, and index return are found to have a negative correlation with default 
intensity.  
Their results suggest that the default probability is estimated to be significantly declining 
in short-term interest rates. Though, firms will bear more interest expenses facing higher 
rates, the sign of the coefficient for the short rate may because of the fact that the US Federal 
Reserve often rise short rates in order to “cool down” business expansions.  
On the other hand, their results show the negative correlation between stock index return 
and default probability. It suggests that a bull market would be bad news for firms’ default 
risk. Duffie et al. (2007) argue that this could be due to correlation between individual stock 
returns and index returns, and perhaps due to the trailing nature of the returns and business-
cycle dynamics.  
Campbell et al. (2008) suggest that the market-to-book ratio of bankrupt firms is slightly 
higher than non-bankrupt firms in US market. Given the fact that, investors often expect the 
default risk and may result in lowering the market value of equity. Default firms have often 
experienced losses that have depreciated the book value of their equity, rising up the market-
to-book ratio. on the other hand, investors often expect that default risk may lower the market 
value of the equity. The stock market often anticipates the bankruptcy or future losses, which 
drives down the market value of equity and the market-to-book ratio. 
 
2.2 Credit Risk of Chinese Firms 
Unlike the studies of U.S. firms, the previous studies on the credit risk of Chinese public 
firms are few and limited. Normally the sample size is small and most research focus on a 
single sector. Thus, their results are less reliable and hard to be generalized. In addition, they 
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intend to apply the structural KMV-Merton model to calculating a default probability 
(hereafter PD) due to the lack of actual default data of Chinese public firms. ST firms are 
used to be default proxy for both model estimation and comparing analysis purpose. Chen 
(2012) investigates the threshold of default for 4 major Chinese insurance companies; Yang 
(2010) conducts an empirical analysis for 40 public listed firms; Zhang et al. (2010) study 
the credit risk of 10 logistics firms during the financial crisis; Zeng and Wang (2013) study 
the credit risk of 42 manufacturing public listed firms; Peng (2012) studies the credit risk of 
11 small and medium size listed firms; All those researches use the KMV-Merton model. 
Given the limited literature in this area, one of the main contributions of our study is the 
large actual default dataset that we constructed. 
 
2.3 Credit Risk Models 
Previous accounting-based models use composite measures that statistically combine several 
accounting variables, such as Altman’s (1968) Z-Score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-Score. 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue that there are several problems when modelling the default 
probability based on accounting data. For example, the accounting data is rarely informative 
about firm’s future status; fixed assets and intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative 
to their market prices due to the conservatism principle; and an asset volatility is ignored in 
accounting-based default prediction models. Although it is obviously easy to implement 
credit scoring models, they have poorer prediction accuracy compared to other models.  
Obviously, it is easy to implement the credit scoring models but they have lower 
prediction accuracy compared to other models. The structural models (also called the 
market-based models) provide an alternative and potentially superior source of information 
compared to the credit scoring models. The information contained in the financial statements 
may not enough to accurately estimate future default probability. The structural models thus 
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add stock prices, which aggregate information from the market in addition to the financial 
statements, into the models. However, the main concern is that the structural model may not 
perform well due to the inclusion of market prices which may lower the estimation accuracy 
for the market value of the asset. Another shortcoming is that the stock price may not 
efficiently include all publicly-available default-related information. In addition, Sloan 
(1966) argues that the market does not accurately include all of the information in financial 
statements, while the structure model estimation is based on stock price. Thus it is ultimately 
an empirical question if the market-based default models or the accounting based default 
models can achieve more accurate estimates (Hillegeist et al., 2004).   
Most recent papers apply a reduced-form model (logit model or the Poisson model) with 
some exogenous variables which are assumed to capture traditional risk factors and DTD as 
determinants of firm’s default probability. For example, Chava and Jarrow (2004), Hillegeist 
et al., (2004), Shumway (2001) estimate a discrete-time hazard model with yearly data and 
directly predict one-year default probabilities. Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. 
(2008) estimate default probability using the logistic regression models. Duffie, et al (2007), 
Duffie et al. (2009) and Duan et al. (2012) develop a Poisson intensity approach with 
common risk factors and firm-specific attributes to estimate corporate defaults.  
Though previous research about China’s public firms mainly applies KMV model (i.e. 
this model is widely used due to the lack of default data), having the actual default data, 
reduced-form model which could incorporate credit scoring factors and DTD is our first 
choice22. Since firms in our sample is in two state: default or non-default, the logit model 
seems to fit well the characteristics of our dataset well. As a result, the binomial multivariate 
logit model is the benchmark model in our paper. But given the fact that most firms in 
China’s market will survive after a default (41 firms delisted in our sample period, but 656 
                                                          
22 The reduced-form model can also incorporate credit scoring factors and DTD. 
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defaults happened in total), the binomial model which discards the post-default data will lose 
considerable useful information. In our paper, we use a multinomial logit model that allows 
the dependent variable to take three states: 1) the default (default); 2) 12 months after default 
has taken place (post-default); 3) the no-default regime (tranquil), which includes the 
remaining observations. 
 
3. Methodology 
Duffie and Lando (2001) argue that a distance to default (DTD) is a crucial covariate for the 
default estimation. However, if DTD cannot be measured accurately or firm’s financial 
health may have multiple influences over time from firm-specific, cross-sector and 
macroeconomic risk factors, adding other covariates would reveal additional information 
about the default probability of the firm. The structural models still face the difficulties in 
estimating firm’s market value or incorporating the credit rating which reveals firm’s 
financial health. As a result, DTD is an important variable but not the only one in our default 
estimation. In the following, by applying multinomial logit model, we consider both firm-
specific and macroeconomic variables. 
 
3.1 Distance-to-Default 
Previous research suggest that the market-based model is very effective in assessing the 
credit risk for China’s public listed firms. So the distance-to-default is one of the key 
variables in our model.  
The Merton’s model applies the European call option developed by Black and Scholes 
(1973). The structural models consider that the default occurs if the asset value falls below 
a threshold associated with the firm’s liabilities; that is, the default will occur if the asset 
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value, i.e. the firm value, is not enough to cover the firm’s liabilities. When the asset value 
falls behind the liabilities, which means the value of equity is zero, and there is no reason of 
holding equity. Thus the firm cannot fully cover creditors’ claims, thereby the firm is in 
default. 
In the structural form model, the stock price follows an independently log normal 
distribution with annual volatility σ and the following parameters: 
 InAt~N(InAt + (μ −
σ2
2
) (T − t), σ2(T − t)),           (2.1) 
The probability of default of InAt falls below the threshold L will be given by ∅(
L−E(x)
σ(x)
), 
and ∅ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
  If the asset value falls below the liability value, the value of equity will be zero, the 
payoff to equity holders described as: 
 Et = max(0, AT − L),                                                  (2.2) 
where the liabilities value is: 𝐿 = 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠.  The haircut 𝛿 is estimated by the transformed-data MLE method. When 
𝛿 = 0 , the model collapses to traditional KMV model. Duan and Wang’s (2012) results 
suggest that when considering other liabilities, the impact is big for financial firms but for 
other firms like industrial firms only a minor difference from KMV method. Generally 
speaking, the haircut δ is relatively small for non-financial firms and the size of other 
liabilities is much smaller relative to its market capitalization. 
The equity value can be calculated using the standard Black–Scholes European call 
option formula: 
 Et=At ∙ ∅(d1) − Le
−r(T−t)∅(d2),                               (2.3) 
where: 
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d1 =
ln(
At
L
)+(r+
σ2
2
)(T−t)
σ√T−t
 And d2 = d1 − σ√T − t     
After values of L, At μ,and σ
2 are calculated, the probability of default can be measured: 
 Pr(Default) = ∅(
InL−LnAt−(μ−
σ2
2
)(T−t)
σ√T−t
),                   (2.4) 
While three the unknown parameters will be estimated, which are μ (i.e. the annual 
expected asset returns), σ (i.e. the annual asset volatility) and At (i.e. market value of assets 
at time t). 
The distance to default (DTD) which is the deviation of asset value from the default point 
L will be calculated: 
 DTD =
InAt+(μ−
σ2
2
)(T−t)−InL
σ√T−t
,                                (2.5) 
The DTD estimated from RMI follows an alternative form that could reduce sampling 
errors: 
 
 
DTD =
InAt−InL
σ√T−t
.                                                    (2.6) 
3.2 Multinomial Logit Model 
A multinomial logit model is used to estimate firm’s default probability by considering 
default, post-default, and tranquil states. This makes our study substantially different from 
the others. As explanatory variables, both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables are 
included. 
For each firm 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 can be one of three states at each month: tranquil period (𝑗 =
0), first month of default event (𝑗 = 1) and 12 months after the default event (𝑗 = 2). The 
probability that a firms is in state 𝑗 is: 
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Firm 𝑖 would stay at the one of ternary states at the month 𝑡: 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = {
0 𝑛𝑜 − 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
1 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
2 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
 (2.7) 
where the firm is defined as the post-default until 12 months 23  after the default. The 
probability that the firm stays at the state 𝑗 conditional on the feasible information set is 
given by 
 𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷𝑗
′𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷ℎ
′ 𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
2
ℎ=1
, 𝑗 = 0,1,2 (2.8) 
where 𝒙𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of unit, macroeconomic variables and frim-specific factors.  
The multinomial model usually adopts 𝜷0 = 𝟎 to remove an indeterminacy in the 
model. Therefore, the probabilities are 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷𝑗
′𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷ℎ
′ 𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
2
ℎ=1
, 𝑗 = 1,2 
Pr(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0|𝒙𝑖,𝑡) =
1
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷ℎ
′ 𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
2
ℎ=1
. 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
However, the partial effect of multinomial model is complicated. For continuous 𝑥𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 which 
is the kth element of 𝒙𝑖,𝑡,  we can write 
 
𝜕 𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
= 𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡) [𝛽𝑗,𝑘 −∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑘𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
2
ℎ=1
], (2.11) 
 
                                                          
23 We test of difference in mean between post-default and tranquil firms considering the post default time 
from 1 months to 12 months. The 12 months’ post default is the most significant one. 
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𝜕 𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
= −𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑘𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
2
ℎ=1
. (2.12) 
 
where 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 is the kth element of 𝜷𝑗. Alternatively, we often use the log-odds for a simple 
interpretation of 𝛽𝑗,𝑘: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
] = 𝜷𝑗
′𝒙𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ|𝒙𝑖,𝑡)
] = (𝜷𝑗 − 𝜷ℎ)
′
𝒙𝑖,𝑡. 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
To estimate the coefficients in the equation (2), we maximize the log likelihood 
 𝐿(𝜷) = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖,𝑡; 𝜷𝑗)
2
𝑗=0
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑖=1   (2.15) 
where 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 1 if firm 𝑖 is at the state 𝑗 at the time 𝑡. As usual, we estimate parameters by 
maximizing the log likelihood (2.15). McFadden (1974) shows that the equation (2.15) is 
globally concave; thereby the maximization problem is straightforward. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Firm-specific Data 
Our dataset contains 981 public listed firms from China’s Shanghai Exchange A Share which 
includes 940 currently active public listed firms along with 41 delisted firms during the time 
period of 1998-2013. For the firm-specific variables, we use quarterly accounting data 
collected from the WIND database. Individual stock prices, interest rates and stock index are 
collected from the Bloomberg. Data such as merger and acquisition (hereafter M&A) are 
hand collected from the Shanghai exchange official database. Default events are provided 
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by Risk Management Institute (RMI) of National University of Singapore (NUS). The 
default events of China’s public listed firms in our sample include: bankruptcy filing-
restructuring, bankruptcy-liquidation, bankruptcy-subsidiary bankrupt, bankruptcy-sued by 
creditor, default corporate action-loan payment, default corporate action-debt restructuring, 
default corporate-principal payment, and default resolution. DTD data are also from RMI, 
NUS where the calculation method follows Duan and Wang (2012). Instead of using KMV 
method (i.e. commonly used in literature of modelling China’s listed firms), they introduce 
‘other liability’ fit high-leverage firms such as banks and insurance firms better. While 
traditional KMV models will cause serious distortion to the credit analysis of financial firms, 
as a result, most papers exclude financial firms in their sample.  
We use common factors and firm-specific factors which are most used in the previous 
literature like Duffie et al. (2007) and Duan et al. (2012). We find that both trend and level 
of some firm-specific variables (e.g. CASH/TA and DTD) is significant of determining the 
default risk. Duan et al. (2012) find out that for two firms with the same DTD are very likely 
to have different default likelihoods if one firm’s DTD has been decreasing in the past few 
months. The variables used in our study are the followings: 
1. Index return: Shanghai A-share index return. 
2. Interest rates: Three months trading treasury rates. 
3. Cash: Cash to total assets ratio. It measures the liquidity in terms of immediately 
available cash by firms. 
4. Cash trend: The difference between current liquidity and its previous 12-month 
average 
5. Net income: Net income to total asset ratio. It measures firm’s profitability. 
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6. Net income trend: The difference between current net income and its previous 12-
month average. 
7. MB: The market-to-book value ratio. 
8. MB trend: The difference between current MB and its previous 12-month average. 
9. Firm size: The logarithm of firm’s market equity value to the market index value. 
10. Distance-to-default (DTD): Most studies calculate DTD using the KMV formula 
(Merton, 1974) in which the default point is set by the sum of short-term debt and 
half of long-term debt. We however adopt Duan and Wang’s (2012) method 
considering firm’s other liabilities to the calculation of default threshold.   
11. DTD trend: The difference between current DTD and its previous 12-month average. 
12. Dummy variable ST24: firms once marked as ST will be ‘1’ and exit ST will be ‘0’. 
 
4.2 Default data 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2.1 plots the monthly actual default events from 1999 to 2013.  The maximum number 
of defaults is 19 and it’s around the year of 2004. Most default events happened from 2001 
to 2011.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2.1 reports the total number of active firms and defaults each year. Through the sample, 
the average active firm is 872 and the size of active firms is expanding year by year from 
666 to 947. On average, the default events are 44 corresponding to 5% default rate. The 
default rate increases between 1999 and 2005 and decreases afterwards. Default rates are 
                                                          
24 ST policy starts from 22/04/1998. 
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extremely high, 12.01% in 2004 and 10.28% in 2005. The high default rates are mainly 
derived by two major facts: the policy-bankruptcy was approaching its deadline and the 
bankruptcy of many state owned enterprise (SOEs) had spill-over effect during this period25. 
According to People.cn 26  (May 31, 2004), the State Council approved the merger and 
bankruptcy of the 725 SOEs, and the central government allocated total bankruptcy subsidies 
amounted 62.7 billion yuan. In 2004, the central government spent 19.947 billion yuan to 
implement the policy-bankruptcy, and a total of 537.5 thousand people were laid off. In 2005, 
the central government spent 22 billion yuan on the 115 state-owned enterprises to 
implement the policy-bankruptcy, more than 590 thousand employees were involved.  After 
the peak of 2004, the default rates started to decline (less than 4% in the last 4 years). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of our selected variables. The average of cash 
is 0.5268, suggesting that firms hold a good amount of liquid assets. The negative cash trend 
indicates that firms possess less liquid assets compared to the past cash holdings. In terms 
of profitability, the average of net income is 0.0193 but its trend is negative, indicating that 
firms are less profitable than the past. The average of MB is 3.7665 and its standard deviation 
is high. Firm size does not vary a lot: the average is 0.0466, the maximum is 0.0586 and the 
minimum is 0.0409. The average of DTD is 4.3048 implying a low default risk. The lowest 
DTD is negative (-0.7085) which indicates a definite default by the KMV structure model. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
25 Policy bankruptcy (the policy code: Guo Fa No. 199459) is part of SOEs reform in China. It started from 
October, 1994 and ended by 2008. It was a policy carried out by the central government to force SOEs to 
dissolve since SOEs with bad performance could not easily go bankruptcy. 
26 People.cn is a large-scale news platform built by People’s Daily, one of the top ten newspapers in the 
world. 
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Table 2.3 shows the average values of independent variables. In our paper, firms are 
within three states: default, post-default and tranquil. Traditionally, when assessing the credit 
risk, only default and non-default are taken into consideration, and all the post-default data 
will be discarded. It means a lot of useful information is lost especially in our case where 
most firms have survived after the default. For better modelling the credit risk of China’s 
public firms, it’s better to include post-default data but also distinguish the data from tranquil 
time to avoid bias problem. As a result, we further study the default year data and tranquil 
year data, and the test shows a significant difference in mean value between these two states 
across all independent variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
The table 2.4 is correlation matrix of independent variables. Most variables are not highly 
correlated with each other. The cash has little correlations with most variables but is 
positively correlated with the DTD trend (0.101), indicating that the firm holding more cash 
is more likely to have a growing default probability; i.e. there is a big difference between 
current DTD and its previous values over the past 12 months. The trend value of cash is 
positively correlated with DTD (0.228). This suggests that firms with higher liquid assets 
may have a higher default probability.  Both the level and trend of the net income and MB 
have very low correlations with both the level and trend of DTD. This suggests that these 
two traditional firm-specific variables may not be relevant with for measuring the default 
risk of public listed firms in China. 
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4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 Model selection 
Since public listed firms in China are more likely to survive after a default event, we cannot 
ignore the post-default event. For this reason, the multinomial model should fit our data 
better than the binomial logit model.  
We estimate the multinomial model with macroeconomic variables and firm-specific 
factors. For comparison, we also estimate the binomial logit model. The pseudo-𝑅2 and ROC 
both suggest that multinomial model outperformance binominal model. For the binominal 
model, the P pseudo-𝑅2  is 0.0182 while for the multinomial model, has a much larger 
pseudo-𝑅2 that is 0.0419.  
  In addition, we compare the two models using the receiver operating characteristic 
(hereafter ROC). The ROC is constructed by varying threshold probability. The ROC curve 
is plotted by the true positive rate (percentage of default firms that the model correctly 
classifies as defaults) on the y-axis as a function of the corresponding false positive rate 
(percentage of non-default firms that are mistakenly classified as defaults) on the x-axis. If 
the model has zero information of the default probability, for example, an entirely random 
prediction model, the ROC curve will correspond to the 45-degree line. While a perfect 
model will have a curve that goes straight up from (0,0) to (0,1) and then across to (1,1). In 
the following, we report the AUC (the area under the curve for the computed values of X 
and Y) of the two models. The maximum AUC is 1, which corresponds to a perfect default 
classifier. Larger AUC values indicate better classifier performance. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2.2 shows the ROC curve for the three models. The solid line (multinomial) 
outperformance the dash curve (binominal). The multinomial model is above the binomial 
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logit model in most of the range. We also calculate the AUCs of these models. The AUC of 
multinomial model (0.6794) is bigger than that of the binomial logit model (0.6263).  
Therefore, the multinomial model with three states outperform the binomial logit model with 
binary states; that is, the post-default data contains useful information for predicting the 
default event.  
We also investigate how much we are able to improve the performance by using the 
actual default data. Figure 2.2 also plots the ROC of KMV-Merton’s structural model (the 
dot line). It is below the ROCs of the two logit models and almost overlaps with the 45-
degree line. Its AUC is 0.5062, which is much smaller than any of the two logit models. 
Therefore, the logit model with the actual default data dominantly outperforms the KMV-
Merton’s structural model with the market data. 
Overall, the results suggest that we should use the multinomial model with the actual 
default data to avoid the loss of information from ignoring the post-default events. The 
estimations result of multinomial logit model and binominal logit model can be found in 
table 2.5 and table 2.6 respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE] 
As a result, in the following, the paper analyse the credit risk based on the multinomial 
logit model. The ‘default’ column denotes the relative default probability in the default state 
compared to the default probability in the benchmark state, ‘tranquil’. Analogously, the 
‘post-default’ column denotes the relative default probability in the post-default state 
compared to the default probability in the ‘tranquil’ state. 
From table 2.5, the default month column shows that interest rate, index return, cash/total 
asset current and trend value (from binomial model outputs in table 2.6, cash/total asset 
current value is not significant), firm’s size, DTD both current and trend value are significant 
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of assessing the credit risk of China’s public firms. Not surprisingly, large firms are less 
likely to default and firms with larger DTD and DTD trend are safer.  
There are two interesting findings. First, firms face higher default risk when they hold 
more liquid assets (cash). A possible scenario is that firms have neither good investment 
opportunities nor intention to expand their business in the time of distress; thereby they hold 
more cash in a bad financial condition. Another possible scenario is that the increase of cash 
flow risk is connected to the increase of idiosyncratic risk27. Therefore, if the idiosyncratic 
risk declines, firms may eventually reduce their cash holdings. The third scenario is that, 
with regard to default type, this result indicates that the most default events in China’s market 
were triggered by insolvency problems (i.e. when firm’s the value of assets is less than the 
value of its liability) but not liquidity problems (i.e. not enough cash to make payment). In 
addition, previous studies indicate that distance-to-default (leveraged adjusted market value 
of asset) is the most powerful factor determining the default risk. So when firms have less 
financing constraints (i.e. access external financing more easily), the impact of illiquidity 
will be weak.  
Second, firms face higher default risk when the interest rate is low. In China, new or 
non-state-owned enterprises usually experience unreasonable loan covenants since they do 
not have well-established relationships with banks. García-Herrero et al. (2009) point out 
that to some extent, Chinese banks are subject to government intervention. In many cases 
the credit provided by banks is directly or indirectly controlled by the central and/or the local 
governments and banks are not free to set interest rates. Therefore, the good relationships 
with banks are actually advantageous to enjoy lower interest rate in China. People’s Bank of 
                                                          
27 Bates et al. (2009) point out that this may explain why US firms are hold more cash and the average cash 
ratio peaked in 2004 in their sample.   
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China also often raises interest rates to cool down business expansion. Hence, it is not 
surprising that firm’s default probability is low in the high interest rate regime.  
Our results show that the coefficient on the index return is positive at 5% significance 
level; that is, a bull market is not a good news for managing firm’s default risk. The finding 
is in line with the results of US firms. Duan et al. (2012) suggest that this result may be due 
to the correlation between the index return and firm-specific variables. In addition, Duffie et 
al. (2009) pointed out that DTD could overstate firm’s financial health after a long increase 
of the stock market; thus there is the positive relationship.  
In terms of firm size, Buera et al. (2011) find that large scale industries such as a 
manufacturing industry have more external financial dependence than small scale industries 
such as a service industry. This abnormality could be caused by credit constraints in China.  
Chan et al. (2012) find that large firms face no credit constraints while small firms have 
significant credit constraints. Asymmetric information and ‘political pecking order’ are key 
in China, and large state-controlled banks dominate the Chinese financial system.  For these 
reasons, small firms have difficulties to access the credit market; thereby they are more 
dependent on internal funds for investments. 
To sum up, our empirical results suggest that investors and regulators should be more 
cautious to potential default events in China. First, ‘Too Big to Fail’ also applies to the 
Chinese financial market; especially, small firms are more likely to default than large firms. 
Second, firms holding more cash will have lower liquidity risk, but their default risk could 
be higher due to the high idiosyncratic risk or slow potential growth. Third, firms with 
smaller DTD show that the market value of their assets is low and are more likely to default. 
Looking at the empirical results (both ‘default’ and ‘post-default’), only ST shows 
inconsistent results. In the default state, ST is not significant, confirming that ST may not be 
directly related to actual default. It becomes significant in the post-default state but the 
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negative sign indicates that ST firms are less likely to enter the post-default state. This is in 
line with the previous results showing that ST is not associated with the actual default event. 
In the following, we calculate default probability of individual firms using parameters 
estimated by the multinomial model. First, we look at the overall default probability (PD) of 
China’s public firms. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2.3 shows the overall default probability of China’s public listed firms from 2001 
to 2014. Overall, China’s public listed firms have relatively high default risk during early 
2000’s and the PD shows a clear downtrend after the year of 2006. The default probability 
is increasing since 2001 and peaking around 2006. The PD keeps decreasing afterwards and 
rise up again right after 2008 (i.e. when a global financial crisis happens) to 2009. Then PD 
is declining after the year of 2009. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Then we further look at the default probability of firms in default, post-default months 
and tranquil months. Figure 2.4 shows the default probability of China’s public firms in 
default months (red line), post default year (green line) and tranquil months (dash line) 
respectively. In most times, tranquil months have the lowest PD and post-default months are 
slightly higher. Not surprisingly, the default months get highest PD. The huge gap is found 
around the year of 2007 when the whole market was turning better but more default events 
actually happened at that time, this is consistent with our model results, which suggests that 
more defaults are expected when the market is in good condition. 
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4.3.2 ST Firms Analysis 
In this section, we further investigate ST28 firms to see the reliability of ST as a proxy 
for the default event. Especially, we use ST as a dependent variable in the binomial logit 
model. 
Instead of complying with market-based policies, the regulatory framework for public 
listed firms in China is more administrative. To keep the good financial condition of listed 
firms in the stock exchange and also to protect investors’ interests, the Chinese Securities 
Regulation Commission (CSRC) designs the ‘Special Treatment (ST)’ regulation for firms 
that are in risk to be delisted. Once a firm is identified as the ‘ST’ firm by regulators, a 
designation of ‘ST’ will be placed in the beginning of its stock ticker. The ‘ST’ is regarded 
as a warning signal to investors in the market. The firm will be on probationary status and 
the change of stock pricing will be limited to +-5% daily (i.e. once reach the caps, the stock’s 
trading will be suspended for the rest of the day).  
The firms being designated of Special Treatment for different reasons, but mainly are 
bad performance according to the financial statement and auditor decisions (being ST 
because of a negative audit option). According to the regulations of the Shanghai stock 
exchange, a firm will be designated as ST firm in the following 4 reasons: 
1. A firm has negative earnings for two consecutive years; 
2. The shareholder equity is lower than registered capital in the last fiscal year; 
3. Auditors issue negative opinions about the firm; 
4. A firm has stopped or intends to cease operations or business activities for at least 
three months. 
                                                          
28 If not specified, ST represent both ST and *ST firms. 
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ST mechanism is mainly used as a warning sign for investors and sometimes helped to 
protect investors from ‘government control’ Pistor and Xu (2005) propose that the ST 
delisting mechanism can be used as a substitute to restrain mismanagement of firms. The ST 
delisting will lead to the lower quota for future IPOs from that region. Though ST is designed 
to protect investors from the danger of delisting, ST may not be a good warning sign for 
underperforming firms and be used as a default proxy to study credit risk. Jiang and Wang 
(2008) suggest that the ST delisting mechanism is not perfect because firms will intend to 
engage in earnings manipulation to avoid accounting losses. And on the hand, some viable 
firms will be delisted due to temporarily poor performance. In addition, the ST designation 
is only a warning signal to investors without revealing more useful information to the public. 
In China’s stock market, lots of mergers and acquisitions happen within ST firms. Firms are 
looking for reverse merger opportunities from ST firms to help them skip the long waiting 
list of IPO. Based on 66 ST firms’ data from 1998-2000, Bai et al. (2004) find that more 
than half of the largest shareholders of these ST firms are changed. And 36% of these firms 
changed their main business. In terms of firm’s performance, surprisingly, the 66 ST firms 
outperformed the market by 31.8% after 24 months being designated by ST. A firm will be 
designated by ST anytime through the year when bad news is discovered and regulators 
identify problems of the firm, but another problem of this ST mechanism is that due to the 
criteria relating to firms’ annual financial statement, ST or *ST decisions will be made 
during April and May and a cluster ST will be observed from the market.  
In our database, we have the 940 active firms from Shanghai A Shares.  There are 216 
firms which are 22.98% of all the A Shares firms are marked or used to be marked as ST 
firms. And the first *ST firm appears in 2003 in the sample. Furthermore, 182 firms have 
been marked as ‘*ST’ between 2003 and 2013. There are two periods when an increasing 
number of new firms were marked ‘*ST’: 26 firms in 2003 and 62 firms between 2006 and 
2007. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2.5 ABOUT HERE] 
From figure 2.5, it shows the ST rate (ST firms / active firms) increases since 2000 and 
peaks around 2008 with 10%. After 2012, the ST rate starts to fall and back to the same level 
at the year of 2004. Apparently, the convex shape of the ST rate is not well fit with the 
default probability lines of default months and post-default months in figure 2.4. Also, the 
ST rate shares no common trend with actual default events from figure 2.1. From the data, 
it seems ST rate and default rate differs greatly and ST may not be a good default proxy. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE] 
Before comparing the credit risk between ST firms and other firms, we estimate the 
binomial logit model using ST as a dependent variable. From table 2.7, the results show 
some clear difference from the model with actual default data and support our discussions 
above. Firstly, unlike actual default firms, the ST firms are not affected by the market 
condition. The index return has a positive sign but not significant due to a large standard 
error. Secondly, cash is insignificant while the net income trend becomes a crucial factor. 
The positive coefficient on the net income trend indicates that the ST firms are more likely 
to have an increasing profit compared to the previous 12 months. The profit of ST firms is 
increasing but it should stay low or even negative before the firms eventually marked with 
ST by regulators. Thirdly, DTD seems to be less important compared to the multinomial 
model with actual default data. Only DTD is significant at 10% while both level and trend 
of DTD are highly significant at 1% in the multinomial model. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.6 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.7 ABOUT HERE] 
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Figure 2.6 plots the median default probability for ST and non-ST firms. The results 
estimated from our model show that PD of ST firms is much higher than PD of the non-ST 
firm during the early 2000s. Hugh default spread is found from 2002 to 2006 from figure 
2.6. It suggests that ST firms being designated by ST during the early 2000s are mainly 
because of insolvency problems and at that times ST could be a good default proxy. But after 
2006, the PDs of ST firms and non-ST firms seem to move together. And from figure 2.7, 
even non-ST firms have higher default probability than ST firms around the year of 2006, 
2007 and 2009. 
Overall, the empirical results confirm that ST is not a reliable default proxy for the actual 
default event. 
4.3.3 Delist Firms Analysis 
The variable *ST contains more relevant information than ST and we use it as a warning 
signal that firms will be delisted by regulators. One could consider delisted firms as default 
proxy, but it is not clear if firms are delisted due to only an insolvency problem. If a firm is 
delisted due to the insolvency (default) problem, its default probability should be higher than 
other firms. On the other hand, if it is delisted due to other problems (‘merger and acquisition’ 
(M&A) or ‘privatization’), its default probability would be similar to or even lower than the 
other firms. 
Our sample contains 41 delisted firms29.  We find that 19 firms exited the market due to 
M&A and 4 firms were marked with ST (one of the four is *ST) out of 19 firms.  The other 
22 firms exited due to insolvency. Out of the 22 firms, 21 were marked with ST (18 were 
marked with *ST). Most delisted ST firms suffer insolvency problems, but this is a small 
part of the total (216 ST firms in our sample). Thus, our sample shows that delisted firms 
                                                          
29 40 firms with PD data in the following analysis. 
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would not be the good proxy for default events. It shows that there is a significant change of 
median default probability before and after 2007. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.8 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2.8 shows predicted default probabilities of individual firms using the parameters 
estimated by the multinomial logit mode. We report the median default probability of three 
different groups (default, delist or active firms) for each month. 
First, delisted firms show a higher default probability than default firms before 2007. We 
find that all the 21 delisted firms exited due to insolvency problems during this period. After 
2007, delisted firms show a lower default probability than default firms. This is because all 
the 19 delisted firms exited due to M&A during this period.  Second, delisted firms show a 
higher default probability than active firms before 2007. Since all the delisted firms exited 
due to insolvency problems, this result is expected. After 2007, delisted firms show a lower 
default probability than active firms. This is because they exited due to M&A.  
Overall, the results suggest that default risk of delisted firms will be subject to the reasons 
of being delisted (i.e. insolvency problems or M&A) from the exchange. Furthermore, this 
is not a complete proxy for the default events. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The empirical literature on default of public listed firms in China is very limited. This paper 
addresses this limitation and constructs a unique default dataset for public listed firms in 
China between 1999 and 2013. This is a significant contribution on corporate credit risk 
study in China. 
We explore the determinants of firms’ default using both firm-specific and 
macroeconomic covariates. Since most firms in China survive after a default, we consider a 
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model with ternary states (default, post-default and tranquil). The test statistic shows a 
significant difference between firm-specific data during post-default and tranquil times. 
We compare the multinomial logit model with the binomial logit model. Both the 
pseudo-R^2 and ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) suggest that the multinomial logit 
model outperforms the binominal logit model; that is, the multinomial logit model shows 
better prediction accuracy than the binomial logit model. The estimation results also show 
that both binomial and multinomial logit models outperform the KMV-Merton structural 
model.  
Our results are different from the results presented for the US firms. Some traditional 
determinants like profitability and market-to-book value are insignificant in China. In 
addition, unlike the US firms, firms holding more liquid assets are more likely to default. 
This is possibly because small and medium size firms cannot obtain sufficient credit during 
distress times. Holding more cash may indicate that they are uncertain about the future or 
that they do not have good investment opportunities.  
In addition to this, we also find that the spread of default probability between ST firms 
and non-ST firms is larger before 2006 but it narrows afterwards. This result supports our 
view that ST may not be a reliable default proxy. We also investigate if delisted firms can 
be used as a proxy for the default event. The results show that high default probabilities 
could cause a delisting but not vice-versa; i.e. the default event is not the unique reason for 
delisting a firm.  
Our results have noticeable policy implications: Firstly, regulators in China should focus 
more on the financial health of small-medium-enterprises (SMEs) during periods when the 
market is not distressed because SMEs are more likely to default when the stock market 
performs well and the interest rates are low. Secondly, the ST mechanism is used to be very 
effective as a default warning sign to investors for the public listed firms in the early period, 
76 
 
but it has been less effective and the criteria should be updated now. The spread of default 
probability between ST and non-ST firms has become smaller in recent years. Finally, given 
the fact that SMEs outperform the large state-owned-enterprises (SIEs) (Luo and Park, 2001; 
Park et al., 2006) but they face more financing constraints than SOEs, more significant 
reforms in terms of financial liberalization should be implemented. 
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Figure 2.1 Default events by month 
Notes: this figure plots the number of actual default events in each month over the sample 
period 1999 to 2013. 
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Figure 2.2 ROC of three models 
Note: this figure plots the ROCs for three default risk models: the multinomial model (solid), 
the binomial logit model (dash) and the KMV-Merton’s structural model (dot). We estimate 
three models using the full sample. If the model has zero information, ROC corresponds to 
the 45-degree line (y=x). On the other hand, the perfect model would have ROC that goes 
straight up from (0,0) to (0,1) and then across to (1,1). 
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Figure 2.3 Median default probability of active firms 
Note: this figures plots the median default probability of active firms from 2000 to 2013. 
We predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by 
the multinomial model, and take the median default probability of all active firms for each 
month. 
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Figure 2.4 Median default probability of active firms in different states 
Note: this figure plots the median default probability in the three different states from 2000 
to 2013: Default (red), post-default (green) and tranquil (dot black). We first predict the 
default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the multinomial 
model. Then we take the median default probability given a state for each month. 
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Figure 2.5 ST rate at each month (ST firms / active firms) 
Note: this figure plots the ST rate at each month from 1999 to 2014. The ST rate is 
calculated by number of ST firms divided by the number of active firms. 
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Figure 2.6 Default probability (median) of ST and Non-ST firms 
Note: this figure plots the median default probability of ST (red) and non-ST (blue) firms. 
We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated 
by the multinomial model. Then we take the median default probability given a state for each 
month. 
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Figure 2.7 PD spread between ST and Non-ST firms 
Note: this figure plots the default probability spread between ST firms and non-ST firms by 
using the median default probability. We first predict the default probability of individual 
firm based on the parameters estimated by the multinomial model. Then we take the median 
default probability given a state for each month. 
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Figure 2.8 PD of delist, default and whole market 
Note: this figure plots the median default probability in the three different states from 2000 
to 2013: Default (orange), delist (blue) and active (yellow). We first predict the default 
probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the multinomial model. 
Then we take the median default probability given a state for each month. 
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Table 2.1 Default rate 
Year Active firms Defaults Default rate 
1999  666  4  0.60% 
2000  707  17  2.40% 
2001  780  47  6.02% 
2002  831  60  7.22% 
2003  850  46  5.41% 
2004  874  105  12.01% 
2005  885  91  10.28% 
2006  890  81  9.10% 
2007  904  64  7.08% 
2008  930  38  4.09% 
2009  958  48  5.01% 
2010  957  29  3.03% 
2011  954  7  0.73% 
2012  951  14  1.47% 
2013  947  5  0.53% 
Note: This table reports the number of active firm and the number of default for each year 
over the sample period 1999-2013. The number of active firm is calculated by averaging the 
number of active firms across all months given the year. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics 
  Max Min Mean Median Std. 
CASH/TA 1.0000  0.0022  0.5268  0.5333  0.2129  
CASH/TAtrend 0.7220  -0.8776  -0.0661  -0.0348  0.3282  
NI/TA 2.4627  -16.1121  0.0193  0.0159  0.1319  
NI/TAtrend 4.0777  -2.1403  -0.0159  -0.0150  0.0653  
M/B 1912.1912  -981.9954  3.7665  2.6607  21.8181  
M/Btrend 5620.4129  -1365.5878  -0.6681  -0.2099  29.8502  
Size 0.0586  0.0409  0.0466  0.0464  0.0024  
DTD 31.1876  -0.7085  4.3048  3.9119  2.1451  
DTDtrend 7.9164  -22.0075  -2.3970  -2.1945  2.2793  
Note: This table reports the maximum (Max), minimum (Min), average (Mean), median 
(Med) and standard deviation (Std.) of firm-specific variables including cash/total asset 
(Cash), net income/total asset (Net income), market value/book value (MB), log of total asset 
(Firm size), distance to default (DTD). All variables excepting Firm size also include their 
trend value which is the difference between current value and its previous 12-month average. 
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Table 2.5 The multinomial logit model 
 
The multinomial logit model estimated is a discrete dependent variable taking 
value 0,1 and 2 for tranquil, default month and 12 months after default 
respectively. 
Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1,2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ +
𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴 +⁄ 𝛽6𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑀 𝐵⁄ +
𝛽8𝑀 𝐵⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑇𝐷 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑇. 
Variables   Default month   12 months after default month 
Constant  -3.0126***  0.1473 
  (1.1481)  (0.3317) 
Interest Rate -0.2549***  -0.1648*** 
  (0.0585)  (0.0161) 
Index Return 1.4406**  0.1734 
  (0.6129)  (0.1717) 
CASH/TA  2.0389***  1.6979*** 
  (0.3336)  (0.0956) 
CASH/TA 
trend 2.2586***  2.0651*** 
  (0.2705)  (0.0767) 
NI/TA  0.3654  0.0445 
  (0.7561)  (0.1232) 
NI/TA trend 0.1378  -0.0792 
  (0.6976)  (0.2223) 
M/B  -0.0009  -0.0004 
  (0.0024)  (0.0007) 
M/B trend  0.0006  0.0004 
  (0.0008)  (0.0003) 
Size  -51.4603**  -62.8342*** 
  (24.7862)  (7.1722) 
DTD  -0.1019***  -0.1236*** 
  (0.0304)  (0.0091) 
DTD trend  -0.0804***  -0.0676*** 
  (0.0271)  (0.0081) 
ST  -0.0732  -0.1570** 
    (0.2654)   (0.0771) 
Number of 
observation  95,826   
***Denotes significance at 1%. 
**Denotes significance at 5%. 
*Denotes significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.6 The binomial logit model (post default 
data excluded) 
 
The binomial logit model estimated is a discrete dependent 
variable taking value 0 and 1 for tranquil and default month 
respectively. 
Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +
𝛽5𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴 +⁄ 𝛽6𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑀 𝐵⁄ + 𝛽8𝑀 𝐵⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +
𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑇𝐷 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑇. 
Variables   
Constant 0.5558 
 (1.2038) 
Interest Rate -0.2371*** 
 (0.0595) 
Index Return 1.8421*** 
 (0.6241) 
CASH/TA 0.3133 
 (0.3359) 
CASH/TA trend 0.5676** 
 (0.2721) 
NI/TA 1.0687 
 (1.1890) 
NI/TA trend -0.2496 
 (0.8756) 
M/B 0.0001 
 (0.0021) 
M/B trend 0.0046 
 (0.0032) 
Size -91.5022*** 
 (25.9405) 
DTD -0.1482*** 
 (0.0304) 
DTD trend -0.0982*** 
 (0.0263) 
ST -0.1624 
  (0.2736) 
Number of observation 44,497 
***Denotes significance at 1%. 
**Denotes significance at 5%. 
*Denotes significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.7 The binomial logit model (post ST data 
excluded) 
 
The binomial logit model estimated is a discrete dependent 
variable taking value 0 and 1 for tranquil and ST month 
respectively. 
Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑇𝐴⁄ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +
𝛽5𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴 +⁄ 𝛽6𝑁𝐼 𝑇𝐴⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑀 𝐵⁄ + 𝛽8𝑀 𝐵⁄  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +
𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑇𝐷 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑. 
Variables   
Constant 16.886 
 (3.1597) 
Interest Rate -0.2329** 
 (0.1044) 
Index Return 1.1912 
 (1.1815) 
CASH/TA -0.5982 
 (0.7047) 
CASH/TA trend 1.6498*** 
 (0.5478) 
NI/TA 0.1727 
 (0.1950) 
NI/TA trend 1.3599*** 
 (0.3171) 
M/B 0.0018 
 (0.0027) 
M/B trend -0.0082 
 (0.0064) 
Size -478.4383*** 
 (71.4416) 
DTD -0.1723* 
 (0.0883) 
DTD trend 0.0711 
  (0.0767) 
Number of observation 87,327 
 
***Denotes significance at 1%. 
**Denotes significance at 5%. 
*Denotes significance at 10%. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Dynamic Default Correlations in Financial 
System 
 
 
In recent years, financial institutions have become increasingly closely 
interconnected in many ways. The systemic risk among these financial entities is a 
great concern for both central banks and investors. This paper studies the joint default 
risk between insurance firms and other financial institutions. Basing our research on 
publicly listed firms in US market, this paper finds dynamic symmetric default 
correlations between these two sectors in different time horizons by using student’s t 
copula with the generalized autoregressive score model (GAS). Economic drivers are 
found for short-term and long-term correlations. In addition, we find the joint default 
risk between insurance firms and financial institutions are very sensitive to global 
financial market events. 
 
 
I would like to thank my friend Yang Zhao for his help in learning copula theory and workshop discussants 
at the school of economics, Zhejiang University, the business school of Nanjing University, and the 
University of Glasgow for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the systemic risk within financial industry is becoming a hot topic and attracts 
great attentions of both investors and regulators. Great concerns about the systematic risk 
among financial institutions have increased after the global financial crisis and EU sovereign 
debt crisis. Financial institutions like insurance and banks (including other small credit 
unions) are normally supervised by regulators separately. For regulators and policymakers, 
the recent financial crisis evokes their interest in systemic risk within different financial 
institutions. 
Across different institutions, insurance firms are the special ones, it is not only because 
they provide insurance for other financial institutions, but also they are regarded the most 
stable ones. Insurance firms, like banks, are playing a more and more important role in the 
financial system. Janina and Gregor (2015) argue that insurance firms are becoming more 
similar to banks and contribute to the systemic risk of the financial system. Additionally, the 
study by Geneva Association (2010) indicates that the insurance industry would raise the 
systemic risk of the financial sector if insurers heavily engage in derivatives trading which 
is off balance sheet or they mismanaged short-term financing activities. In the 2008 financial 
crisis, after the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the collapse and near-failure 
of insurance American International Group (AIG) was a major event in the recent financial 
crisis. AIG lost 99.2 billion US dollar and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provide 
an 85 billion US dollar to save it. Not surprisingly, AIG is engaged with financial derivatives, 
the credit default swap which is the financial instrument that links all entities together causes 
AIG losing 30 billion US dollar. 
Recent studies suggest that the financial institutions are becoming more and more closely 
correlated in recent years by strong business ties between them. First, the linkage between 
insurance firms and banks cannot be ignored and Insurance firms play a crucial role in the 
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financial markets. For example, Main (1982) shows that banks can benefit from good 
correlation with insurance firms. By working with insurance firms, banks can avoid some 
bad debts. This is because the information of obligors provided by insurance firms helps 
banks to understand individual and corporate risk exposures better. In addition to that, by 
mitigating the losses during natural disasters, insurance firms help to reduce the probability 
of default of some investors (policyholders of insurance firms, both individual and corporate) 
who, sometimes, are the same obligors of banks (Lee C.-C. et al, 2016). Lehmann and 
Hofmann (2010) show that banks are more likely to transfer part or all of their risks to other 
financial sectors like insurance firms to avoid high correlation among assets and to reduce 
default probability. Trichet (2005) shows that insurance industry and banking industry is 
linked by ownership and the associations of credit exposure. As a result, insurance firms are 
playing a central role in the financial markets and this may directly affect banks and other 
financial institutions. Second, from the perspective of insurance firms, Billio et al. (2012) 
suggest that in recent years, insurers have become more likely to invest into a non-core 
business like insuring financial products, credit-default swaps, derivatives trading, and 
investments management. And this new business for insurance firms competes directly with 
financial institutions. Traditionally, insurance firms provide credit to hedge funds and hedge 
funds buy principal protections on their funds from insurers. But now insurance firms have 
their own proprietary trading desks and hedge funds offer insurers capital-market-
intermediated insurance like catastrophe bonds. 
Previous papers show that insurance firms and other financial institutions (referred as 
‘financial firms’ hereinafter) are highly interconnected in many ways. Insurance firms are 
acting more like financial firms and they are becoming more and more closely correlated. 
The systemic risk within the financial system arises from the highly interconnected 
institutions which have business relationships and exposed to common factors so that one 
firm’s failure may cause a series firms’ failure. This paper investigates the correlated default 
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risk between insurance and financial sectors based on US stock market. In our paper, we 
include firms from the financial category of Bloomberg which include banks, insurance 
firms, broker/dealers, hedge funds etc. We study the question that whether there are time-
varying default correlations between insurance and financial sectors. We propose the 
dynamic copula model to capture the connectedness between insurance and financial sectors. 
In addition, will the dynamic default correlations vary with the default term structures is 
discussed. At last, we try to find out whether the time-varying correlations come from 
common factors or the interactions between firms by regressing the correlations with 
macroeconomic factors. At last, the simulated joint default probability clearly shows the co-
movement of insurance and financial sectors in different time horizons. 
In this paper, we use the individual default probability of public listed financial firms in 
US market from CRI database Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore. 
Our results show there are time-varying symmetric correlations between insurance and 
financial sectors in different time horizons (1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-
month, 36-month, and 60-month in our paper). Then we investigate the correlations between 
insurance firms and financial institutions using t copula with the generalized autoregressive 
score model (GAS) with skewed t and empirical distribution function (EDF) marginal 
respectively. The skewed t marginal distribution outperformance the EDF, so we study the 
copula correlations based on skewed t marginal. The copula correlations vary widely in 
different time horizons, and the only negative correlation is found in the 1-month horizon. 
Then we regress the copula correlations with economic drivers and find that the adjust R^2 
is low which indicating some latent factors such as the interactive between firms contribute 
the joint movement greatly. At last, we simulate the joint default risk of insurance and 
financial sectors. 
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Our empirical study has the following contributions. Firstly, we find the existence of 
dynamic and symmetric dependence between insurance and financial firms in both short-
term and long-term horizons in the US market.  Billio et al. (2012) study the correlation 
between hedge fund, banks, brokers, and insurance firms based on principal components 
analysis and Granger-causality tests. Our study of term-structure of the correlations are new 
and interesting. The results show that the correlations vary widely in different time horizons. 
In general, short-term correlations are low but volatile while long-term correlations are high 
but stable. Secondly, we find economic drivers of the movement of insurance and financial 
sectors in different horizons by regressing the copula correlations with macroeconomic 
variables. Clear differences are found between short-term and long-term default correlations. 
Our results suggest that short-term correlations (from 1-month to 12-month horizon) are 
driven by economic factors like credit index, VIX, interest rate level, yield curve slope, TED 
spread, crude oil, and index return. Long-term correlations (from 24-month to 60-month) are 
less sensitive to the market conditions. Thirdly, by using the correlations estimated from the 
student’s t GAS copula, we can simulate the joint default probability for the two sectors. 
Comparing to existing literature, we extend the systemic risk study within financial sector. 
While previous study focus on systemic risk among different counties (Lucas et al., 2014) 
or different banks (Chan et al., 2016). We first construct the joint PD of insurance and other 
financial firms across all time horizons which show a similar moving trend in our 20 years’ 
time period. The longer time horizon is, the higher joint default probability can be found. In 
addition, we find the joint PD between these two sectors are very sensitive to global financial 
market events. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the 
development of individual default risk modelling and correlated default risk modelling. 
Section 3 is the methodology, we present the modelling of individual firm’s default 
probability, the way to model the marginal distribution of PD, the Student’s t copula with 
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GAS model, and the joint default probability calculation. Section 4 presents the summary 
statistics of the data. Section 5 is the dependence analysis which includes the tests of 
asymmetric dependence and the time-varying dependence. Section 6 presents our empirical 
results of estimated time-varying copula correlations, the results of regression with economic 
drivers, and the joint default probability across different time horizons. Section 7 makes a 
conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Individual Firm’s Default Risk 
Default risk modelling has a fast developing in recent years from credit scoring models to 
structural models and reduced form models now. Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968) 
first propose scoring models that calculate firm’s default probability by using accounting-
based variables. The structural model first used by Merton (1974) by applying option theory 
to derivate the value of a firm’s liabilities in the presence of default, the probability of default 
is embedded in the option-pricing models and in his paper Merton only considering one 
single type debt of the firm. The firm’s market value of assets can be derived by viewing the 
firm as a call option. When firm’s assets’ value falls below a threshold which calculated by 
the structure of liabilities of the firm, the firm will be considered as default. There are several 
issues in credit scoring and structural models above. When modelling probability of default 
based on accounting data, the estimate of probability of default is aimed to measure an event 
in the future, but financial statements are designed to capture past performance of the firm 
so as a result, the accounting data may not have a strong prediction power about the future 
status of the firm. Also, Hillegeist et al (2004) find that due to the conservatism principle, 
fixed assets and intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative to their market prices which 
will cause accounting-based leverage measures to be overstated. As for the structural model, 
the value of firm’s assets is estimated by market prices. However, market prices may not all 
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publicly-available default-related information of the firm. Also, the term structure, other 
liabilities, and off-balance liabilities are not well specified in structural models when 
calculating default threshold of the firm, when may lead to an inaccurate estimation of 
default probability. 
As a result, this paper uses individual PDs from RMI-NUS database where PD is 
modelled by reduced-form model. Reduced-form models are becoming very popular in 
recent years for individual firm’s probability default estimation. Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) 
first introduce the reduced form model and developed by Duffie and Singleton (1999). The 
reduced-form model assumes exogenous Poisson random variables drive the default 
probability of the firm. A firm will default when the exogenous variables shift from their 
levels. The stochastic process in the models does not directly link to firm’s assets’ value 
which makes the models more tractable. Duffie, et al. (2007) first propose doubly stochastic 
Poisson model with time-varying covariates and then forecasting the evolution of covariates 
using Gaussian panel vector autoregressions. The model is further developed by Duan, et al 
(2012) which applies the pseudo-likelihood to derive the forward intensity rate of the doubly 
stochastic Poisson processes with different time horizon. 
 
2.2 Correlated Default Risk 
A good measure of correlated default risk between insurance and financial institutions is 
crucial for credit risk management given the fact that insurers and banks are engaged more 
closely in many ways. Default risk could spread quickly during financial firms through credit 
derivatives like CDS and CDOs.  For example, Jorion & Zhang (2007) and Stulz (2010) find 
the counterparty risk is transferred through financial products like the CDS protection seller 
will be exposed to higher default risk caused by the protection buyer’s other counterparties.  
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Das et al (2006) point out that both default correlations and default probabilities vary 
through the different economic environment. Time-series variation can be observed in 
default probabilities and the series show high volatility when to shift from the different 
economic environment. For example, default probabilities are more than double in high 
default risk time than low default risk time. These are also well captured by the correlated 
default probability curves from our model in different time horizons. Merton’s structural 
model indicates that both firm volatility and debt are significant in the movement of default 
probability.  
Dembo et al. (2004) find out that macroeconomic variables are significant in explaining 
the default probabilities. Other studies show these common risk factors such as GDP growth 
rate, market volatility, and interest rates have a direct effect on joint default risk. Duffie et 
al. (2007) suggest that common risk factors are not the only reason of correlated default risk. 
Both contagion factor and latent frailty factors play a significant role in explaining joint 
default risk. Here the contagion effect means one firm default will cause the change of 
default risk of other firms. And the frailty factors are the remaining sources of the joint 
default risk which are not explained by the common factors and contagion factors. 
Recent papers model the systemic risk between banks and other financial institutions are 
more or less relying on the stock price. For example, Demirer et al. (2015) use stock returns 
volatility, Acharya et al. (2012) model financial entities’ capital shortfall, and Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2014) apply a CoVar method. Chan et al. (2016) suggest that these 
constructions imply the risk indirectly comparing to model the correlation by PD. Stock 
prices may not contain all the information of firm’s potential failure while the probability of 
default is the likelihood that a firm fail to pay its obligations in the future. The high PD 
indicates a firm is more likely to default over certain horizons and it may trigger a series 
default events in the system through varies contagion channels. As a result, in our paper, 
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instead of stock price, we use individual PD of firm directly. Before using copula to estimate 
correlated default probability of insurance and finance industries, individual default 
probability needs to be modelled. This paper uses individual PDs from RMI-NUS database 
where PD is modelled by the reduced-form model proposed by Duan et al. (2012).  
The modelling of correlated default risk is well developed. Traditional reduced-form 
model of portfolio applies a bottom-up model which portfolio intensity is an aggregate of 
individual intensities or a top-down model which portfolio intensity is calculated without 
including individual intensities. Schönbucher (2003) points out that the drawback of 
intensity-based models is the computational complexities may be very time-consuming. The 
copula-based models have some natural advantages because of the mathematical properties 
in correlated default modelling. The copula allows the great flexibility of choosing a 
marginal distribution for each sector. Random variables with different marginal distributions 
can be easily linked with the copula function. In our case, when modelling the joint default 
risk, the marginal distributions of firm’s default probability can be transformed to the 
portfolio default probability by the copula. Gaussian copula was first introduced to default 
risk to simulate the dependence structure of the times until default by Li (2000).  And this 
Gaussian assumption is further studied by Andersen and Sidenius, 2004; Giesecke, 2004; 
Hull and White, 2004; Glasserman and Li, 2005; Das et al., 2007. Since there is no tail 
dependence of the Gaussian copula, but empirical data always shows ‘fat tails’ in their 
distribution, while obviously Gaussian copula cannot capture the extreme increase in default 
probability when the correlated default happens. An empirical study by Wolfgang et al. 
(2003) turns out student t copula is better than Gaussian copula. Other papers such as 
Meneguzzo and Vecchiato (2004) find that the Student’s t copula well capture the tail 
dependence between different underlying assets when pricing the CDO and basket CDS. 
Their results show that the Student’s t copula outperformance Gaussian copula.  In addition, 
Christoffersen et al. (2016) study dependence in corporate credit and equity returns for 215 
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firms and find that the default dependence is non-Gaussian and highly variable.   As a result, 
in this paper, Student t copula is used to calculate the joint default probability. Traditional 
way uses copula theory to estimate the parameters of risk factors in credit risk management. 
This paper applies time-varying t copula to capture varying correlation between two sectors.  
The linkage between insurance and financial sectors is highly dynamic, especially as 
both sectors are changing greatly over the last decade. The time-varying correlation results 
from connectedness among financial institutions’ holdings and the sensitive to market 
condition. The modelling of this dynamic default correlation is playing a very important role 
in estimating joint default probability. This dynamic dependence is captured by the GAS 
model, which is pioneered by Creal et al. (2013). Unlike parameter-driven models like the 
stochastic volatility model and stochastic intensity models (Shephard, 2005; Bauwens and 
Hautsch, 2006; Koopman et al., 2008), the GAS model is an observation-driven model based 
on the score function. The time variation of the parameter is driven by the scaled score. The 
GAS model is widely used in recent empirical research, for example, Creal et al. (2014a) 
forecast macro, credit, and loss given default risk conditions for U.S. Moody’s-rated firms. 
Janus et al (2014) develop a model for volatility and time-varying dependence in daily 
financial return series that are subject to long memory dynamics and heavy-tailed densities. 
Lucas et al. (2014) study the joint and conditional sovereign default risk in EU from observed 
CDS prices. Salvatierra and Patton (2015) develop new dynamic copula models for daily 
asset returns to extract information from high-frequency data. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this paper, there are four steps to estimate the correlated default risk between insurance 
and financial sectors. First, the individual default probability for each firm in the insurance 
and financial sectors obtained from RMI-NUS database which is calculated following Duan 
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et al. (2012) model should be standardized. Second, we construct a time series of sector’s 
PD by using the median value of all active firms’ PDs within each sector. Third, we estimate 
the dynamic correlations between these two sectors using the t copula with the generalized 
autoregressive score model. Fourth, we estimate the joint default probability of the insurance 
and financial sectors by the dynamic copula correlations.  
 
3.1 Individual Firm’s Probability of Default  
We construct the time-series PD for each sector by using median PD of all active firms in 
that sector. The PD of individual firms is obtained from the National University of Singapore, 
Risk Management Institute, CRI database. 
The model used to calculate default probability based on a doubly stochastic process 
which first presented by Duffie et al. (2007), and further developed by Duan et al. (2012).  
Duan et al. (2012) provide a forward intensity model for multi-period default perdition 
without covariates forecasting. The overlapped pseudo-likelihood function is used and the 
pseudo-likelihood function can be decomposed to different forward times. The estimation of 
parameters with different time horizon is independent of each other. 
A doubly-stochastic formulation of the point process for default is proposed by Duffie 
et al. (2007), where the conditional probability of default within τ years is: 
 𝑞(𝑋𝑡, τ) = 𝐸 (∫ 𝑒
−∫ (𝜆(𝑢)+𝜑(𝑢))𝑑𝑢
𝑧
𝑡
𝑡+τ
𝑡
𝜆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧|𝑋𝑡)               (3.1) 
Xt is the Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. λt (i.e. the 
conditional mean arrival rate of default measured in events per year) is a firm’s default 
intensity. The firm may exit for other reasons like merger or acquisition, the intensity is 
defined as φt. Thus the total exit intensity is φt + λt. 
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The doubly-stochastic model allows to combine two decouple estimators β and γ to 
obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of the default probability q(Xt, τ). In the default 
estimation models, given the path of state-vector X, the merger or acquisition and default 
times of the firm are conditionally independent. The detail log-likelihood function and 
forward intensity can be found in the appendix. 
 
3.2 Marginal distribution of PD  
First, since the forward default intensity in Duan et al. (2012) is exponentials of linear 
combinations of frim-specific and macroeconomic variables and the PD is equal to one 
minus the exponential of multiplication of default intensity and the time horizon (in our 
paper, from 1-month to 60-month). We make some transformations of the PDs, the 
transformation in the following makes PDs back to have linear correlation with default 
attributes (see Duan and Miao, 2016).and then calculate the first difference of the PD: 
 𝑝𝑡 = ln{− ln[1 − 𝑃𝑡(1)]},                                                     (3.2) 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡−1.                                                          (3.3)
Before modelling the PD dependence of the two sectors, we base the transformed PD of 
each sector on the following structure: 
 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖(𝑍𝑡−1) + 𝜎𝑖(𝑍𝑡−1)𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,2                               (3.4) 
where the estimated standardized residuals 𝜀𝑖?̂? ≡ 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖(𝑍𝑡−1) 𝜎𝑖(𝑍𝑡−1)⁄ . 
Then each PD series have potentially time-varying conditional mean and variance. We 
use ARMA (m, n) model up to order (5,5) to model the conditional mean and GJR-GARCH 
(1, 1, 1) (Glosten et al., 1993) to model the conditional variance and z_it is the standardized 
PD. 
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 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖,𝑘𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑘𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑚
𝑘=1            (3.5) 
 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1                              (3.6) 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1 if 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0 and 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0 if 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0 
We consider both parametric and nonparametric marginal distributions for each PD 
series.  
After taking conditional mean and variance, we consider both parametric and 
nonparametric marginal distributions for each PD series.  
For the parametric marginal, z_it follows Hansen (1994) skewed Student’s t distribution. 
 𝑧𝑖,𝑡~𝐹𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤−𝑡,𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖),  𝑣𝑖 ∈ (2,∞], 𝜆𝑖 ∈ (−1,1).               (3.7) 
where 𝑣𝑖 is the degree of freedom and 𝜆𝑖 is the skewness parameter. 
For the nonparametric marginal, the cumulative distribution function (EDF) 𝐹𝑖: 
 𝐹?̂? (𝑍) ≡
1
𝑇+1
∑ 1𝑇𝑡=1 {𝑧𝑖,?̂? ≤ 𝑧}.                                          (3.8) 
 
3.3 Student’s t copula with GAS model 
The Sklar (1959) theorem shows that the conditional joint distribution can be decomposed 
into marginal distributions and a copula. This paper calculated the joint default probability 
and conditional default probability based on t copula with skew-t and empirical distribution 
on a monthly basis. The marginal distribution of individual firm’s PD is defined as Fi, 𝑖 ≥ 2. 
The joint default probability of each industry can be calculated by applying a copula 
function C : 
 𝐹𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐶[𝐹1(𝑢1), 𝐹2(𝑢2),… , 𝐹𝑑(𝑢𝑑)].                         (3.9) 
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The copula C [0,1]𝑑 → [0,1]  above is the one and only one when the marginal 
distributions are continuous. And in our case, the unique copula (t copula) is given by (The 
t Copula and Related Copulas): 
 𝐶𝑣,𝜌
𝑡 (𝑢) = ∫ … 
𝑡𝜐
−1(𝑢1)
−∞
∫
Γ(
𝜐+𝑑
2
)
Γ(
𝜈
2
)√(𝜋𝜈)𝑑|𝜌|
(1 +
𝑥′𝜌−1𝑥
𝜈
)− 
𝜈+𝑑
2 𝑑𝑥.
𝑡𝜐
−1(𝑢𝑑)
−∞
    (3.10) 
where 𝑡𝜐
−1  is the quantile function of a standard univariate 𝑡𝑣  distribution and 𝜌  is the 
correlation matrix. 
The correlation matrix 𝜌 in our paper is modelled by GAS model of Creal, et al. (2013). 
The time-varying copula parameter which in our case is the correlation parameter 𝛿𝑡 is a 
function of its lagged values and a standardized score of the copula log-likelihood. In order 
to make sure the parameter to be (-1, 1), we follow Patton (2012) method to transform the 
parameter: 
 𝑓𝑡 = ℎ(𝛿𝑡) ⇔ 𝛿𝑡 = ℎ
−1(𝑓𝑡)                                                          (3.11)
where 𝛿𝑡 = (1 − exp{−𝑓𝑡})/(1 + exp {−𝑓𝑡}) 
 𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝜔 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡
−1 2⁄ 𝑠𝑡                                                          (3.12) 
where 𝑠𝑡 ≡
𝜕
𝜕𝛿
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝒄(𝑈1𝑡, 𝑈2𝑡;  𝛿𝑡); 𝐼𝑡 ≡ 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡
′] = 𝐼(𝛿𝑡) 
The time-varying parameter is a function of constant 𝜔, current value 𝑓𝑡, and score of 
copula-likelihood 𝐼𝑡
−1 2⁄ 𝑠𝑡. 
 
3.4 Joint default probability 
The joint default probability 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  for insurance sector and financial sector can be defined 
by: 
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 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = Prob (𝑧𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐹𝑖,𝑡
−1(1 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡), 𝑧𝑗,𝑡 > 𝐹𝑗,𝑡
−1(1 − 𝑝𝑗,𝑡)),      (3.13) 
where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is the default intensity of the sector.  
 
4. Data 
The individual default probability data are provided by the CRI database, Risk Management 
Institute, National University of Singapore. We analyse the insurance and financial public 
listed firms with PDs in US market over a time span of 20 years. 43 public listed insurance 
firms 35 public listed financial firms which have monthly data from 1996 to 2015 (240 data 
points in total without missing) are used in our sample. For each firm, we have a monthly 
default probability of 1 month’s, 3 months’, 6 months’, 12 months’,24 months’, 36 months’, 
and 60 months’ time horizon. Market data such as Chicago Fed National Financial 
Conditions Credit Subindex, VIX index, 10-year treasury rate, 3-month treasury bill, The 
TED spread, Crude Oil Price, CPI, and NASDAQ Composite Index returns are collected 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
4.1 Individual default probability 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
The transformed PD which is the default intensity of insurance and financial firms has the 
linear relationship with both macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. Table 3.1 shows 
the log returns of transformed PD of insurance and financial sectors in different horizons. 
The insurance sector is believed to be relatively stable but Table 3.1 suggests that the average 
PD returns of insurance firms is higher than financial firms in most time horizons. In the 
longer time horizons (36 months and 60 months in our case), insurance and financial firms 
have the same moving trend. The variation of Insurance and financial sectors PD returns is 
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almost the same except for the 1-month horizon where insurance firms have bigger standard 
derivation. Quantile analysis indicates non-zero skewness across different time horizons of 
both insurance and financial sectors. The non-zero skewness motivate us to use skewed t and 
empirical distributions to model marginal distributions for both sectors. 
 
5. Dependence analysis 
5.1 Asymmetric dependence 
The summary statistics gives us a quick review of marginal distributions of insurance and 
financial firms. In the next step, we will test the asymmetric dependence between two sectors.  
For a symmetric dependence we have: 
 𝜆𝑞 = 𝜆1−𝑞 ∀ 𝑞 ∈ [0,1]                                          (3.14) 
where 𝜆𝑞 is the quantile dependence and it is defined as:  
𝜆𝑞 = {
Pr[𝑈1𝑡 ≤ 𝑞|𝑈2𝑡 ≤ 𝑞] , 0 < 𝑞 ≤ 1/2
Pr [𝑈2𝑡 > 𝑞|𝑈2𝑡 > 𝑞], 1 2⁄ < 𝑞 < 1
. 
Follow the method from (Patton, 2012b), we test the asymmetric dependence between 
insurance and financial sectors: 
 ?̂? ≡ [𝜆𝑞1, 𝜆𝑞2, … , 𝜆2𝑝]′                                          (3.15) 
where 
𝑞𝑝+𝑗 = 1 − 𝑞𝑗 , for j = 1,2, … , p and q ∈ {0.025, 0.05, 0.10, 0.975, 0.95, 0.90} 
we test: 
 𝐻0: 𝑅𝜆 = 0 𝑣𝑠. 𝐻𝛼: 𝑅𝜆 ≠ 0                            (3.16) 
where R ≡ [𝐼𝑝 ⋮ −𝐼𝑝] 
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The results show that the test fails to reject the null that dependence between two sectors 
is symmetric in all time horizons (1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-monthm, 36-
month and 60-month) with a p-value of 0.9023, 0.9837, 0.9853, 0.9929, 0.9437, 0.9206 and 
0.9945 respectively. For insurance and financial sectors, there is no evidence of asymmetric 
dependence. As a result, in the next section, we will model the time-varying dependence by 
t-copula with GAS model. 
 
5.2 Time-varying dependence 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Patton (2012b) suggests that the conditional dependence structure may vary through time 
like conditional volatility. A simple way to look at time-varying dependence is to calculate 
the rolling rank correlation between two series. Figure 3.1 shows the rolling 60-day rank 
correlation for 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-monthm, 36-month and 60-month 
PD returns. Clear time-varying correlations can be found in each time horizon and this 
motivates us to apply the time-varying copula estimation in the next session.  
Further, we test the time-varying dependence based on the ‘ARCH LM’ test proposed 
by Engle (1982). The test use autocorrelation as a measure of dependence which captures by 
the autoregressive model. From table2, the evidence by the p-value suggests that non-zero 
autocorrelations for lags 5 and 10 across all time horizons but no evidence at lag 1. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE] 
From table 3.2, we have ‘ARCH LM’ test results for time-varying dependence.  The test 
applies an autoregressive model and regard the autocorrelation as a measure of dependence. 
The p-values of AR (5) is 0.0150, 0.0090, 0.0020, 0.0060, 0.0400, 0.0670, and 0.5710 and 
AR (10) is 0.0190, 0.0200, 0.0160, 0.0190, 0.0230, 0.0310, and 0.1780. It suggests that time-
114 
 
varying dependence exists between insurance and finance sectors in 1-month, 3-month, 6-
month, 12-month, 24-monthm and 36-month. 60-month horizon is an exception and our 
results consist with this that 60-month correlation is the flattest one. 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
6.1 Estimation results 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table3.3 shows the estimated parameters of the student’s t GAS copula model for the 
insurance and financial sectors with 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-
month, and 60-month horizon. We estimate the student’s t GAS copula by both skewed t 
distribution and empirical distribution (EDF). The log-likelihood suggests that parametric 
model outperformance semiparametric model across different time horizons. So in the next 
session, we analyze the time-varying Copula correlations based on skewed t distribution for 
insurance and financial sectors. 
 
6.2 Time-varying correlations 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.4 shows the average, standard derivation, median, maximum, and minimum of time-
varying Copula correlations between insurance and financial sectors for 1-month, 3-month, 
6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month, and 60-month horizon. Generally speaking, for a 
longer time horizon, the correlation between the insurance and financial sectors is higher but 
with smaller fluctuation comparing to short-time horizons. It’s not surprising that the highest 
volatility of correlations is found in the 1-month horizon with a value of 0.1738 which is 
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more than 20 times larger than that of 60-month horizon. Also the largest gap between 
maximum and minimum correlations across all time horizons can be found in the 1-month 
horizon.  
In addition, the only negative correlation exists in the 1-month horizon, with a value of 
-0.1928. The lowest average Copula correlation 0.3521 is found in the 1-month horizon. For 
the 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month time horizon, the average Copula 
correlations are around 0.4 and the correlation rises dramatically to nearly 0.5 for 60-month 
time horizon. Results from table 3.4 suggest that insurance firms and financial firms have 
time-varying correlations both in short-term and long-term horizons. But the correlations in 
the short-term horizon are lower than in long-term horizons but are more volatile. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3.2 shows the time-varying copula correlations for insurance and financial sectors 
for 1-month (rhot1), 3-month (rhot3), 6-month (rhot6), 12-month (rhot12), 24-month 
(rhot24), 36-month (rhot36), and 60-month (rhot60) horizon. The correlations are estimated 
by Student’s t GAS copula from 1996 to 2015. 
Figure 3.2 shows that 1-month correlation is clearly the most volatile one and the 60-
month correlation is more like a flat line with average values around 0.35 and 0.5 
respectively. The negative correlations are found within 1-month correlation in three 
different periods. The most sudden increases across all the correlations can be found during 
the early 2000s when Dotcom bubbles happened, around the year of 2008 when the global 
financial crisis began, and from 2010 to 2012 when European debt crisis started and later 
S&P downgraded US sovereign ratings. Our results suggest that insurance and financial 
sectors are positively high correlated in long-term horizon, but the correlations fluctuate 
more in the short-term horizon. In addition, the correlation between these two sectors is more 
likely to increase during global financial events. 
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6.3 Economic drivers of the correlations 
The different behaviours from short-term and long-term correlations between insurance and 
financial sectors motivate us to investigate the economic drivers behind them. In order to 
understand the economic drivers of the copula correlations in different time horizons, we run 
regressions of the time-varying correlations with macroeconomic factors. This also motived 
by whether the time-varying movements of dependence between insurance and financial 
sectors come from the economy condition or the interactions among firms. We select the 
following factors based on the paper of Christoffersen et al., (2016): 
1. The log of Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex is used to 
measure the credit conditions in the market. The credit subindex is composed of 
measures of credit conditions. Increasing risk, tighter credit conditions and declining 
leverage suggest tightening financial conditions. Therefore, a positive value 
indicates the corresponding credit conditions is tighter than on average, while 
negative values indicate the opposite. 
2. The log of the VIX index to model equity market risk. VIX measures market 
expectation of near term volatility conveyed by stock index option prices. 
3. The spread between 10-year Treasury rate and 3-month Treasury bill is used as a 
slope variable to model the term structure and 3-month Treasury bill as a level 
variable. 
4. The TED spread which is the difference between the Libor rate and short-term 
government debt rate is used to capture the liquidity in fixed income markets. The 
Series is calculated as the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on US dollars and 
3-Month Treasury Bill. 
5. The log of Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) - Cushing, Oklahoma. 
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6. The log of CPI to measure the inflation. 
7. The log return of NASDAQ Composite Index. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results of 1-month correlation on credit risk index, VIX, 
interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. The interest rate, yield curve slope, and TED spread are significant 
at 1%. In addition, crude oil and index return are significant at 10%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.6 presents the regression results of 3-month correlation on credit risk index, VIX, 
interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. The interest rate, yield curve slope, and TED spread are significant 
at 1%. Credit index is significant at 5%. VIX and index return are significant at 10%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.7 presents the regression results of 6-month correlation on credit risk index, VIX, 
interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. The interest rate, yield curve slope, and TED spread are significant 
at 1%. Index return is significant at 5%. And VIX is significant at 10%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.8 presents the regression results of 12-month correlation on credit risk index, 
VIX, interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. The interest rate, yield curve slope, and TED spread are significant 
at 1%. Credit index and VIX are significant at 10%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.9 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 3.9 presents the regression results of 24-month correlation on credit risk index, 
VIX, interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. Interest rate and yield curve slope are significant at 1%. VIX are 
significant at 5%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.10 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.10 presents the regression results of 36-month correlation on credit risk index, 
VIX, interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. Interest rate and yield curve slope are significant at 1%. VIX are 
significant at 10%. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.11 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.11 presents the regression results of 60-month correlation on credit risk index, 
VIX, interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and 
Composite index return. Interest rate and yield curve slope are significant at 1%.  
Regression results of 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month, and 
60-month horizon on credit risk index, VIX, interest rate level yield curve slope, TED spread, 
crude oil, inflation, NASDAQ, and Composite index return can be found from table 3.5, 
table 3.6, table 3.7, table 3.8, table 3.9, table 3.10 and table 3.11 respectively. The adjusted 
R^2 of 1-month correlation is 0.177 and it continue to rise with the time horizon increases. 
It peaks at 6-month with the highest adjusted R^2 0.358. Then the adjusted R^2 of 12-month 
correlation drops to 0.212. For 24-month and 36-month correlations, the economic drivers 
in our sample have very weak explanation power with the adjusted R^2 around 0.01. Finally, 
the adjusted R^2 of 60-month correlation increases to 0.134. 
Across all time horizons, interest rate level and yield curve slope are the only two 
variables remain significant (significant at 1%) and inflation is the only variable remain not 
significant.  In general, short-term correlations (from 1-month to 12-month horizon) are 
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more likely driven by economic factors, such as credit index, VIX, interest rate level, yield 
curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, and index return. When the financial condition (credit 
and liquidity) is tighter than average, equity market risk is high along with the high return, 
and crude oil price rises, insurance firms, and financial firms become more correlated. On 
the contrary, the two sectors are less correlated when interest rate level and yield curve slope 
is high. 
Long-term correlations (from 24-month to 60-month), they are less sensitive to the 
market condition. Our results show they are only affected by interest rate level, yield curve 
slope, and the market volatility (except for 60-month). Consistent with short-term horizons, 
insurance firms and financial firms are less correlated when interest rate level and yield curve 
slope is high while being more correlated when equity market risk is high. 
6.4 Joint default probability 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3.3 shows the estimated time-varying joint default probabilities of insurance and 
financial sectors from 1996 to 2015 by Student’s t GAS copula. The joint default 
probabilities are estimated based on 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-
month, and 60-month horizon respectively.  
The arrows indicate time points of several major events in the global financial market. 
The joint default probabilities across all time horizons show a similar moving trend in our 
20 years’ time period. The longer time horizon is, the higher joint default probability can be 
found.  
In the previous section, we find economic drivers of the time-varying correlations across 
different horizons. In addition, we find the joint default probabilities between insurance and 
financial sectors which are simulated by the Copula correlations are very sensitive to global 
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financial market. From 1997 to 1998, the PDs slightly rise when Asia crisis began. Later, a 
big increase can be found when the Argentine and Russian financial crises happened and 
further the joint PDs peak around 2000 when Dotcom bubble bust. At the year of 2008, when 
the global financial crisis started, the joint PDs grow dramatically and then decline slightly 
afterwards until the end of 2009. But two upward slopes can be found in the next two years 
when European debt crisis happened and the S&P downgrading of US sovereign debt ratings. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Previous research shows that insurance firms are acting more closely with financial 
institutions in many ways. Our paper investigates the linkage between the insurance and 
financial sectors from the prospective of dynamic copula correlations and joint default 
probability. Our database includes individual’s default probability of public listed insurance 
firms and financial firms in US market from the National University of Singapore, Risk 
Management Institute, CRI database. Evidence of time-varying symmetric correlations 
between these two sectors are found for both short-term and long-term horizons. We estimate 
the time-varying symmetric correlations and the joint default risk by student’s t GAS copula 
correlations with skewed t and empirical distribution.  
Our results show the existence of time-varying correlations between these two sectors 
which indicating dynamic and symmetric dependencies. And the correlations vary widely in 
different time horizons, the only negative correlation is found in the 1-month horizon. Short-
term correlations are relatively lower but more fluctuating while the long-term correlations 
suggest that insurance and financial firms are positively correlated. We find economic 
drivers of the movement of insurance and financial sectors by regressing the copula 
correlations with macroeconomic variables. Across all time horizons, interest rate level and 
yield curve slope always remain significant (significant at 1%) and inflation is the only 
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variable remain not significant.  In general, short-term correlations (from 1-month to 12-
month horizon) are more likely driven by economic factors like credit index, VIX, interest 
rate level, yield curve slope, TED spread, crude oil, and index return. Long-term correlations 
(from 24-month to 60-month) are less sensitive to the market condition. Our results suggest 
they are only affected by interest rate level, yield curve slope, and the market volatility 
(except for 60-month). Low adjust 𝑅2 indicates that the joint movement may come from the 
interactions between insurance firms and financial firms. By using the cupula correlations, 
we can also simulate the joint default probability for the two sectors. The joint PD of all time 
horizons show similar moving trend in our 20 years’ time period. The longer the time horizon 
is, the higher the joint default probability that can be found. In addition, we find the joint PD 
between these two sectors are very sensitive to global financial market events, such as 1997 
Asia crisis, 1998 Argentine and Russian financial crisis, 2000 Dotcom bubble, 2008 global 
financial crisis, 2010 European debt crisis, and the 2011 S&P downgrading US of sovereign 
debt ratings. 
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Appendix 
In the following, it’s a brief introduction of forward intensity from in Duan et al. (2012) 
model. 
Likelihood Function 
Instead of modelling the time-varying covariates to calculate the default probability, Duan 
et al. (2012) use the forward intensity rate to calculate the default rate. The model needs to 
derive the forward intensity rate at time τ. 
The pseudo-likelihood function for the prediction time τ defined as 
 ℒ𝜏(𝛼, 𝛽; 𝜏𝐶 , 𝜏𝐷 , 𝑋) =∏∏ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽),
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (1) 
And the likelihood function ℒτ,i,t(α, β) for firm i consists of five situations: the first is 
the firm i survives in the prediction time period, the second is the firm i defaults in the 
prediction period, the third is the firm i exits for other reasons (i.e. like merger and 
acquisition), the fourth is the firm i exits after this prediction time period and the last is the 
firm i exits before the start of this time interval: 
 
   ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽) 
= 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐶𝑖≥𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 𝑡 + 𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖= 𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐷𝑖 =         𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤
𝑡 + 𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖,𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 , 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏) +      1{𝑡0𝑖>𝑡} +
 1{𝑡𝐶𝑖<𝑡}. 
 
(2) 
Forward Intensity of Individual Firm’s PD 
First, we define Ft( τ) to be the time conditional distribution function of the combined 
exit time.  
 𝜓𝑡(𝜏) = −
𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝐹𝑡( 𝜏))
 𝜏
= −
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡 [𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−∫ (𝜆𝑢 + 𝜑𝑢)𝑑𝑧
𝑡+ 𝜏
𝑡
)]
 𝜏
 (3) 
Then,  exp[−ψt(s)s] becomes the survival probability at time interval (t, t+τ). 
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And the forward combined exit intensity is defined as: 
 𝑔𝑡( 𝜏) ≡
𝐹′𝑡( 𝜏)
1 − 𝐹𝑡( 𝜏)
=  𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) + 𝜓
′
𝑡
( 𝜏) 𝜏. (4) 
Also, the forward default intensity censored by other forms of exit: 
 
𝑓𝑡( 𝜏) ≡ 𝑒
𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) 𝜏 lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃𝑡(𝑡 +  𝜏 <   𝜏𝐷 =  𝜏𝑐  ≤ 𝑡 +  𝜏 + ∆𝑡)
∆𝑡
= 𝑒𝜓𝑡( 𝜏) 𝜏 lim
∆𝑡→0
𝐸𝑡 [∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−∫ (𝜆𝑢 + 𝜑𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑧
𝑡
)𝜆𝑧𝑑𝑧
𝑡+ 𝜏+∆𝑡
𝑡+ 𝜏
]
Δ𝑡
,  
(5) 
So the default intensity between (t, t+s) will be ∫ −eψt( τ) τ
 τ
0
ft(s)ds. 
And since Xt is the state variables contain both firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. 
 𝑓𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝛼1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛼2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘), (6) 
 𝑔𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑓𝑡(𝜏) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽0(𝜏) + 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛽2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘) (7) 
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Figure 3.2 Time-varying copula correlations for insurance and financial 
sectors 
Notes: Figure3.2 plots the estimated time-varying correlation between insurance and 
financial sectors from 1996 to 2015 by Student’s t GAS copula. The time-varying 
correlations are estimated based on 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-
month, and 60-month horizon respectively.  
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Figure 3.3 Joint default probability for insurance and finance industry 
Notes: Figure3.3 plots the estimated time-varying joint default probabilities of insurance and 
financial sectors from 1996 to 2015 by Student’s t GAS copula. The joint default 
probabilities are estimated based on 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-
month, and 60-month horizon respectively. The arrows indicate time points of several major 
events in the global financial market. 
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Table 3.2 Tests for time-varying dependence 
 
Month AR(1) AR(5) AR(10) 
1 0.7290  0.0150  0.0190  
3 0.9190  0.0090  0.0200  
6 0.9110  0.0020  0.0160  
12 1.0000  0.0060  0.0190  
24 0.9510  0.0400  0.0230  
36 0.9550  0.0670  0.0310  
60 0.9600  0.5710  0.1780  
Note: this table shows ‘ARCH LM’ test results for time-varying dependence. P-values of 
AR (1), AR (5), and AR (10) are presented here with 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-
month, 24-month, 36-month, and 60-month horizon respectively.  
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Table 3.4 Time-varying Copula correlations 
 
Month Mean std Median Max Min 
1 0.3521  0.1738  0.3604  0.6757  -0.1928  
3 0.4022  0.0891  0.4227  0.5820  0.1545  
6 0.4221  0.0911  0.4368  0.5650  0.1921  
12 0.4132  0.0794  0.4246  0.5492  0.1911  
24 0.4064  0.0453  0.4154  0.5020  0.1621  
36 0.4155  0.0266  0.4206  0.4717  0.3177  
60 0.4938  0.0068  0.4946  0.5055  0.4699  
Note: this table presents the average, standard derivation, median, maximum, and minimum 
of time-varying Copula correlations for 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, 
36-month, and 60-month horizon.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Analysing the Determinants of Credit Risk 
for General Insurance Firms in the UK 
 
 
This paper estimates a reduced-form model to assess the credit risk of General 
Insurance (GI) non-life firms in the UK. Compared to earlier studies, it uses a much 
larger sample including 30 years of data for 515 firms, and also considers a much 
wider set of possible determinants of credit risk. The empirical results suggest that 
macroeconomic and firm-specific factors both play important roles. Other key 
findings are the following: credit risk varies across firms depending on their business 
lines; there is default clustering in the GI industry; different reinsurance levels also 
affect the credit risk of insurance firms. The implications of these findings for 
regulators of GI firms under the coming Solvency II are discussed.  
This chapter is the early version of the working paper “Caporale, Guglielmo Maria., Cerrato, Mario., and 
Zhang, Xuan.  (2016). Analysing the Determinants of Credit Risk for General Insurance Firms in the UK.” 
I am grateful to Standard & Poor’s and the Bank of England for data support. I have benefited from 
comments from Papachristou Dimitris, Claus Stefan, Khaleghy Jennifer, Winter Richard, David Simmons, 
Nylesh Shah and others from the General Insurance Division of the Bank of England. I would like to 
thank the conference discussant at 3rd annual Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Workshop in 
Brighton, The 48th Money, Macro and Finance Research Group Annual Conference in Bath, and School 
of Economics Zhejiang University, AFR seminar in Hangzhou for helpful discussions and comments. 
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1.  Introduction 
The UK’s non-life insurance industry is worth £60bn and is the largest in Europe and the 
third largest in the world (after the US and Japan). It comprises more than 300 active firms 
(both domestically- and foreign-owned); 30  in addition, 94 Lloyds’s syndicates also 
underwrite non-life business (Lloyd's Annual Report 2014). In total, it currently generates 
approximately £48.217bn in gross written premium income (International Underwriting 
Association, 2015). 
Compared to the banking sector, the insurance industry is relatively stable and less 
subject to risk: unlike banks, insurers do not accept deposits from customers, and therefore 
they do not face the risk of a sudden shortage in liquidity which may cause bank runs; also, 
they often hold more long-term than short-term liabilities. Bell and Keller (2009) find that 
insurers are less interconnected than banks and there is less contagion among them. 
However, Janina and Gregor (2015) argue that insurance firms are becoming more similar 
to banks and contribute to the systemic risk of the financial sector. Further, a study by the 
Geneva Association (2010) indicates that the insurance industry increases systemic risk if 
insurers engage heavily in trading derivatives off the balance sheet or mismanage short-term 
financing activities. 
It is very difficult to access data on the credit risk of insurance firms because very few 
have become “insolvent” - the majority choose instead to transfer their business to other 
insurance firms or just stop underwriting new business. As an alternative, third-party rating 
agencies may provide a good overview of their financial condition. The main problem with 
external rating agencies is that not all insurance firms are rated and the ratings normally stay 
                                                          
30 In addition, more than 500 non-life insurance firms that are not regulated by the UK government are 
licensed by the European Economic Area to conduct business in the UK (Financial Services Authority, 
2013). 
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the same for many years. Also, different rating agencies such as A M Best, Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch have different rating methodologies and labelling systems.  
Under Solvency II, credit risk is defined as the risk of loss (or of adverse change) in the 
financial situation of a company which results from fluctuations in the credit standing of 
issuers of securities, counterparties and any debtors to which a Solvency II undertaking is 
exposed, in the form of counterparty default risk, spread risk, or market risk concentration.31 
In this paper, we assume that the credit risk of insurance firms is made up of three 
components. The first is the credit quality of their investment portfolio, whose performance 
we measure using investment returns. The second is the counter-party risk through 
reinsurance activity and the purchasing of derivative contracts. A high reinsurance ratio and 
holding derivative contracts increase the credit risk exposure of firms. The reinsurance ratio 
and a dummy variable for the use of derivative contracts are therefore used in our study to 
capture this second component. The third is the direct default risk of insurers when their 
liabilities are less than their assets and therefore they might become insolvent. The financial 
health of firms is measured here using the leverage, profitability, solvency and liquidity 
ratios. Size, growth and claims volatility are also taken into account.  
We consider different exit situations for firms, including insolvency and transferring 
business to a third party. Ours is the first study to use a very large dataset consisting of 30 
years of data for 515 firms to analyse the credit risk of General Insurance (GI) firms in the 
UK. We show that other risk factors (macroeconomic and firm-specific factors), in addition 
to the standard ones considered by the literature (i.e. interest rate, whole sale price change, 
credit supply change, usage of financial derivatives and combined ratios) affect insurers’ 
insolvency. When assessing their profitability, we take into account profit from both the 
traditional underwriting business and investment activities. We estimate both the individual 
                                                          
31 Art. 13(32) of the Solvency II Directive 
146 
 
probability of default (PD) for all available firms and the joint one using pair correlations. 
Ours is the first study to analyse the systemic risk of insurance firms in the UK on the basis 
of their individual PD. Our results show high dependence between insurance firms when 
their individual PDs are high; this suggests that the joint probability of default is higher 
during distress times. Finally, we examine the relationship between reinsurance and change 
in the credit risk of insurance firms. Previous studies show that primary insurers can benefit 
from reinsurance contracts in many ways (e.g. they can hedge against risk, and hold more 
capital to underwrite new business). We show that reinsurers may also benefit from 
reinsurance activities by reducing their credit risk.  
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data and the various determinants of risk considered. Section 4 
outlines the modelling approach. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 
summarises the main findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
Insurance firms play a very important role in the economy. Most studies (Carmichael, 
Pomerleano, 2002, Das et al., 2003, Lee, 2013 and Lee and Chang, 2015) suggests that they 
can enhance financial stability by transferring risk to multiple parties through insurance and 
reinsurance activities. Rothstein (2011) shows that a healthy and well-developed insurance 
industry will improve the stability of financial markets. In addition, insurance firms protect 
individuals and corporations from losses arising from natural disasters such as floods etc. 
(Adams et al., 2003; Faure and Heine, 2011; Kugler and Ofoghi, 2005; Ward and Zurbruegg, 
2000). 
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The insurance industry is thought to be less exposed to turbulence in financial markets 
than other industries such as the banking one. There are several possible reasons for this 
difference. Harrington (2009) argues that insurance firms have to comply with more rigorous 
capital requirements than other financial institutions, and as a result credit events in the 
insurance industry have a small effect on the stability of the financial system as a whole.  
Das et al. (2003) suggest that the insurance industry is more stable because insurers do not 
suffer from bank runs, and the cancellation process for insurance policies takes longer than 
closing a bank account. Furthermore, because of larger premia, policy holders would suffer 
a loss if the policy were cancelled.  
However, recent developments have made the insurance industry less stable; in 
particular, the fast growth of financial derivatives has meant that insurance firms have 
become more engaged with banks. 32  Schinasi (2006) and Rule (2001) find that more 
insurance firms are buying credit default swaps to hedge their credit risk and using 
alternative risk transfer (ART) tools such as catastrophe bonds to transfer the catastrophe 
risk to other investors. Also, investment in asset-backed securities has increased. As a result, 
as pointed out by Baluch et al. (2011), insurance firms have become more vulnerable during 
crises. This is also shown by studies such as those by Das et al., (2003), who find that 
linkages through reinsurance activities may cause several primary insurance firms to fail at 
the same time, and by Acharya et al. (2015), who suggest that large insurance firms are more 
likely to invest in high-risk assets because they are correlated with different financial 
institutions. One of the contributions of this paper is to assess the vulnerability of the UK 
insurance industry; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this issue is addressed 
in the case of the UK.  
                                                          
32 Insurance firms are more engaged with banks through trading financial derivatives and other investment 
activities. 
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The linkage between insurance firms and banking crises should not be ignored. Insurance 
firms play a crucial role in financial markets. For example, Main (1982) shows that banks 
can avoid some bad debts by working with them. This is because the information on obligors 
provided by insurance firms helps banks to understand individual and corporate risk 
exposures better. In addition, by mitigating the losses during natural disasters, insurance 
firms help to reduce the probability of default of some investors (policy holders, both 
individual and corporate) who, sometimes, are the same obligors as those of banks (Lee et 
al, 2016). Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) show that banks are more likely to transfer part or 
all of their risks to other financial sectors to avoid high correlation between assets that may 
lead to a higher default probability. Trichet (2005) shows that the insurance and banking 
industries are linked by ownership and the associations of credit exposure. As a result, 
insurance firms are playing a central role in financial markets and this may directly affect 
banks.  
One of the most recent papers on the UK non-life insurance industry is by Shiu (2011), 
who uses data from 1985 to 2002 to investigate the relationship between reinsurance and 
capital structure. He shows that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more 
reinsurance, and those with higher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of 
debt. Using the same database, Shiu (2007) shows that an insurer’s size, liquidity, interest 
rate risk exposure, line of business concentration and organizational form are important 
factors associated with the decision to employ financial derivatives. Adam et al. (2003) 
explore the determinants of credit ratings in the UK insurance industry analysing a sample 
of 65 firms over the period from 1993 to 1997. They find that mutual insurers are generally 
given higher ratings than non-mutual ones. Also, liquidity and profitability have a significant 
positive effect on ratings. 
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Most previous studies on credit risk focused on banking crises. For example, early 
warning systems are well developed for banks (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Borio 
and Drehmann, 2009; Drehmann and Juselius, 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Barell et al., 2010 and Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Given the fact that insurance firms play 
a central role in financial markets and are becoming more engaged with banks, analysing 
their credit risk is clearly important.  In the present study, we employ a reduced-form model 
to assess it in the case of the UK.  
 
3.  Data and Covariates  
Firm-specific variables are collected from SynThesys Non-Life.33 This consists of FSA data 
(now regulated under the Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England) of non-life 
annual return regulatory data. This database allows quick access to FSA return data for the 
current year and past years back to 1985. Over 400 companies are covered by the current 
SynThesys Non-Life system and the data include statements of solvency, components of 
capital resources, statements of net assets, calculations of capital requirement, analysis of 
admissible assets, liabilities, the profit and loss account, analysis of derivative contracts, 
summary of business carried on, technical account, analysis of premiums, analysis of claims, 
analysis of expenses and analysis of technical provisions etc. Also, there are approximately 
180 ratios currently included, with all the underlying calculations being done by SynThesys.  
Since most general insurance firms are small and non-public, there is no specific default 
list. Further, in the UK market, instead of becoming insolvent, most general insurance firms 
go into ‘Run-Off’ (i.e. stop underwriting new business and wait for their financial condition 
to improve or transfer their business to others). All the credit events in our paper have been 
                                                          
33 From Standard & Poor’s 
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collected by hand from Appendix D: Company Changes, Transfers, Mergers of SynThesys 
Non-Life UserGuide version 10.134, PwC - Insurance insolvency35 and Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme 36 , and the final list has been further discussed with technical 
specialists and senior supervisors from the Insurance Division at the Bank of England. 
Macroeconomic data have been obtained from the World Bank. Therefore, ours is a unique 
dataset for the insurance industry in the UK. 
Before analysing the data, we remove firms without at least one-year balance data for all the 
variables. This is because these firms cannot be used to calibrate the model. We also remove 
firms for reasons such as merger & acquisitions, insolvency or simply running off and 
disappearing. If the model fails to take other types exit (i.e. except insolvency) into 
consideration, which means active firms will only have two states within the prediction 
period either insolvent or survival.  As a result, firms exited due to other reasons will be 
treated as survival firms which will affect the estimation accuracy. This of course will affect 
the calibration of the model. More discussion of the different types of firms’ exit can be 
found in the model section. In the end, we are left with 363 firms with 14 firm-specific 
variables and 6 macroeconomic variables in our dataset spanning from 1986 to 2014. These 
include 35 firms that became insolvent during that period and 45 firms that exited owing to 
other reasons such as transferring their business to other firms. 
To lessen the effect of outliers, we use the following strategy: for example, we cap the 
reinsurance ratio and leverage ratio at the 95 percentile value and remove the lower 5 
percentile value. Also we cap the liquidity ratio, profitability ratio, growth premium written 
change, claim change and excess capital ratio at the 99 percentile value and remove the lower 
                                                          
34 Updated on November 2014 
35 http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/insights/insurance-insolvency-case-updates-pwc-uk.html 
36 http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/products/insurance/insurance-insolvencies/ 
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1 percentile value. The summary statistics and correlation matrix of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables respectively are reported in Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
3.1 Covariates 
Following the literature, 37 we choose the following firm-specific variables: leverage (Net 
Technical Provisions /Adjust Liquid Assets, SynThesys Appendix K: Ratio Definitions R12), 
profitability (underwriting profit to Total Assets), growth (the change in the natural 
logarithm of total admissible assets), firm size (the natural logarithm of total admitted 
assets), reinsurance (the ratio of Reinsurance Premiums Ceded to Gross Premium written), 
claims change (the change in net claims incurred), capital (the change in excess capital 
resources to cover general business CRR), liquidity (Cash/Total Asset: the ratio of the sum 
of cash and short-term investments to total assets), gross premium written (the annual change 
in gross premium written), combined ratio (Incurred Claims + Management Expense) / 
Gross Premium Written), Line-of-Business Concentration (Herfindahl index), 
organizational form (mutual or non-mutual firm) and a derivative dummy variable 
(Derivative dummy defined based on SynThesys form 17, i.e. whether the sum of form 17 is 
zero or not). In addition, we also include UK macroeconomic variables, namely GDP 
growth, the change in the wholesale price index (2010=100), the change in foreign direct 
investment, net inflows, the real interest rate, the real effective exchange rate index 
(2010=100) and the change in the credit provided by financial institutions (% of GDP) from 
the World Bank. 
Leverage 
                                                          
37 Brotman (1989), Adams (1995), Pottier (1997, 1998), Adams et al. (2003) and Shiu (2011) etc. 
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Higher leverage may have an adverse effect on insurance firms by affecting their 
underwriting performance and making an insurer’s capital more vulnerable to economic 
shocks. Further, Adams et al. (2003) find that insurers with lower financial leverage are more 
likely to be given a higher credit rating. Previous studies such as Brotman (1989) and Pottier 
(1997, 1998) also report a negative relationship between financial leverage and the capital 
structure of insurance firms. 
Profitability  
Profitability indicates the ability of insurance firms to generate a surplus to develop their 
current business and generate new business. A higher profitability ratio means that the 
insurance firm can manage expenses effectively and set competitive premium rates. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009) also suggest that highly profitable firms 
have a lower debt ratio and hence a lower credit risk. 
Firm Growth 
Normally, a positive growth ratio signals a good financial condition for a firm. But for issuers 
with significant new business growth could be achieved by poor underwriting standards and 
mispricing strategy (Adams et al., 2003). Borde et al. (1994) and Pottier (1997) find that this 
will lead to greater uncertainty about the capital reserve risk for insurance firms. Further, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) conclude that firms with a high growth ratio face more debt-related 
agency issues and higher associated cost. 
Firm Size 
Prior studies such as Bouzouita and Young (1998) find that large insurers are less likely to 
become insolvent; they normally benefit from economies of scale, and given their sizeable 
market shares and higher ratings have lower financing costs than small insurers (Adams et 
al., 2003). 
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Reinsurance 
Berger et al. (1992) point out that there are two types of traditional reinsurance activities 
involving a direct insurer ceding all or part of its assumed underwritings to another insurance 
company. Insurance firm transfer part of their risk to third parties by reinsurance, which 
result in lower uncertainty concerning their future losses and enables them to reduce their 
capital reserves. Adams (1996) suggests that reinsurance improves the ability of the primary 
insurer to survive an external economic shock. On the other hand, the financial health of a 
heavily reinsured firm will be adversely affected by the insolvency of reinsurance firms. 
Claims Growth38  
In the insurance industry, incurred claims are the amount of outstanding liabilities for 
policies over a given valuation period. A significant increase in net claims may generate 
liquidity risk for an insurer, which will eventually become insolvent if it cannot raise enough 
capital. 
Capital 
When measuring the default risk of insurance firms, it is natural to include the Excess 
(deficiency) of capital resources to cover general business CRR (Capital Requirements 
Regulation). Insurance firms should hold enough capital to cover the policies they 
underwrite. 
Liquidity  
We use the cash ratio as a measure of a firm’s liquidity. For insurance firms, a high liquidity 
ratio indicates good claim-paying ability. Previous studies such as Carson and Scott (1997) 
                                                          
38 Difference of annual incurred claims 
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and Bouzouita and Young (1998) show a negative correlation between the liquidity risk and 
the credit rating of insurance firms.  
 
Gross Premium Written Growth 
Generally speaking, an increase in gross premia written39 indicates that the insurance firm is 
in a good financial condition. Incorporating this variable into the model will automatically 
exclude ‘run-off’ firms from the sample; these are very common in the insurance industry 
(insurance firms can stop underwriting business but still exist for many years). 
Derivative Dummy 
Shiu (2011) notes that insurers use derivatives to hedge risk, which may also increase their 
exposure to counterparty risk. Following his study, we obtain label 1 for a derivative user by 
looking for nonzero values from Form 17 of the PRA returns.  
Organizational Form 
Adams (1995) argued that the organizational form can partly affect the decision-making of 
insurance firms. A mutual insurance firm is an organisation that supplies insurance services, 
and that is owned by its customers, or members, which means that there are no shareholders 
to pay dividends to or account to. Such a firm can concentrate entirely on delivering products 
and services that best meet the needs of its customers. In our analysis we separate mutual 
and non-mutual firms. 
Combined Ratio 
                                                          
39 Gross premia written are the total premia written, which include both direct and assumed premia written, 
before any reinsurance. 
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We include the combined ratio defined as Incurred Claims + Management Expense) / Gross 
Premium Written) in the model to capture any mispricing by insurers. 
 
Line-of-Business Concentration 
Insurers with a high line-of-business concentration may have a higher earning risk. We 
follow Shiu (2011) in using the Herfindahl index to proxy the line-of-business concentration 
(a higher number indicates a lower level of business mix, the max value is: 
 𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1                                         (4.1) 
where si  is the premium written for one business line / [Gross Premium Written (Total 
Primary direct & fac. Business) – Gross Premium Written (Total Treaty reinsurance accepted 
business)]. 
GDP Growth 
The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices is calculated using values in 
2005 US dollars.  
Change of Wholesale Price Index (2010=100) 
The wholesale price index includes a mix of agricultural and industrial goods at various 
stages of production and distribution, including import duties.  
Change of Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows 
Foreign Direct Investment is defined as direct investment equity flows in the reporting 
economy. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital. Direct 
investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one 
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economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise that is resident in another economy.40  
Real Interest Rate 
The real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the 
GDP deflator. The terms and conditions attached to lending rates differ by country, however, 
which limits their comparability. 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (2010=100) 
The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (which measures the 
value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a 
price deflator or index of costs. 
Change of Credit provided by Financial Institutions (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a 
gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial 
sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial 
corporations when data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable 
deposits but incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits).41  
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
                                                          
40 According to the World Bank, ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock is 
the criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship. 
41 Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance 
corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies. 
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As already pointed out, the insurance industry is relatively more stable than other industries. 
This is confirmed by Table 4.1, which shows that the standard deviation (Std) of 
underwriting profitability (PT) and investment return (InvR) is very small.42 
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Insurance firms, on average, have a higher investment profit than the traditional 
underwriting profit. 43  This could be driven by derivative trading (Schinasi, 2006). On 
average, general insurance firms in the UK hold more than 17 % (excess) capital than last 
year, the reason being that they have to comply with more rigorous capital requirements than 
financial institutions (Harrington 2009). The size of firms changes a lot over the sample 
period that we are considering, suggesting that, although the industry as a whole is relatively 
stable, many insurance firms transfer their business to others before they become insolvent.44 
This is also why we consider the transfer of the business to other companies as a possible 
form of exit. The high volatility of the combined ratio (Combined) could be due to 
mispricing problem. The Herfindahl index is 0.71 on average with a small standard 
deviation. This further supports the view that insurance firms are stable and their business is 
not very diverse. 
Table 4.2 shows that, compared to the full sample, on average default firms have negative 
both underwriting profit (PT) and gross premium written change (GPW %), smaller firm’s 
size (Size), lower cash ratio (CA), smaller incurred claim increase (Claim %), negative 
firm’s growth (Growth), smaller excess capital increase (Excess %) and lower investment 
return (InvR). This may indicate that they lose money from their main business and their 
                                                          
42 Compared to banks, insurers do not face the risk of a‘bank run’ and claiming payments from them 
normally takes longer than withdrawing cash from banks. 
43 Investing in high-risk portfolios may yield higher returns than the normal underwriting business.  
44 To protect the interests of policy-holders, insurance firms are more likely to stop writing new business or 
transfer their business to other firms rather than becoming insolvent. 
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investment performance is not as good as in the case of other firms. They are relatively small 
size firms with slow business growth, and holding less capital makes them more vulnerable. 
They also have higher leverage, reinsurance ratio, combined ratio and Herfindahl index (H-
index), which suggests that they are more exposed to interest risk, credit risk and market 
risk. Overall, the evidence in Table 4.2 confirms the previous findings of the literature (see, 
e.g., Adams et al., 2003 and Shiu, 2011).  
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix of the 12 firm-specific variables. Underwriting 
profitability (PT) is negatively correlated to leverage (Lev) and the reinsurance ratio. This 
suggests that financing activities through debt and reinsurance may reduce profits. Firm size 
has a positive relationship with leverage (Lev) but a negative one with the cash ratio (CA), 
which indicates that large firms are relatively more leveraged and hold less cash. Finally, 
firm size and the Herfindahl index (H-index) are negatively correlated, which suggests that 
large firms have a relatively concentrated business. 
 
4.  The Model  
Default risk modelling has developed considerably in recent years. Beaver (1966, 1968) and 
Altman (1968) first proposed credit scoring models that calculate the default probability for 
a firm using accounting-based variables. The structural model, first used by Merton (1974), 
applies option theory to derive the value of a firm’s liabilities in the event of default.  
There are several issues arising in the context of such models. Estimating the probability 
of default on the basis of accounting data amounts to trying to predict a future event using 
financial statements designed to capture the past performance of a firm; therefore, the 
obtained estimates might not have strong predictive power about the future status of the firm. 
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Also, Hillegeist et al. (2004) find that, owing to the conservatism principle, fixed assets and 
intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative to their market prices causing accounting-
based leverage measures to be overstated. As for the structural model, the value of a firm’s 
assets is estimated at market prices; however, these may not contain all publicly available 
default-related information on the firm. Also, the term structure, off-balance and other 
liabilities are not well specified in structural models when calculating the default threshold 
of the firm, which may lead to inaccurate estimates of the default probability. 
For these reasons, in this paper instead we estimate default probabilities using reduced-
form models that have become increasingly popular for individual firms in recent years. 
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) first introduced this type of models, which were then extended 
by Duffie and Singleton (1999). They assume that exogenous Poisson random variables 
drive the default probability of a firm. A firm will default when the exogenous variables shift 
from their normal levels. The stochastic process in the model is not directly linked to the 
firm’s assets value. This makes the models more tractable. Duffie et al. (2007) first proposed 
a doubly stochastic Poisson model with time-varying covariates and then forecast the 
evolution of covariate processes using Gaussian panel vector autoregressions. The model 
was further developed by Duan et al. (2012), who applied a pseudo-likelihood method to 
derive the forward intensity rate of the doubly stochastic Poisson processes at different time 
horizons. 
The Poisson process with stochastic intensities has been widely applied to model default 
events. The specification adopted in this paper assumes that the stochastic intensity has a 
linear relationship with macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. A doubly-stochastic 
formulation of the point process for default is proposed by Duffie et al. (2007), with the 
conditional probability of default within τ years being given by: 
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 𝑞(𝑋𝑡, τ) = 𝐸 (∫ 𝑒
−∫ (𝜆(𝑢)+𝜑(𝑢))𝑑𝑢
𝑧
𝑡
𝑡+τ
𝑡
𝜆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧|𝑋𝑡)                                            (4.2)
where Xt is the Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates, and  
λt (i.e. the conditional mean arrival rate of default measured in events per year) is a firm’s 
default intensity. The firm may exit for other reasons, such as merger and acquisition or 
transfer of business to other firms, in which case the intensity is defined as φt. Thus the total 
exit intensity is φt + λt. 
 The forward default intensity is given by: 
 𝑓𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝛼1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛼2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘)                    (4.3) 
  and the forward combined exit intensity is defined as: 
 𝑔𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝑓𝑡(𝜏) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽0(𝜏) + 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛽2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘)                 (4.4) 
We use the pseudo-likelihood function derived by Duan et al. (2012) to estimate the 
forward default intensity. The details of the derivation of its large sample properties can be 
found Appendix A in Duan’s (2012) paper. In short, the pseudo-likelihood function for the 
prediction time τ is defined as: 
 ℒ𝜏(𝛼, 𝛽; 𝜏𝐶 , 𝜏𝐷 , 𝑋) = ∏ ∏ ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽),
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1                                        (4.5) 
Our sample period goes from 0 to T and the frequency is annual. Firm i first appears in 
the sample at 𝑡0𝑖 and 𝜏𝐷𝑖 is the default time while 𝜏𝐶𝑖 is the combined exit time. During the 
sample period, if firm i exits because of default, then 𝜏𝐷𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶𝑖, otherwise 𝜏𝐶𝑖 < 𝜏𝐷𝑖.   As 
previously explained, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  are the covariates including common factors and firm-specific 
variables.  The prediction horizon τ is measured in years with  Δ𝑡 = 1, and α and β are the 
model parameters for default and other exit processes respectively. 
According to the double stochastic assumption (also known as the conditional 
independence assumption), firms’ default probabilities only depend on common factors and 
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firm-specific variables and are independent from each other, i.e. the default of one firm will 
not influence other firms’ exit probabilities. 
The likelihood function  ℒτ,i,t(α, β) allows for five possible cases for firm i: in the 
prediction time period it can survive, default,45 exit for other reasons (which in our sample 
means that the insurance firm transferred its business to other firms); it can also exit after or 
before the prediction time period: 
 
   ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽) 
= 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐶𝑖≥𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 𝑡 + 𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖= 𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖; 𝜏𝐷𝑖 =  𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 +
𝜏) + 1{𝑡0𝑖≤𝑡,𝜏𝐷𝑖≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖,𝜏𝐶𝑖≤𝑡+𝜏}𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖; 𝜏𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖, & 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏) +      1{𝑡0𝑖>𝑡} +
 1{𝑡𝐶𝑖<𝑡}         
(4.6) 
where 
𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 𝑡 + 𝜏) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−∑𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑠)Δ𝑡
𝜏−1
𝑠=0
] 
𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖; 𝜏𝐷𝑖 =  𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏)
=
{
 
 
 
 
1 − exp[−𝑓𝑖𝑡(0)Δ𝑡] , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜏𝐶𝑖 = 𝑡 + 1
exp [− ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑠)Δ𝑡]
𝜏𝐶𝑖−𝑡−2
𝑠=0
∗ {exp[−𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡 − 1)Δ𝑡] − exp[−𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 − 𝑡 − 1)Δ𝑡]},
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 + 1 < 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏 }
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖; 𝜏𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 , & 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏)
=
{
 
 
 
 
exp[−𝑓𝑖𝑡(0)Δ𝑡] − exp[−𝑔𝑖𝑡(0)Δ𝑡] , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜏𝐶𝑖 = 𝑡 + 1
exp [− ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑠)Δ𝑡] ∗ {exp[−𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 − 𝑡 − 1)Δ𝑡] − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜏𝐶𝑖 − 𝑡 − 1)Δ𝑡]},
𝜏𝐶𝑖−𝑡−2
𝑠=0
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 + 1 < 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝜏 }
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 Default events are collected from SynThesys Non-Life and include insolvent, in liquidation, placed in 
administration and dissolved. 
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The pseudo-likelihood function    ℒ𝜏,𝑖,𝑡(𝛼, 𝛽) can be maximized numerically to obtain 
the estimated parameters 𝛼ො  and ?̂?. Owing to the overlapping nature of this function, the 
inference is not immediately clear. For example, at time 𝑡5 and the prediction horizon 𝜏 =
2, firm A‘s default over the 2-year period starting 1 year ahead (𝑡4 to 𝑡6) will be correlated 
with firm’s B default in the next time period (𝑡6 in this case). 
In addition, the pseudo-likelihood function can be decomposed into two processes α and 
β, and each process can be further decomposed into different prediction horizon 𝜏. As a 
result, estimates of 𝛼ො and ?̂? can be obtained at the same time. 
 ℒ𝜏(𝛼(𝑠)) = ∏ ∏ ℒ𝑖,𝑡(𝛼(𝑠)), 𝑠 = 0,1, … , 𝜏 − 1
𝑇−𝑠−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1            (4.7) 
 ℒ𝜏(𝛽(𝑠)) = ∏ ∏ ℒ𝑖,𝑡(𝛽(𝑠)), 𝑠 = 0,1, … , 𝜏 − 1
𝑇−𝑠−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑖=1 .          (4.8) 
In order to test the consistency of the model, we split the sample by using data up to 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, and then we calibrate the model by using the four different 
samples.  
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1 Estimations Results 
In our model, the logarithm of forward default intensity has a linear relationship with the 
covariates: 
 𝜆𝑡( 𝜏) = 𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝛼1(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,1 + 𝛼2(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑘(𝜏)𝑋𝑡,𝑘.          (4.9) 
𝑋𝑡,𝑘 includes GDP growth, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, FDI, wholesale 
price change, credit by financial change, underwriting profit, leverage, firm’s size, cash ratio, 
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gross premium written change, reinsurance, incurred claimed change, firm’s growth, excess 
capital change, investment return, combined ratio, Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and 
organizational form. 
Table 4.4 below shows the main estimation results based on four different samples. Other 
exit (i.e. transferring business to others) outputs can be found in Appendix B 
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4.4 shows the results for the sample periods 1985 to 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 
2014 respectively. We split the whole sample (1985 to 2014) into five subsamples to check 
if variables are consistently significant.      
Overall, most our results are in line with those of Adam et al. (2003). Leverage, profit, 
reinsurance and organizational form46 are significant factors both for assessing the credit risk 
of insurance firms and determining the quality of credit rating. On the other hand, firm size 
and growth are not significant47. Further, we find that macroeconomic and firm-specific 
factors (the change of credit provided by financial institutions, whole sale price change, 
investment profitability, combined ratio, and the usage of financial derivatives) are also 
important, and therefore should not be neglected. As far as we are aware ours is the first 
study documenting their key role in determining the credit risk of insurance firms. 
In general, the real interest rate and the change in wholesale prices have a positive effect 
on default intensity which could lead to a higher default probability (PD). Writing 
Profitability and investment profitability are negatively correlated with the default intensity. 
This suggests that high profitable firms are less likely to become insolvent. Our results are 
consistent with those of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009), and also 
                                                          
46 ‘Business Activitiy’ in Adam et al. (2003) 
47 This could be due to the difference in the dataset. In our paper, we have 363 general insurance firms and 
data from 1985 to 2014. Adam et al., (2003) paper instead, use only 40 firms rated by A.M. Best plus 25 
firms rated by S&P and they apply both general insurance and life insurance firms into the model. 
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with the findings of Carson and Scott (1997) and Bouzouita and Young (1998), which show 
that higher liquidity is consistent with higher credit rating. Therefore, firms holding more 
capital tend to have higher liquidity and a lower default probability. In general, large firms 
typically have a good reputation and therefore it is easier for them to obtain credit in the 
market.  
Bouzouita and Young (1998) find that large insurers are less likely to default. Our results 
suggest that firm size is not significant in determining the solvency of insurance firms. Firms 
with larger gross premium written will not only have cash inflows in the short term but also 
potential claims in the long term. The one-year PD shows that writing more premiums will 
lower an insurer’s default probability. 
Highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive during recessions and therefore 
normally have a higher PD. Ad hoc structured reinsurance may reduce the credit risk 
exposure - for example, Adams (1996) shows that reinsurance improves the ability of the 
primary insurer to survive an external economic shock. However, we find a positive 
relationship between reinsurance and PD, which suggests that heavily reinsured firms are 
more likely to default. Insurers transfer part or all of their risk to other insurers through 
reinsurance and release capital reserves; in this way they have resources to write new 
business. Our results show that the effect of negative perspective of reinsurers cannot be 
ignored. That is, insurers are exposed to the counterparty risk of reinsures (e.g. when 
reinsurers are insolvent or run-off, insurers will have to pay the claims to the policy-holders) 
and their fast-growing business may lead to higher potential losses in the future. One 
important question is if using derivatives increases the counterparty risk or if it is only useful 
for hedging. For example, derivatives could be used for hedging risk, but Shiu (2011) shows 
that this could also increase the exposure to counterparty risk. Our findings indicate that the 
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use of derivatives may increase the probability of a firm becoming insolvent. This has 
important implications for assessing risk in this industry. 
 
 
5.2 Overall Probability of Default for the General Insurance Industry 
In this section we estimate the default probabilities for all active firms as well as the survival 
firms. This is in fact the first study using historical default risk for all active firms based on 
their individual PD. We also consider the performance of insurance firms during natural 
disasters and financial distress times (that is, at times when insurers are vulnerable and more 
likely to default). Figure 4.1 below shows the probability of default for the General Insurance 
industry from 1986 to 2014. The PDs are calculated using the parameters estimated using 
the full sample. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show that the PD of insolvent firms is much higher and 
fluctuates more compared to the whole GI industry (despite the different sample size of 
solvent and insolvent firms, the median PD reported in Appendix C shows the same trend as 
in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). The highest PD of insolvent firms is about 0.09 which is almost 
double that of the whole industry.  For the GI industry, the PD peaks around the early 90s 
and then decreases until 2000. The PD is relatively low but increased sharply in 2008, at the 
time of the global financial crisis. The PD of insolvent firms peaks around 1990 and then 
decreases until 1998. There are two spikes in 2000 and 2003, before the 2008 global financial 
crisis. The average PD for default firms is 317 bps and 124 bps for the whole industry (112 
bps for survival firms). The standard deviation for default firms is 0.0276, which is much 
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higher than for the whole industry (0.0119) and survival firms (0.0101). In general, default 
firms are more risky compared to the whole GI industry.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 4.3 shows a large PD spread between insolvent firms and the whole GI industry 
during the early 90s and a sharp rise in 2000 and 2003. It is generally positive before 2009. 
During the financial crisis, it increases rapidly, which indicates that all insolvent firms faced 
a worse financial situation and are more vulnerable than the whole GI industry. After the 
2008 financial crisis, it is much smaller or even negative. 
To sum up, the default probability of the General Insurance industry varies over time and 
the PD of insolvent firms is more volatile than that of the survival firms. High PDs are 
usually found when there are disasters such as floods; this indicates that, unlike other 
financial institutions, insurance firms are relatively stable but very sensitive to natural 
disasters. The high PDs around the time of the 2008 financial crisis suggest that the insurance 
and banking industries are closely correlated. Regulators should consider these interactions 
and be aware of the contagion effect in distress times.  
 
5.3 Probability of Default for Different Business Lines 
In general, insurance firms have business in different sectors and firms may change their 
main business line over time. In addition to business concentration, the change in the credit 
risk in different sectors has also important implication for the regulators’ supervision and 
policy-making decisions. This crucial issue has been completely overlooked in the literature. 
Here we extend the credit risk analysis to the insurance firms’ business line. 
On the basis of the gross premium written by each firm for different business lines, we 
classify insurance firms into 7 groups: 1. Accident & Health; 2. Motor; 3. Marine, Aviation 
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& Goods in Transit; 4. Third-party Liability; 5. Financial Loss; 6. Household& Domestic 
All risks and Property; 7. Miscellaneous. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.4 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.5 ABOUT HERE] 
Before 1995, Household & Domestic All Risk and Property (group 6) has the highest 
default probability, with Marine, Aviation & Goods in Transit (group 3) having the second 
highest. Third-party Liability (group5) has the third highest, and Accident & Health (group 
1) the lowest. After 1995, the PDs of group 6 and group 3 are decreasing, while those of 
group 5 and group 1 are fluctuating around their average. The PDs of most groups exhibit 
an upward trend during the 2008 financial crisis, the exceptions being Marine, Aviation & 
Goods in Transit as well as Miscellaneous, which are relatively flat. After the financial crisis, 
Financial Loss and Household & Domestic All Risk & property become the riskiest groups.  
Insurance firms are generally very vulnerable when natural disasters happen. 
Decomposing the PD of the insurance industry into different business lines reveals clear 
differences around the early 90s. Household, Property, Motor, Transportation and Third-
party Liability are the riskiest businesses because they are more likely to be exposed to 
catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes etc. However, the PDs of all business lines have the 
same upward trend in distress times. These findings suggest that regulators might want to 
consider the varying composition of the premium written by insurance firms when setting 
capital requirements. This forward-looking PD could give supervisors at the central bank a 
warning sign of a risky business, and the under Solvency II the central bank could take 
action, for instance requiring firms to provide an additional buffer before they breach their 
MCR (minimum capital requirement) and SCR (solvency capital requirement)48. 
                                                          
48 The SCR and MCR act as trigger points in the ‘supervisory ladder of intervention’ introduced by Solvency 
II. 
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5.4 Default Clustering and Systemic Risk  
Since most insurance firms are non-public firms with short history, very few of them are 
rated by credit rating agencies (e.g. Moody’s, S&P, Fitch and A&M Best). Adam et al. 
(2003) analyse 65 non-life and life firms rated by A.M. Best and S&P, while our sample 
includes more than 300 GI firms. Using the estimation results from our model (see Table 
4.4), we calculate firms’ PD for all available firms (see equation 4.2). We can then extend 
the analysis to investigate the joint default risk. We compute pair correlations of firms for 
different quantiles, and use the average value to obtain the default correlation. Previews 
studies like Das et al. (2007) find strong default correlations among corporate obligors. It is 
interesting to establish whether insurance firms are likely to default jointly when their 
individual PDs are high. Also, high PD correlations may suggest insurers are exposed to 
common factors besides firm-specific factors. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.6 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 4.6 shows the average pair PD correlations of all firms within different groups 
(from low risky 0%-20% to high risky 80%-100%) based on data for the period 1985-2014. 
The highest PD correlations are found at the 0%-20% quantile, and the second highest in the 
riskiest group 80%-100%.  
Figure 4.6 shows that the highest correlation is that between insurers with the lowest PD. 
This suggests that when insurance firms are less exposed to risk there is a more important 
role of common factors, in our case macroeconomic factors such as credit supply and 
wholesale price changes. Insurers within the highest 80%-100% quantile have the second 
highest PD correlation, which indicates that their credit risk is affected by both common and 
firm-specific factors. The trend of PD correlations among different quantiles supports our 
choice of considering macroeconomic factors as well as firm-specific factors. Overall, our 
empirical results are in line with those of Bell and Keller (2009), who show that insurers are 
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less interconnected than banks and there is a lower contagion effect among them. The 
average PD correlation across firms is 0.1069. The PDs for the 20% quantile has the highest 
correlation (0.2311). The lowest correlation is 0.0072, while the PD correlation for the group 
‘40% - 60%’ is much higher (0.0675), and the PD correlation for the group ‘20% - 40%’ is 
slightly higher (0.0914). The ‘80%-100%’ group has the second largest PD correlation 
(0.1375); this is not every different from the industry average, and points to some default 
clustering. The highest PD correlation is found for the group ‘0%-20%’, which suggests that 
in safe times most insurance firms are in a good financial situation.  
 
5.5 Reinsurance and Default Risk 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.7 ABOUT HERE] 
Reinsurance is a pure hedging contract that enables primary insurers to transfer risks to third 
parties (i.e. reinsurers receive a share of annual premiums written from primary insurers to 
compensate potential loss events). Previous papers show that corporate hedging decisions 
such as reinsurance affect the strategic performance of firms (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Adam 
et al., 2007). Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) show that indemnity contracts such as 
reinsurance contracts are pure hedging instruments. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) argue 
that reinsurance is important because solvency risk matters to both policy holders and 
regulators. Upreti and Adam (2015) find that reinsurance enables primary insurers to have 
sufficient risk capacity for planning and pricing new business lines. Therefore, insurers can 
be exposed to new risks through risk financing as well as reinsuring actives.  
As we discussed in previous section of estimate results, high reinsurance ratio will lead 
primary insurers high PD. So the counter-party risk of reinsurance will increase the 
insolvency risk of primary insurers, and not surprisingly, under Solvency II, reinsurance 
assets  are listed separately from cash and financial assets in one insurance firm’s balance 
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sheet.  And the technical provision (i.e. provisions for expected future claims) of reinsurance 
has been incorporated into Solvency II as part of liabilities. The reinsurance actives link 
different insurers together acting as a contagious channel in the system in distress times, so 
the performance of reinsurance firms (firms buying reinsurance) is very important to the 
whole general insurance industry. 
Next, we investigate the performance of firms when they use the reinsurance market. We 
first classify them into different groups based on the percentage of reinsurance they accept 
relative to their total written gross premium, and then we analyse the credit spread of firms 
who accepted reinsurance across the different groups.  
The maximum spreads for each group are 61 bps, 194 bps, 945 bps, 386 bps, 109 bps, 
and 62 bps respectively, and their standard deviations 0.0064, 0.0073, 0.0198, 0.0104, 
0.0042 and 0.0027. For each group, we calculate the credit spread between firms accepting 
reinsurance and firms not accepting it.  
Figure 4.7 shows that the lowest 20% firms have a negative spread, especially during the 
early 90s, with respect to the firms which do not use the reinsurance market. This may 
indicate that firms that are less involved with the reinsurance market often have good 
creditworthiness and take reinsurance as part of their business plan.49 By contrast, firms 
accepting 20% to 40% reinsurance can have either positive or negative spreads at different 
points in time in the sample period. During the financial crisis, their spread vis-à-vis firms 
not accepting reinsurance is negative. This may reflect their risk management strategy aimed 
at reducing potential losses during distress times. For the group of firms which accept 
between 40% to 60% and 60% to 80% reinsurance, the spread is negative most of the time, 
                                                          
49 Through reinsurance, firms will have less liability, fewer reserves requirement, but release more capital to 
write new business or investment in other products. 
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except during the 90s.50 Finally, for the group accepting more than 80% reinsurance the 
spread peaked during the early 90s,51 and during the financial crisis becomes relatively small 
and sometimes negative.  
In terms of firm size, the percentage of firms for each group is changing over years. The 
total percentage of firms accepting reinsurance peaked in 1988 and decreases afterwards.  
Most firms accept less than 20% reinsurance, and the percentage of firms is decreasing since 
the year of 1987. Less than 50% of firms accept 20% to 80% reinsurance, most of the time, 
in the last 30 years. There are more than 15% of firms in the upper 20% group between 1996 
and 2005, and the number of firm peaked in 2005.  
The average spread between firms accepting reinsurance and those not accepting is only 
-1 bps, which indicates only a slightly smaller credit risk for the former. In our sample period 
there are 12 years with a positive spread, and 17 years with a negative one. The results imply 
that firms accepting reinsurance have a lower default probability, especially during bad times 
(i.e. early 90s Burns’ Day Storm and 2008 financial crisis).  This is a new and important 
result. Firms taking reinsurance may choose a more determined risk management strategy 
and therefore buy good-quality reinsurance to help reduce risk in distress times. Doherty and 
Tinic (1981) find that reinsurance contracts make primary insurers manage cash flow 
volatility more effectively, and result in better future underwriting capacity, and lower 
insolvency probability. Our results show that, on the other hand, reinsurers also benefit from 
indemnity contracts resulting in lower default probabilities. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
                                                          
50 The Burns' Day Storm occurred on 25–26 January 1990 over north-western Europe and is one of the 
strongest European windstorms on record. Winds of up to 100 mph kill 97 people and cause £3.37 billion 
worth of damage, the most costly weather event for insurers in British history. 
51 Affect by the Burns’ Day Storm occurred in 1990. 
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This paper analyses the credit risk of general insurance (GI) firms in the UK using a unique 
dataset. We use a reduced form model to estimate the credit risk of GI firms by considering 
both insolvency and other exits such as transferring business. Our results show that most 
classic risk factors (for example, profitability, leverage and reinsurance etc.) are significant 
for assessing insurers’ credit risk. In addition, we find that insurance firms are exposed to 
some common factors and new firm-specific risk factors such as usage of financial 
derivatives and investment profitability.  However, in contrast to other studies, we also show 
that macroeconomic factors (GDP growth, interest rate, whole sale price and credit provided 
by financial institutions) and firm-specific factors (underwriting profit, leverage, growth 
premium written, reinsurance, incurred claims, excess capital, combined ratio, investment 
profit, usage of derivatives and organizational form) are also crucial for assessing the credit 
risk of General Insurance firms. This represent new and interesting evidence. 
Further, we investigate the credit risk of firms with different business lines. We show 
that in the early 90s, owing to natural disasters, the group Household & Domestic All Risk 
has the highest credit risk, while after the financial crisis Third-party Liability becomes the 
most risky sector. Our time-varying estimates of PD could be used as an early warning for 
risky sectors to which regulators might want to apply more stringent minimum capital 
requirements. We also show the default correlation between different insurance firms is low, 
but there is a default clustering for GI firms. The estimated default correlations suggest 
insurance firms may be exposed to common risk factors.  
Our findings indicate that different reinsurance levels affect the credit risk of insurance 
firms. Reinsurers can benefit from reinsurance contracts that have a lower default 
probability.  This has implications for regulators of GI firms under the coming Solvency II 
which incorporates reinsurance into the technical provision calculations. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A - Insolvency cases: 
 
AA Mutual Intl Ins 
Andrew Weir Ins 
Anglo American 
Atlantic Mutual Intl 
BAI (Run-Off) 
BlackSea&Baltic 
Bryanston Ins 
Chester St Emp 
City Intl Ins 
Drake Ins 
Exchange Ins 
FolksamIntl UK 
Highlands Ins UK 
HIH Cas&Gen Ins 
Independent Ins 
Island Cap Europe 
London Auths Mut 
Millburn Ins 
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Municipal General 
North Atlantic Ins 
OIC Run-Off 
Paramount Ins 
Scan RE 
SovereignMar&Gen 
UIC Ins 
Baloise Ins Ukbr 
East West Ins 
Fuji Intl Ins 
Hiscox Ins 
Metropolitan RE 
Moorgate Ins 
Nippon InsCo Europe 
Polygon Ins UK 
Swiss RE (UK) 
Tower Ins Ukbr 
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Appendix B - Multi-Period Default Estimation Outputs 
  1 2 3 4 5 
C -26.959*** -37.507 -36.182 -49.547 -18.585 
 -8.411 -125.922 -61.624 -110.445 -93.697 
GDP_growth -0.013 0.045 0.079 0.449 0.015 
 -0.098 -0.87 -0.373 -0.694 -0.432 
Real_IR 0.109** 0.217 0.152 0.265 0.189 
 -0.043 -0.422 -0.322 -0.77 -0.598 
Real_EXrate 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.019 -0.003 
 -0.013 -0.275 -0.145 -0.238 -0.22 
FDI % -0.073 0.022 -0.148 -0.095 -0.022 
 -0.072 -0.865 -0.546 -0.566 -0.183 
Wholesale Price % 22.777*** 25.717 24.151 38.491 6.943 
 -7.452 -95.525 -49.076 -88.161 -77.494 
Credit by 
Financial % 
-4.323*** -0.286 0.584 -2.292 4.415*** 
 -1.586 -1.295 -0.878 -1.739 -0.801 
PT -4.895*** -3.455 1.09 1.096 3.884 
 -1.284 -38.286 -34.568 -53.766 -66.484 
Lev 1.972*** 2.134 1.857 1.585 2.288 
 -0.323 -5.682 -4.868 -7.259 -9.352 
Size 0.022 0.127 0.12 0.062 -0.146 
 -0.062 -0.607 -0.31 -0.41 -0.472 
CA -0.21 0.21 -0.001 -2.414 -2.698 
 -0.562 -0.757 -1.692 -5.414 -1.921 
GPW% -0.414*** -0.143 0.098 -0.164 0.016 
 -0.111 -0.506 -0.28 -0.456 -0.432 
Rein 1.123*** 1.898 2.034 1.783 1.078 
 -0.304 -9.542 -6.758 -9.141 -8.315 
Claim% 0.052*** -0.012 -0.003 0.04 0.047 
 -0.015 -0.331 -0.079 -0.217 -0.164 
Growth 0.059 0.111 0.283 0.187 0.251 
 -0.118 -1.817 -1.759 -2.643 -2.181 
Eecess% -0.229* -0.261 -0.187 0.027 -0.101 
 -0.123 -0.671 -0.356 -0.471 -0.598 
InvR -24.849*** -14.78 -4.048 -9.868 -3.836 
 -7.364 -301.181 -205.288 -303.345 -303.642 
Combined Ratio 0.026*** 0.013 0.025 0.017 0.065 
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 -0.01 -0.092 -0.036 -0.148 -0.049 
Herfindahl index 0.429 1.021 1.683* 1.994 1.512 
 -0.377 -2.248 -0.978 -2.022 -1.518 
Derivative Dummy 0.654** 0.298 0.521 0.528 0.967 
 -0.275 -0.757 -0.39 -0.359 -0.779 
Organizational Form 0.642** 0.604 0.577 0.225 0.07 
  -0.303 -2.535 -1.484 -1.723 -1.926 
Note: this table shows the multi-period default estimation results in 1,2,3,4 and 5 years’ 
time horizon.  
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Appendix C - Multi-Period Other Exit Estimation Outputs 
  1 2 3 4 5 
C -2.25 -5.996 -3.812 -10.554 -6.543 
 -29.285 -29.742 -18.084 -22.116 -29.397 
GDP_growth -0.046 -0.017 0.01 0.073 0.046 
 -0.093 -0.045 -0.053 -0.054 -0.074 
Real_IR -0.01 0.049 0.048 0.011 -0.024 
 -0.242 -0.261 -0.17 -0.216 -0.295 
Real_EXrate 0.014 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.009 
 -0.061 -0.058 -0.032 -0.039 -0.048 
FDI % 0.002 0.011 -0.053 -0.191 0.006 
 -0.132 -0.092 -0.109 -0.22 -0.092 
Wholesale Price % -4.248 -0.067 -2.454 5.55 3.514 
 -23.218 -23.994 -14.397 -17.451 -26.661 
Credit by 
Financial % 
-0.535 -1.482 -1.109 -3.343 -6.793*** 
 -1.131 -1.07 -1.495 -2.921 -2.103 
PT -2.119 -0.118 -1.599 -2.416 -2.672 
 -14.92 -16.619 -10.447 -14.4 -15.724 
Lev 0.456 0.41 0.126 -0.095 -0.697 
 -2.591 -2.863 -1.83 -2.345 -2.58 
Size -0.002 0.09 0.154 0.246 0.343 
 -0.272 -0.288 -0.182 -0.216 -0.225 
CA -1.479* -1.214** -0.859** -0.372 -0.953* 
 -0.769 -0.521 -0.372 -0.414 -0.566 
GPW% -0.029 0 -0.018 0.035 0.038 
 -0.158 -0.18 -0.122 -0.157 -0.154 
Rein 0.56 0.718 0.655 0.622 0.744 
 -2.674 -3.045 -2.04 -2.925 -4.098 
Claim% 0.056 0.063*** 0.043*** -0.088*** -0.114** 
 -0.037 -0.022 -0.01 -0.03 -0.047 
Growth -0.315 -0.401 -0.447 -0.483 -0.505 
 -0.756 -0.887 -0.602 -0.846 -1.132 
Eecess% -0.08 -0.014 -0.035 -0.055 -0.07 
 -0.141 -0.158 -0.12 -0.191 -0.192 
InvR 7.119 5.56 2.541 -0.625 7.667 
 -120.96 -126.475 -82.1 -112.554 -134.414 
Combined Ratio 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.043*** 
 -0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 
Herfindahl index 1.078** 1.496*** 1.237*** 1.227*** 1.342*** 
 -0.435 -0.286 -0.253 -0.357 -0.271 
Derivative Dummy 1.059** 0.636 0.349 0.316 0.454 
 -0.53 -0.533 -0.327 -0.426 -0.489 
Organizational Form -0.1 -0.173 -0.131 -0.031 -0.181 
  -1.23 -1.15 -0.725 -0.937 -1.021 
Note: this table presents the multi-period estimation results of other exit in 1,2,3,4 and 5 
years’ time horizon.  
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Appendix D – Default Probability of GI Industry (Median) 
 
Note: the figure plots one-year median default probability of all GI firms (blue) and insolvent 
firms (red) from 1985 to 2014. We fist predict the default probability of individual firm 
based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take 
the median default probability given a state (active firms or insolvent firms) for each year. 
And the spread is calculated by the median PD of insolvent firms minus that of all firms. 
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Figure 4.1 PD of all firms 
Note: this figure plots one-year default probability of all GI firms (in red line) and survival 
firms (in blue line) from 1986 to 2014. We fist predict the default probability of individual 
firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we 
take the average default probability given a state (active firms or survival firms) for each 
year. 
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Figure 4.2 PD of all firms and insolvent firms 
Note: this figure plots one-year default probability of GI firms from 1986 to 2014. We fist 
predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the 
doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the average default probability of all 
insolvent firms for each year. 
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Figure 4.3 PD of Survival firms and spread between default and survival firms 
Note: this figure plots one-year default probability of survival firms and the spread between 
survival and default firms from 1986 to 2014. We fist predict the default probability of 
individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. 
Then we take the average default probability given a state (insolvent firms or survival firms) 
for each year. And the spread is calculated by the median PD of insolvent firms minus that 
of survival firms. 
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Figure 4.4 PD of 7 Groups 
Note: this figure plots one-year default probability which is decomposed to 7 groups’ PD 
from 1986 to 2014. We fist predict the default probability of individual firm based on the 
parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the average 
default probability given a business line (accident & health; motor; marine, aviation & goods 
in transit; third-party liability; financial loss; household & domestic all risks and property; 
miscellaneous.) for each year. 
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Figure 4.5 PD of 7 Groups 
Note: this figure presents the one-year default probability of 7 groups: Accident & Health, 
Motor, Marine, Aviation & Goods in transit, Third-party liability, Financial loss, Household 
& Domestic all risks and property, and Miscellaneous from 1986 to 2014. We fist predict 
the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly 
stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the average default probability given a business line 
for each year. 
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Figure 4.6 Asymmetric Correlation of PDs 
Note: this figure plots correlation of PDs for the different PD quantiles in our study. We fist 
predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the 
doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we rank the PD of the whole GI industry (average 
PD of all firms at the year) from the lowest to highest. And we find exceedance levels 
according the GI industry PD. The lowest quantile 0%-20% indicates the least risky years 
and the highest 80%-100% quantile mean the most risky years of GI industry. And then we 
calculate average correlations of each pairs in the same group. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics - Full Sample 
  Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.31  -0.30  -0.01  -0.01  0.06  
Lev 1.36  0.02  0.60  0.59  0.32  
Size 17.83  1.29  11.31  11.34  2.18  
CA 0.99  0.00  0.11  0.21  0.23  
GPW % 11.21  -3.50  0.03  0.08  0.93  
Rein 1.00  0.00  0.24  0.32  0.30  
Claim % 25.89  -6.89  0.03  0.23  1.96  
Growth 6.47  -9.45  0.01  0.02  0.41  
Excess % 8.74  -4.22  0.05  0.17  0.96  
Combined 24.12  -1.00  0.44  1.03  2.71  
InvR 0.11  -0.04  0.03  0.03  0.02  
H-Index 1.00  0.00  0.76  0.71  0.28  
 
Note: this table shows the maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation of 
firm-specific variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash 
ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, change of incurred claims, growth 
ratio, change of excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of 
the whole industry. 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics - Default Firms 
  Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.29  -0.24  -0.02  -0.03  0.06  
Lev 1.35  0.02  0.76  0.73  0.30  
Size 15.25  5.82  11.46  11.33  1.66  
CA 0.97  0.00  0.12  0.19  0.20  
GPW % 8.03  -3.39  -0.07  -0.10  0.95  
Rein 1.00  0.00  0.44  0.45  0.27  
Claim % 25.07  -6.04  0.01  0.09  1.76  
Growth 1.59  -1.42  -0.02  -0.01  0.28  
Excess % 6.97  -3.43  0.01  0.09  1.01  
Combined 24.06  -0.98  0.48  1.75  3.47  
InvR 0.09  -0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  
H-Index 1.00  0.19  0.78  0.73  0.26  
 
Note: this table presents the maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation 
of firm-specific variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash 
ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, change of incurred claims, growth 
ratio, change of excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of 
default firms. 
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Table 4.4 Estimations Results 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Parameters      
C -19.364*** -25.172*** -24.116***  -25.313*** -26.959*** 
 (-6.143) (-7.441) (-7.798) (-8.054) (-8.411) 
GDP_growth -0.092  -0.019  -0.028  -0.010  -0.013  
 (-0.062) (-0.083) (-0.087) (-0.090) (-0.098) 
Real_IR 0.009  0.034  0.085** 0.098**  0.109** 
 (-0.055) (-0.045) (-0.042) (-0.043) (-0.043) 
Real_EXrate -0.003  0.006  0.006  0.007  0.007  
 (-0.009) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.013) 
FDI % -0.027  0.008  -0.052  -0.109  -0.073  
 (-0.086) (-0.089) (-0.067) (-0.075) (-0.072) 
Wholesale 
Price % 
17.830*** 23.977*** 21.153*** 21.988*** 22.777*** 
 (-5.355) (-6.754) (-6.691) (-6.998) (-7.452) 
Credit by 
Financial % 
-5.103** -6.674*** -5.011*** -4.824*** -4.323*** 
 (-2.001) (-2.244) (-1.650) (-1.669) (-1.586) 
PT -4.112*** -4.409*** -4.815*** -4.867*** -4.895*** 
 (-1.328) (-1.143) (-1.204) (-1.224) (-1.284) 
Lev 1.863*** 1.840*** 1.966*** 1.973*** 1.972*** 
 (-0.311) (-0.296) (-0.311) (-0.313) (-0.323) 
Size 0.030  0.028  0.016  0.018  0.022  
 (-0.061) (-0.059) (-0.061) (-0.061) (-0.062) 
CA -0.182  -0.160  -0.228  -0.224  -0.210  
 (-0.574) (-0.549) (-0.560) (-0.561) (-0.562) 
GPW% -0.180   -0.435*** -0.416***  -0.413***  -0.414*** 
 (-0.175) (-0.109) (-0.108) (-0.109) (-0.111) 
Rein 1.109*** 1.003*** 1.091*** 1.108*** 1.123*** 
 (-0.275) (-0.259) (-0.270) (-0.279) (-0.304) 
Claim% 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
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 (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.015) 
Growth 0.014  -0.010  0.055  0.060  0.059  
 (-0.120) (-0.105) (-0.115) (-0.116) (-0.118) 
Eecess% -0.287** -0.281** -0.230* -0.231* -0.229* 
 (-0.122) (-0.113) (-0.122) (-0.123) (-0.123) 
InvR -25.362*** -25.449*** -25.184*** -24.899*** -24.849*** 
 (-5.517) (-4.585) (-5.832) (-6.190) (-7.364) 
Combined Ratio 0.024*** 0.023** 0.025** 0.025** 0.026*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Herfindahl index 0.606  0.508  0.439  0.435  0.429  
 (-0.380) (-0.367) (-0.373) (-0.374) (-0.377) 
Derivative 
Dummy 
0.607** 0.641** 0.655** 0.653** 0.654** 
 (-0.278) (-0.281) (-0.276) (-0.275) (-0.275) 
Organizational 
Form 
0.509  0.528* 0.553* 0.559* 0.642** 
  (-0.321) (-0.316) (-0.308) (-0.310) (-0.303) 
 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
Note: this table shows coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange 
rate, foreign direct investment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial 
institutions %, underwriting profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, 
reinsurance, incurred claims %, growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, 
Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and organizational form based on five different samples 
using data from 1985 to 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Results of multi-
periods (5 years’ horizon) estimation which based on full sample (1985-2014) can be found 
in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
 
 
Credit risk management has been well developed in the last decades. From credit scoring 
models to structural models, and reduced-form models, it allows us to quantify the credit 
risk of firms based on firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. The global financial crisis 
and the credit crunch, European debt crisis that followed make credit risk management to 
play a crucial role in the central bank.  
The first chapter of this thesis provides an extensive review of recent developments credit 
risk models and some important applications in systemic risk management by Copula theory. 
We briefly introduce the credit scoring model which is an accounting-based model. Second, 
we review the development of widely used which are structural models and reduced form 
model. The structural-form models are developed in many ways, such as stochastic process, 
term structure and credit spread etc. However, structural-form models still face difficulties 
in estimating a firm’s market value and credit rating, which can reveal that the financial 
health of a firm is not incorporated in the structural models. In recent years, the reduced-
form models which use an exogenous Poisson random variable to determine the default 
probability is becoming more and more popular. Reduced-form models treat default as an 
unpredicted event given by hazard process. The exogenous variable which is not dependent 
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on the value of firm’s asset makes reduce-form models more tractable than structural models. 
Then, we provide a comprehensive review of recent developed reduced-form model in multi-
periods forecasting. Lastly, we discuss copula-based models in joint default risk modelling. 
The second chapter of this thesis is to assess the credit risk of China’s public listed firms. 
The research is based on the unique default dataset of Chinese public firms from 1999 to 
2013 which is provided by Risk Management Institute (RMI) of National University of 
Singapore (NUS). In order to explore the determinants of firm failure using both firm-
specific and macroeconomic covariates, we apply the binomial multivariate logit model as 
the benchmark model which takes default and non-default into account (i.e. after a firm 
default, the rest data of the firm will be discarded). Since in China’s market, most firms 
survive after the default, we consider three states (default, post-default and tranquil) of firms 
to include as much information as possible (post-default data will remain in the sample). The 
test shows a significant difference of firm-specific data between post-default and tranquil 
times. In the following, the multinomial logit model is selected to assessing firm’s default 
probability. The estimation results suggest that both binomial and multivariate logit models 
outperform the KMV structural model. Some results are surprisingly different from the US 
market: for example, some traditional determinants like profitability and market / book value 
are not significant in China. In addition, unlike the US market, firms in China holding more 
liquid assets are more likely to default. In addition, we find ST may not be a good default 
proxy. We further analyse the PD of delisted firms and the results show no clear difference 
of default probability between active firms and delisted firms in recent years. 
The third chapter investigates the linkage between the insurance and financial sectors 
based on the default probability for individual firms. Time-varying symmetric correlations 
between these two sectors are found for both short-term (1-month to 12-month) and long-
term horizons (24-month to 60-month). We estimate the time-varying symmetric 
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correlations by student’s t GAS copula correlations with skewed t distribution. The negative 
correlation is found in the 1-month horizon. Short-term correlations are relatively lower but 
more fluctuating while the long-term correlations suggest that insurance and financial firms 
are positively correlated. In addition, we find economic drivers of the movement of insurance 
and finance industries by regressing the copula correlations with macroeconomic variables.  
In general, short-term correlations (from 1-month to 12-month horizon) are more likely 
driven by economic factors like credit index, VIX, interest rate level, yield curve slope, TED 
spread, crude oil, and index return. Long-term correlations (from 24-month to 60-month) are 
less sensitive to market conditions. Our results suggest they are only affected by interest rate 
level, yield curve slope, and market volatility (except for 60-month). Lastly, we simulate the 
joint default probability for the two sectors by using the cupula correlations. The joint PD 
between these two sectors are very sensitive to global financial market events, such as 1997 
Asia crisis, 1998 Argentine and Russian financial crises, 2000 Dotcom bubble, 2008 global 
financial crisis, 2010 European debt crisis, and 2011 S&P downgrading of US sovereign 
debt ratings. 
The forth chapter analyses the credit risk of general insurance (GI) firms in the UK using 
a unique dataset. By using the reduced form model to estimate the credit risk of GI firms, 
we consider both insolvency and other exits such as transferring business. Our results show 
that most classic risk factors (for example, profitability, leverage and reinsurance etc.) are 
significant for assessing insurers’ credit risk. In addition, we find that insurance firms are 
exposed to some common factors and new firm-specific risk factors such as usage of 
financial derivatives and investment profitability.  We also show that macroeconomic factors 
(GDP growth, interest rate, whole sale price and credit provided by financial institutions) 
and firm-specific factors (underwriting profit, leverage, growth premium written, 
reinsurance, incurred claims, excess capital, combined ratio, investment profit, usage of 
derivatives and organizational form) are also crucial for assessing the credit risk of General 
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Insurance firms. Further, we investigate the credit risk of firms with different business lines. 
The time-varying estimates of PD could be used as an early warning for risky sectors to 
which regulators might want to apply more stringent minimum capital requirements. We 
also look at the default correlation between different insurance firms and find the correlation 
is low, but there is a default clustering for GI firms. In addition, we study the relationship 
between reinsurance levels and the credit risk of insurance firms. The results show that 
reinsurers can benefit from reinsurance contracts that have a lower default probability. This 
has implications for regulators of GI firms under the new Solvency II regulations which 
incorporate reinsurance into the standard technical provision calculations. 
The empirical findings in this thesis have important implications for both investors and 
policy-makers for the credit risk management. However, some challenges are still left for 
future research. First, the modelling of default probability is well studied, but the study is 
based on large datasets which include firm-specific variables, macroeconomic variables, and 
most importantly, the default data. The default probability modelling of small and new 
markets which lack actual default events is a very difficult but interesting topic.  Second, in 
the thesis, we study the determinants of credit risk of China’s market, and the results show 
that ST may not be a good default proxy. Given the fact that many mergers and acquisitions 
happened within ST firms, the determinants of ST firms in China’s market is not very clear 
and it would be worthwhile to explore that in future. Third, we investigate the dynamic 
correlation between insurance firms and other financial institutions in the US market using 
the copula method. The other joint movements among financial entities is interesting: for 
example, the correlation between banks and hedge funds. Finally, there are many unexplored 
areas of credit risk management in the insurance industry. The possible extension may 
include the insurance firms’ capital structure before and after Solvency II and how 
reinsurance and derivatives trading affect the creditworthiness of insurance firms. 
